S1247: Embargo

S1247: Embargo describes [Embargo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1247) is a ransomware variant written in Rust that has been active since at least May 2024.(Citation: Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024)(Citation: ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024) [Embargo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1247) ransomware operations are associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid.(Citation: Cyble Embargo Ransom...

Executive priority

S1247: Embargo is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1247: Embargo by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (ESXi, Linux, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S1247: Embargo appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Embargo

Embargo is a ransomware variant written in Rust that has been active since at least May 2024.[1][2] Embargo ransomware operations are associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid.[1][2] Embargo ransomware has been known to be delivered through a loader known as MDeployer which also leverages a malware component known as MS4Killer that facilitates termination of processes operating on the victim hosts.[2] Embargo is also reportedly a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS).[2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques22 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1489	Service Stop	Embargo has terminated active processes and services based on a hardcoded list using the `CloseServiceHandle()` function.[1] Embargo has also leveraged MS4Killer to terminate processes contained in an embedded list of security software process names that were XOR-encrypted.[2]
Enterprise	T1480.002	Mutual ExclusionSub-technique	Embargo has utilized a hardcoded mutex name of “LoadUpOnGunsBringYourFriends” using the `CreateMutexW()` function.[1] Embargo has also utilized a hardcoded mutex name of “IntoTheFloodAgainSameOldTrip."[2]
Enterprise	T1068	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Embargo has leveraged MS4Killer to deliver a vulnerable driver to the victim device, sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).[2] Embargo has utilized the vulnerable driver probmon.sys version 3.0.0.4 which had a revoked certificated from “ITM System Co.,LTD.”[2]
Enterprise	T1657	Financial Theft	Embargo has been leveraged in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, to prompt victims to pay a ransom.[1][2]
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	Embargo has searched for folders, subfolders and other networked or mounted drives for follow on encryption actions.[1] Embargo has also iterated device volumes using `FindFirstVolumeW()` and `FindNextVolumeW()` functions and then calls the `GetVolumePathNamesForVolumeNameW()` function to retrieve a list of drive letters and mounted folder paths for each specified volume.[1]
Enterprise	T1688	Safe Mode Boot	Embargo has used a DLL variant of MDeployer to disable security solutions through Safe Mode.[2]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	Embargo has leveraged Windows Native API functions to execute its operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	Embargo has utilized MS4Killer to detect running processes on the victim device.[2] Embargo has also captured a snapshot of active running processes using the Windows API `CreateToolHelp32Snapshot()`.[1]
Enterprise	T1112	Modify Registry	Embargo has modified and deleted Registry keys to add services, and to disable Security Solutions such as Windows Defender.[2]
Enterprise	T1490	Inhibit System Recovery	Embargo has cleared files from the recycle bin by invoking `SHEmptyRecycleBinW()` and disabled Windows recovery through `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /q /c bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no`.[1]
Enterprise	T1679	Selective Exclusion	Embargo has avoided encrypting specific files and directories by leveraging a regular expression within the ransomware binary.[1]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Embargo has utilized MDeployer to decrypt two payloads that contain MS4Killer toolkit b.cache and the Embargo ransomware executable a.cache with a hardcoded RC4 key `wlQYLoPCil3niI7x8CvR9EtNtL/aeaHrZ23LP3fAsJogVTIzdnZ5Pi09ZVeHFkiB`.[2]
Enterprise	T1135	Network Share Discovery	Embargo has searched for folders, subfolders and other networked or mounted drives for follow-on encryption actions.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	Embargo has encrypted both MDeployer and MS4 Killer payloads with RC4.[2]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	Embargo has utilized a BAT script to disable security solutions.[2]
Enterprise	T1007	System Service Discovery	Embargo has obtained active services running on the victim’s system through the functions `OpenSCManagerW()` and `EnumServicesStatusExW()`.[1]
Enterprise	T1053.005	Scheduled TaskSub-technique	Embargo has obtained persistence of the loader MDeployer by creating a scheduled task named “Perf_sys.”[2]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File DeletionSub-technique	Embargo has leveraged MDeployer to terminate the MS4Killer process, delete the decrypted payload files and a driver file dropped by MS4killer, and reboot the system.[2]
Enterprise	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique	Embargo has modified the Windows Registry to start a custom service named irnagentd in Safe Mode.[2]
Enterprise	T1569.002	Service ExecutionSub-technique	Embargo has created a service named irnagentd that executed the MDeployer loader after the system is rebooted in Safe Mode.[2]
Enterprise	T1486	Data Encrypted for Impact	Embargo has the ability to encrypt files with the ChaCha20 and Curve25519 cryptographic algorithms.[1] Embargo also has the ability to encrypt system data and add a random six-letter extension consisting of hexadecimal characters such as ".b58eeb" or “.3d828a” to encrypted files.[2]
Enterprise	T1543.003	Windows ServiceSub-technique	Embargo has created persistence through the DLL variant of the MDeployer toolkit by creating a service called irnagentd that launches after the system is rebooted in Safe Mode.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G1053: Storm-0501

Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Oct 19, 2025, 20:17 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Oct 20, 2025, 15:39 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 82ae931d79375057...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Oct 20, 2025, 15:39 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`82ae931d7937…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Oct 20, 2025, 15:39 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`82ae931d7937…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024
Cyble. (2024, May 24). The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In. Retrieved October 19, 2025.
Open source URL
[2]
ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024
Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.
Open source URL
[3]
mitre-attackS1247
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use