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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S9025: NOOPLDR

NOOPLDR is a shellcode loader with XML/C# and DLL versions that has been used by MirrorFace to load HiddenFace.[1]

EnterpriseS9025MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

NOOPLDR matters because it is described by ATT&CK as a Windows shellcode loader, with XML/C# and DLL versions, used by MirrorFace to load HiddenFace. For leaders, the decision point is not just the malware name; it is whether Windows endpoint monitoring can see trusted-tool abuse, DLL activity, process injection, registry changes, decoding/deobfuscation, and cleanup behavior before a loader enables follow-on malware.

Executive priority

Prioritize NOOPLDR as a readiness test for Windows endpoint visibility and incident response evidence retention. Its ATT&CK relationships point to stealth-heavy behaviors, including obfuscation, encoded files, junk code, process injection, file deletion, registry modification, MSBuild abuse, and DLL abuse. Executives should ask whether SOC and IR teams can reconstruct loader activity when artifacts are hidden or deleted, and whether controls around developer/build utilities and DLL loading are governed outside developer workstations.

Technical view

Validate coverage on Windows hosts for the linked behaviors: T1127.001 MSBuild execution of XML/C# content, T1574.001 DLL abuse, T1055 process injection, T1112 registry modification, T1106 native API use, T1140 decoding/deobfuscation, T1070.004 file deletion, T1082 system information discovery, and T1027/T1027.013/T1027.016 obfuscation patterns. Treat MirrorFace and HiddenFace relationships as context for threat-informed hunting, not as proof of local exposure.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows process creation and command-line telemetry, especially MSBuild.exe and unusual parent/child process chains
  • Endpoint file creation, modification, deletion, and rename events for XML, C#/build artifacts, DLLs, and encoded or obfuscated payload-like files
  • DLL load telemetry and image/module load context
  • Registry write/change telemetry, including user and administrative hives where available
  • EDR or host telemetry for process injection, cross-process memory access, and suspicious native API-related behavior

Detection direction

  • Confirm whether MSBuild use is baselined by host role; developer systems may generate noise, while MSBuild execution on non-build endpoints should receive higher scrutiny.
  • Hunt for combinations rather than single indicators: MSBuild or DLL activity followed by decoding, registry modification, injection-like behavior, and file deletion is more meaningful than any one event alone.
  • Tune for obfuscation-resistant evidence: encoded content, junk-code-heavy samples, and deleted files can weaken static signatures, so endpoint behavioral telemetry and retained forensic artifacts are important.
  • Review DLL search/load context for unusual locations or unexpected processes, without assuming all DLL loads are malicious.
  • Correlate registry modifications with nearby process execution and file activity to separate administrative change from suspicious persistence or evasion behavior.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with visibility: ensure Windows endpoint logging and EDR retention cover process, file, registry, DLL/module load, and injection-relevant events.
  • Reduce unnecessary exposure of trusted execution utilities by governing where MSBuild is installed, expected, or allowed to execute outside developer/build environments.
  • Apply least privilege for users and administrators to limit registry modification and execution paths that require elevated access.
  • Use application control or execution policy approaches where appropriate to restrict unexpected DLL, build-file, or loader execution patterns.
  • Prepare IR playbooks for stealthy loader cases, including rapid collection before file deletion and triage of decoded/deobfuscated payload artifacts.
Additional notes and limits

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for NOOPLDR, so this take is derived from the official description, the Windows platform field, the cited Trend Micro external reference, and the supplied technique relationships. The most defensible use is as a threat-informed validation case for Windows loader behavior rather than as a standalone indicator set.

The supplied ATT&CK object does not include indicators, hashes, command lines, infrastructure, procedure examples, or explicit detection analytics. Tactics are not specified for the malware object. Local environment baselines are required to distinguish legitimate MSBuild, DLL, registry, and system discovery activity from suspicious behavior.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

NOOPLDR

NOOPLDR is a shellcode loader with XML/C# and DLL versions that has been used by MirrorFace to load HiddenFace.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

12 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

NOOPLDR can inject decrypted payloads into processes including wuauclt.exe., rdrleakdiag.exe, and tabcal.exe.[1]

EnterpriseT1127.001MSBuildSub-technique

NOOPLDR can be executed via MSBuild.[2]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

NOOPLDR can decrypt its payload prior to execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

The NOOPLDR payload is encrypted with AES256-CBC.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

NOOPLDR can delete a file containing configuration instructions after use.[1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

NOOPLDR can use control flow flattening to help hide malicious code.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

NOOPLDR can use native APIs `NtProtectVirtualMemory`, `NtWriteVirtualMemory`, and `NtCreateThreadEx` to aid process injection.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

NOOPLDR can store its payload in the Registry using a random hex string in `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\COM3`.[1]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

NOOPLDR can be executed via sideloading.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1564Hide Artifacts

NOOPLDR can hide services used to aid execution.[2]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

NOOPLDR can discover the device ID and hostname from the targeted machine to use for encryption keys.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.016Junk Code InsertionSub-technique

NOOPLDR can insert junk code to obfuscate malicious payloads.[1][2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1054: MirrorFace

MirrorFace is a People's Republic of China (PRC)-aligned cyberespionage actor believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella based on targeting, tools, and infrastructure overlaps. MirrorFace has been active since at least 2019, at first exclusively targeting Japanese organizations across the media, defense, diplomatic, financial, manufacturing, and academic sectors. Subsequent MirrorFace operations included targets in Central Europe and featured use of LODEINFO, HiddenFace, and UPPERCUT malware.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1055: Process InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1127.001: MSBuildEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1574.001: DLLEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1564: Hide ArtifactsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · GroupG1054: MirrorFaceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.016: Junk Code InsertionEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
42f31bdc5a9a2eaa...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.0Current bundle42f31bdc5a9a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    JPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024

    Tomonaga, S. (2024, July 16). MirrorFace Attack against Japanese Organisations. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    mitre-attackS9025
    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS9025
    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS9025
    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    JPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024

    Tomonaga, S. (2024, July 16). MirrorFace Attack against Japanese Organisations. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    JPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024

    Tomonaga, S. (2024, July 16). MirrorFace Attack against Japanese Organisations. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    JPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024

    Tomonaga, S. (2024, July 16). MirrorFace Attack against Japanese Organisations. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    JPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024

    Tomonaga, S. (2024, July 16). MirrorFace Attack against Japanese Organisations. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    JPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024

    Tomonaga, S. (2024, July 16). MirrorFace Attack against Japanese Organisations. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    JPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024

    Tomonaga, S. (2024, July 16). MirrorFace Attack against Japanese Organisations. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    JPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024

    Tomonaga, S. (2024, July 16). MirrorFace Attack against Japanese Organisations. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    JPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024

    Tomonaga, S. (2024, July 16). MirrorFace Attack against Japanese Organisations. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024

    Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
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