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MITRE ATT&CK® Campaign

C0018: C0018

C0018 was a month-long ransomware intrusion that successfully deployed AvosLocker onto a compromised network. The unidentified actors gained initial access to the victim network through an exposed server and used a variety of open-source tools prior to executing AvosLocker.[1][2]

EnterpriseC0018CampaignObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

C0018: C0018 describes [C0018](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0018) was a month-long ransomware intrusion that successfully deployed [AvosLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1053) onto a compromised network. The unidentified actors gained initial access to the victim network through an exposed server and used a variety of open-source tools prior to executing [AvosLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1053).(Citation: Costa AvosLocker May 2022)(Citation: Cisco Talos Avos Jun 2022)

Executive priority

C0018: C0018 is an official MITRE ATT&CK campaign. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate C0018: C0018 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether C0018: C0018 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

C0018

C0018 was a month-long ransomware intrusion that successfully deployed AvosLocker onto a compromised network. The unidentified actors gained initial access to the victim network through an exposed server and used a variety of open-source tools prior to executing AvosLocker.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

19 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

During C0018, the threat actors exploited VMWare Horizon Unified Access Gateways that were vulnerable to several Log4Shell vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-45105, and CVE-2021-44832.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

For C0018, the threat actors renamed a Sliver payload to `vmware_kb.exe`.[2]

EnterpriseT1571Non-Standard Port

During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892, to establish RDP connections.[1]

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique

During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports to establish RDP connections, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892.[1]

EnterpriseT1219.002Remote Desktop SoftwareSub-technique

During C0018, the threat actors used AnyDesk to transfer tools between systems.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1570Lateral Tool Transfer

During C0018, the threat actors transferred the SoftPerfect Network Scanner and other tools to machines in the network using AnyDesk and PDQ Deploy.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

During C0018, the threat actors collected `whoami` information via PowerShell scripts.[1]

EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

During C0018, the threat actors used AvosLocker ransomware to encrypt files on the compromised network.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1046Network Service Discovery

During C0018, the threat actors used the SoftPerfect Network Scanner for network scanning.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

During C0018, the threat actors used encoded PowerShell scripts for execution.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1027.010Command ObfuscationSub-technique

During C0018, the threat actors used Base64 to encode their PowerShell scripts.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

During C0018, the threat actors ran `nslookup` and Advanced IP Scanner on the target network.[1]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

For C0018, the threat actors acquired a variety of open source tools, including Mimikatz, Sliver, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, AnyDesk, and PDQ Deploy.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

During C0018, the threat actors used HTTP for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1072Software Deployment Tools

During C0018, the threat actors used PDQ Deploy to move AvosLocker and tools across the network.[2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

During C0018, the threat actors downloaded additional tools, such as Mimikatz and Sliver, as well as Cobalt Strike and AvosLocker ransomware onto the victim network.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1036Masquerading

During C0018, AvosLocker was disguised using the victim company name as the filename.[2]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

During C0018, the threat actors used WMIC to modify administrative settings on both a local and a remote host, likely as part of the first stages for their lateral movement; they also used WMI Provider Host (`wmiprvse.exe`) to execute a variety of encoded PowerShell scripts using the `DownloadString` method.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

During C0018, the threat actors used `rundll32` to run Mimikatz.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0633: Sliver

Sliver is an open source, cross-platform, red team command and control (C2) framework written in Golang. Sliver includes its own package manager, "armory," for staging and downloading additional tools and payloads to the primary C2 framework.[1][2]

WindowsLinuxmacOS
ToolEnterprise

S0108: netsh

netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems. [1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0097: Ping

Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections. [1]

MalwareEnterprise

S1053: AvosLocker

AvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.[1][2][3]

LinuxWindows
ToolEnterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0154: Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · ToolS0633: SliverEnterpriseuses · ToolS0108: netshEnterpriseuses · ToolS0097: PingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1190: Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1571: Non-Standard PortEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1021.001: Remote Desktop ProtocolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1219.002: Remote Desktop SoftwareEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1570: Lateral Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · MalwareS1053: AvosLockerEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1486: Data Encrypted for ImpactEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1046: Network Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · ToolS0002: MimikatzEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.010: Command ObfuscationEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0154: Cobalt StrikeEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1588.002: ToolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1072: Software Deployment ToolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036: MasqueradingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
2f9c329aaa796a11...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle2f9c329aaa79…
19.11.0Older bundleb8aa3fa0dcc0…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Costa AvosLocker May 2022

    Costa, F. (2022, May 1). RaaS AvosLocker Incident Response Analysis. Retrieved January 11, 2023.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Cisco Talos Avos Jun 2022

    Venere, G. Neal, C. (2022, June 21). Avos ransomware group expands with new attack arsenal. Retrieved January 11, 2023.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackC0018
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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