C0045: ShadowRay

ShadowRay was a campaign that began in late 2023 targeting the education, cryptocurrency, biopharma, and other sectors through a vulnerability (CVE-2023-48022) in the Ray AI framework named ShadowRay. According to security researchers ShadowRay was the first known instance of AI workloads being activley exploited in the wild through vulnerabilities in AI infrastructure. CVE-2023-48022, which allows access to compute resources and sensitive data for exposed instances, remains unpatched and has been disputed by the vendor as they maintain that Ray is not intended for use outside of a strictly controlled network environment.[1]

EnterpriseC0045CampaignObject v1.0ModifiedJul 31, 2026, 18:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)

C0045: ShadowRay describes [ShadowRay](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0045) was a campaign that began in late 2023 targeting the education, cryptocurrency, biopharma, and other sectors through a vulnerability (CVE-2023-48022) in the Ray AI framework named ShadowRay. According to security researchers [ShadowRay](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0045) was the first known instance of AI workloads being activley exploited in the wild through vulnerabilities in AI infrastructure. CVE-2023-48022, which allows access to compute resources an...

Executive priority

C0045: ShadowRay is an official MITRE ATT&CK campaign. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate C0045: ShadowRay by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

Validate whether C0045: ShadowRay appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

ShadowRay

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques10 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1190	Exploit Public-Facing Application	During ShadowRay, threat actors exploited CVE-2023-48022 on publicly exposed Ray servers to steal computing power and to expose sensitive data.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	During ShadowRay, threat actors used Base64-encrypted Python code to evade detection.[1]
Enterprise	T1003.008	/etc/passwd and /etc/shadowSub-technique	During ShadowRay, threat actors used `cat /etc/shadow` to steal password hashes.[1]
Enterprise	T1546.004	Unix Shell Configuration ModificationSub-technique	During ShadowRay, threat actors executed commands on interactive and reverse shells.[1]
Enterprise	T1588.002	ToolSub-technique	During ShadowRay, threat actors used tools including the XMRig miner and Interactsh.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	During ShadowRay, threat actors downloaded and executed the XMRig miner on targeted hosts.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.006	PythonSub-technique	During ShadowRay, threat actors used the Python `pty` module to open reverse shells.[1]
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	During ShadowRay, threat actors invoked DNS queries from targeted machines to identify their IP addresses.[1]
Enterprise	T1068	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	During ShadowRay, threat actors downloaded a privilege escalation payload to gain root access.[1]
Enterprise	T1496.001	Compute HijackingSub-technique	During ShadowRay, threat actors leveraged graphics processing units (GPU) on compromised nodes for cryptocurrency mining.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Dec 2, 2024, 19:35 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Jul 31, 2026, 18:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 6f3d63bffdffbbf0...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Jul 31, 2026, 18:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`6f3d63bffdff…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Dec 2, 2024, 22:01 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`dbc482902ccf…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Oligo ShadowRay Campaign MAR 2024
Lumelsly, A. et al. (2024, March 26). ShadowRay: First Known Attack Campaign Targeting AI Workloads Actively Exploited In The Wild. Retrieved December 2, 2024.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackC0045
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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