LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0596: ShadowPad

MITRE ATT&CK S0596: ShadowPad Malware details for Windows, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.

EnterpriseS0596MalwareObject v1.3Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0596: ShadowPad describes [ShadowPad](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0596) is a modular backdoor that was first identified in a supply chain compromise of the NetSarang software in mid-July 2017. The malware was originally thought to be exclusively used by [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096), but has since been observed to be used by various Chinese threat activity groups. (Citation: Recorded Future RedEcho Feb 2021)(Citation: Securelist ShadowPad Aug 2017)(Citation: Kaspersky ShadowPad Aug 2017)

Executive priority

S0596: ShadowPad is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0596: ShadowPad by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0596: ShadowPad appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

ShadowPad

No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

21 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User DiscoveryThis object uses System Owner/User Discovery.
EnterpriseT1112Modify RegistryThis object uses Modify Registry.
EnterpriseT1124System Time DiscoveryThis object uses System Time Discovery.
EnterpriseT1070Indicator RemovalThis object uses Indicator Removal.
EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationThis object uses Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information.
EnterpriseT1027.011Fileless StorageSub-techniqueThis object uses Fileless Storage.
EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryThis object uses System Network Configuration Discovery.
EnterpriseT1029Scheduled TransferThis object uses Scheduled Transfer.
EnterpriseT1057Process DiscoveryThis object uses Process Discovery.
EnterpriseT1071.004DNSSub-techniqueThis object uses DNS.
EnterpriseT1132.002Non-Standard EncodingSub-techniqueThis object uses Non-Standard Encoding.
EnterpriseT1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsSub-techniqueThis object uses File Transfer Protocols.
EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolThis object uses Non-Application Layer Protocol.
EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or InformationThis object uses Obfuscated Files or Information.
EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-techniqueThis object uses Web Protocols.
EnterpriseT1055Process InjectionThis object uses Process Injection.
EnterpriseT1082System Information DiscoveryThis object uses System Information Discovery.
EnterpriseT1680Local Storage DiscoveryThis object uses Local Storage Discovery.
EnterpriseT1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsSub-techniqueThis object uses Domain Generation Algorithms.
EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool TransferThis object uses Ingress Tool Transfer.
EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-techniqueThis object uses Dynamic-link Library Injection.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0096: APT41

APT41 is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, APT41 has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries.[1] Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and Winnti Group.[2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G1042: RedEcho

RedEcho is a People’s Republic of China-related threat actor associated with long-running intrusions in Indian critical infrastructure entities. RedEcho overlaps with various other PRC-linked threat groups, such as APT41, and is linked to ShadowPad malware use through shared infrastructure.[1][2]

GroupEnterprise

G0129: Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

GroupEnterprise

G0081: Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G0143: Aquatic Panda

Aquatic Panda is a suspected China-based threat group with a dual mission of intelligence collection and industrial espionage. Active since at least May 2020, Aquatic Panda has primarily targeted entities in the telecommunications, technology, and government sectors.[1]

GroupEnterprise

G0060: BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G0131: Tonto Team

Tonto Team is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States since at least 2009; by 2020 they expanded operations to include other Asian as well as Eastern European countries. Tonto Team has targeted government, military, energy, mining, financial, education, healthcare, and technology organizations, including through the Heartbeat Campaign (2009-2012) and Operation Bitter Biscuit (2017).[1][2][3][4][5][6]

GroupEnterprise

G1006: Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca is a suspected China-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least April 2019. Earth Lusca has targeted organizations in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Germany, France, and the United States. Targets included government institutions, news media outlets, gambling companies, educational institutions, COVID-19 research organizations, telecommunications companies, religious movements banned in China, and cryptocurrency trading platforms; security researchers assess some Earth Lusca operations may be financially motivated.[1]

Earth Lusca has used malware commonly used by other Chinese threat groups, including APT41 and the Winnti Group cluster, however security researchers assess Earth Lusca's techniques and infrastructure are separate.[1]

CampaignEnterprise

C0043: Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions

Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions is a sequence of intrusions from 2021 through early 2022 linked to People’s Republic of China (PRC) threat actors, particularly RedEcho and Threat Activity Group 38 (TAG38). The intrusions appear focused on IT system breach in Indian electric utility entities and logistics firms, as well as potentially managed service providers operating within India. Although focused on OT-operating entities, there is no evidence this campaign was able to progress beyond IT breach and information gathering to OT environment access.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d8ce46c5a7bbd4fd...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundled8ce46c5a7bb…
19.11.3Older bundled8ce46c5a7bb…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Recorded Future RedEcho Feb 2021

    Insikt Group. (2021, February 28). China-Linked Group RedEcho Targets the Indian Power Sector Amid Heightened Border Tensions. Retrieved March 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Securelist ShadowPad Aug 2017

    GReAT. (2017, August 15). ShadowPad in corporate networks. Retrieved March 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Kaspersky ShadowPad Aug 2017

    Kaspersky Lab. (2017, August). ShadowPad: popular server management software hit in supply chain attack. Retrieved March 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    FireEye APT41 Aug 2019

    Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    POISONPLUG.SHADOW

    (Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)

  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS0596
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.