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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1564.006: Run Virtual Instance

Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance.[1] Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.[2]

Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V), deploy lightweight emulators (ex: QEMU), or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries).[3] After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.[4]

Threat actors may also leverage temporary virtualized environments such as the Windows Sandbox, which supports the use of `.wsb` configuration files for defining execution parameters. For example, the `` property supports the creation of a shared folder, while the `` property allows the specification of a payload.[5][6][7]

In VMWare environments, adversaries may leverage the vCenter console to create new virtual machines. However, they may also create virtual machines directly on ESXi servers by running a valid `.vmx` file with the `/bin/vmx` utility. Adding this command to `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` (i.e., RC Scripts) will cause the VM to persistently restart.[8] Creating a VM this way prevents it from appearing in the vCenter console or in the output to the `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms` command on the ESXi server, thereby hiding it from typical administrative activities.[9]

EnterpriseT1564.006Sub-techniqueObject v2.0Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1564.006: Run Virtual Instance describes Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance.(Citation: CyberCX Akira Ransomware) Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex...

Executive priority

T1564.006: Run Virtual Instance is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1564.006: Run Virtual Instance by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (stealth), supported platforms (ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1564.006: Run Virtual Instance appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Run Virtual Instance

Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance.[1] Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.[2]

Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V), deploy lightweight emulators (ex: QEMU), or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries).[3] After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.[4]

Threat actors may also leverage temporary virtualized environments such as the Windows Sandbox, which supports the use of `.wsb` configuration files for defining execution parameters. For example, the `` property supports the creation of a shared folder, while the `` property allows the specification of a payload.[5][6][7]

In VMWare environments, adversaries may leverage the vCenter console to create new virtual machines. However, they may also create virtual machines directly on ESXi servers by running a valid `.vmx` file with the `/bin/vmx` utility. Adding this command to `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` (i.e., RC Scripts) will cause the VM to persistently restart.[8] Creating a VM this way prevents it from appearing in the vCenter console or in the output to the `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms` command on the ESXi server, thereby hiding it from typical administrative activities.[9]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1564Hide ArtifactsThis object subtechnique of Hide Artifacts.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0449: Maze

Maze ransomware, previously known as "ChaCha", was discovered in May 2019. In addition to encrypting files on victim machines for impact, Maze operators conduct information stealing campaigns prior to encryption and post the information online to extort affected companies.[1][2][3]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0451: LoudMiner

LoudMiner is a cryptocurrency miner which uses virtualization software to siphon system resources. The miner has been bundled with pirated copies of Virtual Studio Technology (VST) for Windows and macOS.[1]

macOSWindows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

mitigates · MitigationM1038: Execution PreventionEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1047: AuditEnterprisemitigates · MitigationM1042: Disable or Remove Feature or ProgramEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0481: Ragnar LockerEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0449: MazeEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0451: LoudMinerEnterprisesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1564: Hide ArtifactsEnterprisedetects · Detection StrategyDET0321: Detection Strategy for Hidden Virtual Instance ExecutionEnterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

MitigationEnterprise

M1038: Execution Prevention

Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Application Control:

- Use Case: Use tools like AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create whitelists of authorized applications and block unauthorized ones. On Linux, use tools like SELinux or AppArmor to define mandatory access control policies for application execution. - Implementation: Allow only digitally signed or pre-approved applications to execute on servers and endpoints. (e.g., `New-AppLockerPolicy -PolicyType Enforced -FilePath "C:\Policies\AppLocker.xml"`)

Script Blocking:

- Use Case: Use script control mechanisms to block unauthorized execution of scripts, such as PowerShell or JavaScript. Web Browsers: Use browser extensions or settings to block JavaScript execution from untrusted sources. - Implementation: Configure PowerShell to enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-administrator users. (e.g., `Set-ExecutionPolicy AllSigned`)

Executable Blocking:

- Use Case: Prevent execution of binaries from suspicious locations, such as `%TEMP%` or `%APPDATA%` directories. - Implementation: Block execution of `.exe`, `.bat`, or `.ps1` files from user-writable directories.

Dynamic Analysis Prevention: - Use Case: Use behavior-based execution prevention tools to identify and block malicious activity in real time. - Implemenation: Employ EDR solutions that analyze runtime behavior and block suspicious code execution.

MitigationEnterprise

M1047: Audit

Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures.

Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

System Audit:

- Use Case: Regularly assess system configurations to ensure compliance with organizational security policies. - Implementation: Use tools to scan for deviations from established benchmarks.

Permission Audits:

- Use Case: Review file and folder permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access or privilege escalation. - Implementation: Run access reviews to identify users or groups with excessive permissions.

Software Audits:

- Use Case: Identify outdated, unsupported, or insecure software that could serve as an attack vector. - Implementation: Use inventory and vulnerability scanning tools to detect outdated versions and recommend secure alternatives.

Configuration Audits:

- Use Case: Evaluate system and network configurations to ensure secure settings (e.g., disabled SMBv1, enabled MFA). - Implementation: Implement automated configuration scanning tools like SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) to identify non-compliant systems.

Network Audits:

- Use Case: Examine network traffic, firewall rules, and endpoint communications to identify unauthorized or insecure connections. - Implementation: Utilize tools such as Wireshark, or Zeek to monitor and log suspicious network behavior.

MitigationEnterprise

M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Remove Legacy Software:

- Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash). - Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date.

Disable Unused Features:

- Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required. - Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue.

Control Applications Installed by Users:

- Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools. - Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment.

Remove Unnecessary Services:

- Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices. - Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations.

Restrict Add-ons and Plugins:

- Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes. - Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
ea1afa95b970e6c4...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.0Current bundleea1afa95b970…
19.12.0Older bundleea1afa95b970…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    CyberCX Akira Ransomware

    CyberCX. (2023, September 15). Weaponising VMs to bypass EDR – Akira ransomware. Retrieved April 4, 2025.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    SingHealth Breach Jan 2019

    Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth. (2019, January 10). Public Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on Singapore Health Services Private Limited's Patient Database. Retrieved June 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Securonix CronTrap 2024

    Den Iuzvyk and Tim Peck. (2024, November 4). CRON#TRAP: Emulated Linux Environments as the Latest Tactic in Malware Staging. Retrieved May 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Sophos Ragnar May 2020

    SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    ESET MirrorFace 2025

    Dominik Breitenbacher. (2025, March 18). Operation AkaiRyū: MirrorFace invites Europe to Expo 2025 and revives ANEL backdoor. Retrieved May 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    ITOCHU Hack the Sandbox

    ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence Inc.. (2025, March 12). Hack The Sandbox: Unveiling the Truth Behind Disappearing Artifacts. Retrieved November 5, 2025.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    ITOCHU Sandbox PPT

    ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence Inc.. (n.d.). Hack The Sandbox: Unveiling the Truth Behind Disappearing Artifacts. Retrieved November 5, 2025.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    vNinja Rogue VMs 2024

    Christian Mohn. (2024, November 11). Beware Of The Rogue VMs!. Retrieved March 26, 2025.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    MITRE VMware Abuse 2024

    Lex Crumpton. (2024, May 22). Infiltrating Defenses: Abusing VMware in MITRE’s Cyber Intrusion. Retrieved March 26, 2025.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    mitre-attackT1564.006
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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