S9025: NOOPLDR
NOOPLDR is a shellcode loader with XML/C# and DLL versions that has been used by MirrorFace to load HiddenFace.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S9025: NOOPLDR describes [NOOPLDR](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9025) is a shellcode loader with XML/C# and DLL versions that has been used by [MirrorFace](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1054) to load [HiddenFace](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9023).(Citation: Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024)
Executive priority
S9025: NOOPLDR is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S9025: NOOPLDR by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S9025: NOOPLDR appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
NOOPLDR
NOOPLDR is a shellcode loader with XML/C# and DLL versions that has been used by MirrorFace to load HiddenFace.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1564 | Hide Artifacts | NOOPLDR can hide services used to aid execution.CitationJPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1027.016 | Junk Code InsertionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1127.001 | MSBuildSub-technique | NOOPLDR can be executed via MSBuild.CitationJPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1054: MirrorFace
MirrorFace is a People's Republic of China (PRC)-aligned cyberespionage actor believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella based on targeting, tools, and infrastructure overlaps. MirrorFace has been active since at least 2019, at first exclusively targeting Japanese organizations across the media, defense, diplomatic, financial, manufacturing, and academic sectors. Subsequent MirrorFace operations included targets in Central Europe and featured use of LODEINFO, HiddenFace, and UPPERCUT malware.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 42f31bdc5a9a… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 42f31bdc5a9a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024
Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS9025Open source URL
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