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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0037: FIN6

FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.[1][2]

EnterpriseG0037GroupObject v4.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0037: FIN6 describes [FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)

Executive priority

G0037: FIN6 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0037: FIN6 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0037: FIN6 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

FIN6

FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

40 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1560.003Archive via Custom MethodSub-technique

FIN6 has encoded data gathered from the victim with a simple substitution cipher and single-byte XOR using the 0xAA key, and Base64 with character permutation.[1]CitationTrend Micro FIN6 October 2019

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

FIN6 has targeted victims with e-mails containing malicious attachments.CitationVisa FIN6 Feb 2019

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

FIN6 has deployed a utility script named kill.bat to disable anti-virus.[2]

EnterpriseT1087.002Domain AccountSub-technique

FIN6 has used Metasploit’s PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim's Active Directory database.[1]

EnterpriseT1059Command and Scripting Interpreter

FIN6 has used scripting to iterate through a list of compromised PoS systems, copy data to a log file, and remove the original data files.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1572Protocol Tunneling

FIN6 used the Plink command-line utility to create SSH tunnels to C2 servers.[1]

EnterpriseT1213.006DatabasesSub-technique

FIN6 has collected schemas and user accounts from systems running SQL Server.CitationVisa FIN6 Feb 2019

EnterpriseT1027.010Command ObfuscationSub-technique

FIN6 has used encoded PowerShell commands.CitationVisa FIN6 Feb 2019

EnterpriseT1059.007JavaScriptSub-technique

FIN6 has used malicious JavaScript to steal payment card data from e-commerce sites.CitationTrend Micro FIN6 October 2019

EnterpriseT1102Web Service

FIN6 has used Pastebin and Google Storage to host content for their operations.[2]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

FIN6 has collected and exfiltrated payment card data from compromised systems.CitationTrend Micro FIN6 October 2019CitationRiskIQ British Airways September 2018CitationRiskIQ Newegg September 2018

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

FIN6 has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence for its downloader tools known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

FIN6 has used kill.bat script to disable security tools.[2]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

FIN6 has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, and AdFind.[4][2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

FIN6 has removed files from victim machines.[1]

EnterpriseT1003.003NTDSSub-technique

FIN6 has used Metasploit’s PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim's Active Directory database.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1134Access Token Manipulation

FIN6 has used has used Metasploit’s named-pipe impersonation technique to escalate privileges.[2]

EnterpriseT1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

FIN6 has used tools to exploit Windows vulnerabilities in order to escalate privileges. The tools targeted CVE-2013-3660, CVE-2011-2005, and CVE-2010-4398, all of which could allow local users to access kernel-level privileges.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

FIN6 has used malicious documents to lure victims into allowing execution of PowerShell scripts.CitationVisa FIN6 Feb 2019

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

FIN6 has renamed the "psexec" service name to "mstdc" to masquerade as a legitimate Windows service.[2]

EnterpriseT1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceSub-technique

FIN6 has used fake job advertisements sent via LinkedIn to spearphish targets.[4]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

FIN6 has used PowerShell to gain access to merchant's networks, and a Metasploit PowerShell module to download and execute shellcode and to set up a local listener.[1][2]CitationVisa FIN6 Feb 2019

EnterpriseT1560Archive Collected Data

Following data collection, FIN6 has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

FIN6 has used Comodo code-signing certificates.[4]

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique

FIN6 used RDP to move laterally in victim networks.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1119Automated Collection

FIN6 has used a script to iterate through a list of compromised PoS systems, copy and remove data to a log file, and to bind to events from the submit payment button.[1]CitationTrend Micro FIN6 October 2019

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft's built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

FIN6 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for various malware it uses, including downloaders known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD and FrameworkPOS.[1]

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

FIN6 has created Windows services to execute encoded PowerShell commands.[2]

EnterpriseT1046Network Service Discovery

FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft's built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.[1]

EnterpriseT1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolSub-technique

FIN6 has sent stolen payment card data to remote servers via HTTP POSTs.CitationTrend Micro FIN6 October 2019

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

FIN6 has used WMI to automate the remote execution of PowerShell scripts.[4]

EnterpriseT1110.002Password CrackingSub-technique

FIN6 has extracted password hashes from ntds.dit to crack offline.[1]

EnterpriseT1555Credentials from Password Stores

FIN6 has used the Stealer One credential stealer to target e-mail and file transfer utilities including FTP.CitationVisa FIN6 Feb 2019

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

FIN6 has used Metasploit Bind and Reverse TCP stagers.CitationTrend Micro FIN6 October 2019

EnterpriseT1078Valid Accounts

To move laterally on a victim network, FIN6 has used credentials stolen from various systems on which it gathered usernames and password hashes.[1][2]CitationVisa FIN6 Feb 2019

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

FIN6 used the Plink command-line utility to create SSH tunnels to C2 servers.[1]

EnterpriseT1003.001LSASS MemorySub-technique

FIN6 has used Windows Credential Editor for credential dumping.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

FIN6 has used the Stealer One credential stealer to target web browsers.CitationVisa FIN6 Feb 2019

EnterpriseT1074.002Remote Data StagingSub-technique

FIN6 actors have compressed data from remote systems and moved it to another staging system before exfiltration.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0284: More_eggs

More_eggs is a JScript backdoor used by Cobalt Group and FIN6. Its name was given based on the variable "More_eggs" being present in its code. There are at least two different versions of the backdoor being used, version 2.0 and version 4.4. [1][2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0154: Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
ToolEnterprise

S0029: PsExec

PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[1][2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0449: Maze

Maze ransomware, previously known as "ChaCha", was discovered in May 2019. In addition to encrypting files on victim machines for impact, Maze operators conduct information stealing campaigns prior to encryption and post the information online to extort affected companies.[1][2][3]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0372: LockerGoga

LockerGoga is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.[1][2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0446: Ryuk

Ryuk is a ransomware designed to target enterprise environments that has been used in attacks since at least 2018. Ryuk shares code similarities with Hermes ransomware.[1][2][3]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · MalwareS0381: FlawedAmmyyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560.003: Archive via Custom MethodEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1685: Disable or Modify ToolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.002: Domain AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059: Command and Scripting InterpreterEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1572: Protocol TunnelingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1213.006: DatabasesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.010: Command ObfuscationEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0632: GrimAgentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.007: JavaScriptEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1102: Web ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0503: FrameworkPOSEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1588.002: ToolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1003.003: NTDSEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0284: More_eggsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1134: Access Token ManipulationEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0154: Cobalt StrikeEnterpriseuses · ToolS0005: Windows Credential EditorEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1068: Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
4.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
1dafe287c86a0a1c...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.24.0Current bundle1dafe287c86a…
19.14.0Older bundle65d27d5cdb3e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    FireEye FIN6 April 2016

    FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019

    McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018

    CrowdStrike. (2018, February 26). CrowdStrike 2018 Global Threat Report. Retrieved October 10, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019

    Villadsen, O.. (2019, August 29). More_eggs, Anyone? Threat Actor ITG08 Strikes Again. Retrieved September 16, 2019.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Camouflage Tempest

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  6. [6]
    FIN6

    (Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)

  7. [7]
    ITG08

    (Citation: Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019)

  8. [8]
    Magecart Group 6

    (Citation: Security Intelligence ITG08 April 2020)

  9. [9]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Security Intelligence ITG08 April 2020

    Villadsen, O. (2020, April 7). ITG08 (aka FIN6) Partners With TrickBot Gang, Uses Anchor Framework. Retrieved October 8, 2020.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Skeleton Spider

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)

  12. [12]
    TAAL

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  13. [13]
    mitre-attackG0037
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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