T1564.009: Resource Forking

Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.[1] Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.[2][3]

Adversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.[4][5]

EnterpriseT1564.009Sub-techniqueObject v2.0ModifiedMay 12, 2026, 15:12 UTC (UTC+00:00)

T1564.009: Resource Forking describes Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application ...

Executive priority

T1564.009: Resource Forking is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1564.009: Resource Forking by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (stealth), supported platforms (macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether T1564.009: Resource Forking appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Resource Forking

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques1 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1564	Hide Artifacts	This object subtechnique of Hide Artifacts.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

S0276: Keydnap

This piece of malware steals the content of the user's keychain while maintaining a permanent backdoor [1].

macOS

S0402: OSX/Shlayer

OSX/Shlayer is a Trojan designed to install adware on macOS that was first discovered in 2018.[1][2]

macOS

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

mitigates · MitigationM1013: Application Developer GuidanceEnterprise uses · MalwareS0276: KeydnapEnterprise uses · MalwareS0402: OSX/ShlayerEnterprise subtechnique of · TechniqueT1564: Hide ArtifactsEnterprise detects · Detection StrategyDET0584: Detection Strategy for Resource Forking on macOSEnterprise

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

M1013: Application Developer Guidance

Application Developer Guidance focuses on providing developers with the knowledge, tools, and best practices needed to write secure code, reduce vulnerabilities, and implement secure design principles. By integrating security throughout the software development lifecycle (SDLC), this mitigation aims to prevent the introduction of exploitable weaknesses in applications, systems, and APIs. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Preventing SQL Injection (Secure Coding Practice):

- Implementation: Train developers to use parameterized queries or prepared statements instead of directly embedding user input into SQL queries. - Use Case: A web application accepts user input to search a database. By sanitizing and validating user inputs, developers can prevent attackers from injecting malicious SQL commands.

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Mitigation:

- Implementation: Require developers to implement output encoding for all user-generated content displayed on a web page. - Use Case: An e-commerce site allows users to leave product reviews. Properly encoding and escaping user inputs prevents malicious scripts from being executed in other users’ browsers.

Secure API Design:

- Implementation: Train developers to authenticate all API endpoints and avoid exposing sensitive information in API responses. - Use Case: A mobile banking application uses APIs for account management. By enforcing token-based authentication for every API call, developers reduce the risk of unauthorized access.

Static Code Analysis in the Build Pipeline:

- Implementation: Incorporate tools into CI/CD pipelines to automatically scan for vulnerabilities during the build process. - Use Case: A fintech company integrates static analysis tools to detect hardcoded credentials in their source code before deployment.

Threat Modeling in the Design Phase:

- Implementation: Use frameworks like STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) to assess threats during application design. - Use Case: Before launching a customer portal, a SaaS company identifies potential abuse cases, such as session hijacking, and designs mitigations like secure session management.

**Tools for Implementation**:

- Static Code Analysis Tools: Use tools that can scan for known vulnerabilities in source code. - Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST): Use tools like Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP to simulate runtime attacks and identify vulnerabilities. - Secure Frameworks: Recommend secure-by-default frameworks (e.g., Django for Python, Spring Security for Java) that enforce security best practices.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 2.0
Created: Oct 12, 2021, 20:02 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: May 12, 2026, 15:12 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: dc18214de00e3bb6...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	2.0	May 12, 2026, 15:12 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`dc18214de00e…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	2.0	May 12, 2026, 15:12 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`dc18214de00e…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
macOS Hierarchical File System Overview
Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
[2]
Resource and Data Forks
Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
Open source URL
[3]
ELC Extended Attributes
Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There's more to files than data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
Open source URL
[4]
sentinellabs resource named fork 2020
Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
Open source URL
[5]
tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020
Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
Open source URL
[6]
mitre-attackT1564.009
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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