S1169: Mango

Mango is a first-stage backdoor written in C#/.NET that was used by OilRig during the Juicy Mix campaign. Mango is the successor to Solar and includes additional exfiltration capabilities, the use of native APIs, and added detection evasion code.[1]

EnterpriseS1169MalwareObject v1.0ModifiedNov 25, 2024, 22:08 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S1169: Mango describes [Mango](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1169) is a first-stage backdoor written in C#/.NET that was used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) during the [Juicy Mix](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0044) campaign. [Mango](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1169) is the successor to [Solar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1166) and includes additional exfiltration capabilities, the use of native APIs, and added detection evasion code.(Citation: ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023)

Executive priority

S1169: Mango is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1169: Mango by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S1169: Mango appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Mango

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques13 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1573.001	Symmetric CryptographySub-technique	Mango can receive XOR-encrypted commands from C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	Mango can collect the machine name of a compromised system which is later used as part of a unique victim identifier.[1]
Enterprise	T1573.002	Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique	Mango can use TLS to encrypt C2 communications.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	Mango contains a series of base64 encoded substrings.[1]
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	Mango can enumerate the contents of current working or other specified directories.[1]
Enterprise	T1685	Disable or Modify Tools	Mango contains an unused capability to block endpoint security solutions from loading user-mode code hooks via a DLL in a specified process by using the `UpdateProcThreadAttribute API` to set the `PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_MITIGATION_POLICY` to `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON` for an identified process. [1]
Enterprise	T1204.002	Malicious FileSub-technique	Mango has been executed through a Microsoft Word document with a malicious macro.[1]
Enterprise	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Mango can use its HTTP C2 channel for exfiltration.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Mango can retrieve C2 commands sent in HTTP responses.[1]
Enterprise	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	Mango can collect the user name from a compromised system which is used to create a unique victim identifier.[1]
Enterprise	T1132.001	Standard EncodingSub-technique	Mango can receive Base64-encoded commands from C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	Mango has the ability to use Native APIs.[1]
Enterprise	T1053.005	Scheduled TaskSub-technique	Mango can create a scheduled task to run every 32 seconds to communicate with C2 and execute received commands.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0049: OilRig

OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

C0044: Juicy Mix

Juicy Mix was a campaign conducted by OilRig throughout 2022 that targeted Israeli organizations with the Mango backdoor.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Nov 25, 2024, 22:02 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Nov 25, 2024, 22:08 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 0b927fdd84afc800...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Nov 25, 2024, 22:08 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`0b927fdd84af…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Nov 25, 2024, 22:08 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`0b927fdd84af…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023
Hromcova, Z. and Burgher, A. (2023, September 21). OilRig’s Outer Space and Juicy Mix: Same ol’ rig, new drill pipes. Retrieved November 21, 2024.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS1169
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use