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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1247: Embargo

Embargo is a ransomware variant written in Rust that has been active since at least May 2024.[1][2] Embargo ransomware operations are associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid.[1][2] Embargo ransomware has been known to be delivered through a loader known as MDeployer which also leverages a malware component known as MS4Killer that facilitates termination of processes operating on the victim hosts.[2] Embargo is also reportedly a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS).[2]

EnterpriseS1247MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

Embargo matters because ATT&CK describes it as a Rust-based ransomware variant associated with double extortion: data theft before encryption and threats to publish files. Its listed platform scope spans Windows, Linux, and ESXi, which makes it relevant to both endpoint and virtualization recovery planning. For leaders, the key decision value is not only “can we detect ransomware,” but whether the organization can see discovery, persistence, service/process disruption, recovery inhibition, and encryption behaviors early enough to contain business interruption.

Executive priority

Treat Embargo as a ransomware resilience validation case. Confirm that incident response, backup recovery, privileged access controls, and monitoring cover Windows servers, Linux systems, and ESXi where applicable. Because ATT&CK links Embargo to double extortion and financial theft, executives should ask whether legal, communications, cyber insurance, and evidence-preservation processes are ready for both encryption and data-exposure decisions. Budget priority should favor controls that reduce ransomware blast radius: hardened administrative access, recoverable backups, service/process change visibility, and tested response procedures.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for Embargo, so defenders should build coverage from the listed relationships. Validate telemetry and analytics for discovery activity such as process, service, file/directory, and network share enumeration; Windows execution and persistence through command shell, scheduled tasks, services, service execution, Registry modification, and Run keys; stealth and defense impairment such as encoded files, decoding activity, file deletion, mutex-based execution constraints, selective exclusion, and Safe Mode boot abuse; and impact behaviors including service stop, recovery inhibition, data encryption, and financial extortion context. The description also notes delivery through MDeployer and use of MS4Killer to facilitate process termination, so IR playbooks should treat suspicious mass process/service termination as a high-priority ransomware precursor when paired with discovery or encryption signals.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry on Windows and Linux
  • Windows Event Log data for scheduled tasks, services, Registry changes, Run keys, Safe Mode boot configuration, and service control activity
  • Linux and ESXi host logs showing process enumeration, file traversal, service changes, and recovery-related changes
  • File system telemetry for high-volume file modification, encryption-like rename/write patterns, file deletion, and exclusion patterns
  • Network share access and enumeration logs, especially SMB share discovery on Windows environments

Detection direction

  • Because MITRE does not provide an Embargo-specific detection recommendation, prioritize behavior-based detections mapped to the related ATT&CK techniques rather than relying on malware names alone.
  • Correlate discovery activity with subsequent service/process termination, persistence creation, recovery inhibition, and high-volume file encryption; isolated administrative discovery commands may be benign, but clustered sequences should raise priority.
  • Tune Windows detections around schtasks, cmd, service control, Registry modification, Run keys, and Safe Mode configuration changes, while accounting for legitimate administration and software deployment activity.
  • For ESXi and Linux, validate that host and management-plane logging can show process discovery, file/directory traversal, service stopping, recovery/snapshot tampering, and encryption-impact patterns.
  • Review blind spots around virtualization hosts, backup infrastructure, and systems where EDR does not load in Safe Mode or has limited coverage.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize resilient, tested backups and recovery paths that cannot be easily deleted or disabled from ordinary administrative accounts.
  • Harden privileged access across Windows, Linux, and ESXi, including separation of duties for backup, virtualization, and domain/server administration.
  • Restrict and monitor mechanisms commonly abused for execution and persistence, including scheduled tasks, services, service execution, command shell use, Registry Run keys, and startup locations.
  • Protect endpoint and server security controls against tampering, Safe Mode bypass scenarios, and unauthorized process/service termination.
  • Segment critical servers, virtualization management, and file shares to limit ransomware spread and reduce access to high-value data stores.
Additional notes and limits

This take is based on ATT&CK S1247 Embargo in enterprise-attack version 19.1 and its supplied relationships. ATT&CK describes Embargo as Rust-based ransomware active since at least May 2024, associated with double extortion, reportedly RaaS, and known to be delivered through MDeployer with MS4Killer facilitating process termination. Relationship context also states Storm-0501 uses this object. Defensive planning should use those facts as prioritization context and validate against local telemetry before drawing conclusions.

No official ATT&CK detection guidance, aliases, labels, or object-level tactics were provided. The related techniques give strong behavioral direction, but they do not by themselves prove Embargo activity in an environment. Platform relevance is limited to the supplied platforms: ESXi, Linux, and Windows. Local logging depth, EDR capability, backup architecture, and incident evidence are required to assess actual exposure or coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Embargo

Embargo is a ransomware variant written in Rust that has been active since at least May 2024.[1][2] Embargo ransomware operations are associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid.[1][2] Embargo ransomware has been known to be delivered through a loader known as MDeployer which also leverages a malware component known as MS4Killer that facilitates termination of processes operating on the victim hosts.[2] Embargo is also reportedly a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS).[2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

22 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1489Service Stop

Embargo has terminated active processes and services based on a hardcoded list using the `CloseServiceHandle()` function.[1] Embargo has also leveraged MS4Killer to terminate processes contained in an embedded list of security software process names that were XOR-encrypted.[2]

EnterpriseT1480.002Mutual ExclusionSub-technique

Embargo has utilized a hardcoded mutex name of “LoadUpOnGunsBringYourFriends” using the `CreateMutexW()` function.[1] Embargo has also utilized a hardcoded mutex name of “IntoTheFloodAgainSameOldTrip."[2]

EnterpriseT1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Embargo has leveraged MS4Killer to deliver a vulnerable driver to the victim device, sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).[2] Embargo has utilized the vulnerable driver probmon.sys version 3.0.0.4 which had a revoked certificated from “ITM System Co.,LTD.”[2]

EnterpriseT1657Financial Theft

Embargo has been leveraged in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, to prompt victims to pay a ransom.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Embargo has searched for folders, subfolders and other networked or mounted drives for follow on encryption actions.[1] Embargo has also iterated device volumes using `FindFirstVolumeW()` and `FindNextVolumeW()` functions and then calls the `GetVolumePathNamesForVolumeNameW()` function to retrieve a list of drive letters and mounted folder paths for each specified volume.[1]

EnterpriseT1688Safe Mode Boot

Embargo has used a DLL variant of MDeployer to disable security solutions through Safe Mode.[2]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Embargo has leveraged Windows Native API functions to execute its operations.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Embargo has utilized MS4Killer to detect running processes on the victim device.[2] Embargo has also captured a snapshot of active running processes using the Windows API `CreateToolHelp32Snapshot()`.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Embargo has modified and deleted Registry keys to add services, and to disable Security Solutions such as Windows Defender.[2]

EnterpriseT1490Inhibit System Recovery

Embargo has cleared files from the recycle bin by invoking `SHEmptyRecycleBinW()` and disabled Windows recovery through `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /q /c bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no`.[1]

EnterpriseT1679Selective Exclusion

Embargo has avoided encrypting specific files and directories by leveraging a regular expression within the ransomware binary.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Embargo has utilized MDeployer to decrypt two payloads that contain MS4Killer toolkit b.cache and the Embargo ransomware executable a.cache with a hardcoded RC4 key `wlQYLoPCil3niI7x8CvR9EtNtL/aeaHrZ23LP3fAsJogVTIzdnZ5Pi09ZVeHFkiB`.[2]

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

Embargo has searched for folders, subfolders and other networked or mounted drives for follow-on encryption actions.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Embargo has encrypted both MDeployer and MS4 Killer payloads with RC4.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Embargo has utilized a BAT script to disable security solutions.[2]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

Embargo has obtained active services running on the victim’s system through the functions `OpenSCManagerW()` and `EnumServicesStatusExW()`.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Embargo has obtained persistence of the loader MDeployer by creating a scheduled task named “Perf_sys.”[2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Embargo has leveraged MDeployer to terminate the MS4Killer process, delete the decrypted payload files and a driver file dropped by MS4killer, and reboot the system.[2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Embargo has modified the Windows Registry to start a custom service named irnagentd in Safe Mode.[2]

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

Embargo has created a service named irnagentd that executed the MDeployer loader after the system is rebooted in Safe Mode.[2]

EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

Embargo has the ability to encrypt files with the ChaCha20 and Curve25519 cryptographic algorithms.[1] Embargo also has the ability to encrypt system data and add a random six-letter extension consisting of hexadecimal characters such as ".b58eeb" or “.3d828a” to encrypted files.[2]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

Embargo has created persistence through the DLL variant of the MDeployer toolkit by creating a service called irnagentd that launches after the system is rebooted in Safe Mode.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1053: Storm-0501

Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1489: Service StopEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1480.002: Mutual ExclusionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1068: Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1657: Financial TheftEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1688: Safe Mode BootEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · GroupG1053: Storm-0501Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1490: Inhibit System RecoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1679: Selective ExclusionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1135: Network Share DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1569.002: Service ExecutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1486: Data Encrypted for ImpactEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
82ae931d79375057...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.0Current bundle82ae931d7937…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Microsoft Storm-501 Sabbath Ransomware Embargo September 2024

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, September 26). Storm-0501: Ransomware attacks expanding to hybrid cloud environments. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Microsoft Storm-0501 Embargo Ransomware August 2025

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2025, August 27). Storm-0501’s evolving techniques lead to cloud-based ransomware. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    mitre-attackS1247
    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    mitre-attackS1247
    Open source URL
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    mitre-attackS1247
    Open source URL
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    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

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    Open source URL
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    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

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    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

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    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

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    Open source URL
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    Microsoft Storm-0501 Embargo Ransomware August 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

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    Open source URL
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    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

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    Open source URL
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    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

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    Open source URL
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    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

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    Open source URL
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    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

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    Open source URL
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    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

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    Open source URL
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    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

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    Open source URL
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    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  57. [57]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  58. [58]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  59. [59]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  60. [60]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

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    Open source URL
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    Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024

    Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  62. [62]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
  63. [63]
    ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024

    Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.

    Open source URL
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