G0107: Whitefly

Whitefly matters because MITRE describes it as a cyber espionage group focused on stealing large amounts of sensitive information, with reporting centered mostly on organizations in Singapore and a link to the SingHealth incident. For leaders, the decision value is less about the name and more about whether the organization can prevent, detect, and investigate credential theft, malicious file execution, tool transfer, DLL abuse, obfuscated files, and privilege escalation behaviors that ATT&CK associates with this group.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as an information-theft and resilience scenario: validate protection of sensitive data, identity infrastructure, privileged access, endpoint visibility, and incident response readiness. The relationship to LSASS credential access and Mimikatz makes identity compromise a key business risk area. Because MITRE provides no official detection text for the group itself, executives should ask for evidence-based control coverage mapped to the associated techniques rather than relying on group-name alerts.

Technical view

SOC and IR teams should validate detections and investigation playbooks around the supplied relationships: Mimikatz use, LSASS memory access on Windows, command and scripting interpreter activity, malicious file execution, ingress tool transfer, encrypted or encoded files, resource-name masquerading, exploitation for privilege escalation, and DLL abuse. Treat the group page as a threat-intelligence pivot, then test whether telemetry can connect initial user-driven execution to tool staging, credential access, privilege escalation, and stealth behaviors.

Likely telemetry

Endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry
Windows security and authentication events, especially privileged logons and abnormal account use
Endpoint detection telemetry for LSASS access and credential dumping indicators
File creation, modification, rename, and path/location telemetry for suspicious naming or trusted-location abuse
DLL load events and application execution context on Windows

Detection direction

Do not depend on the group name; build coverage around the associated ATT&CK techniques and software relationship.
Validate LSASS and Mimikatz detections with attention to administrative-tool false positives and legitimate security testing activity.
Tune command and scripting interpreter analytics against known administrative baselines to reduce noise while preserving visibility into unusual execution chains.
Review whether file obfuscation, encoded content, DLL abuse, and legitimate-name/location masquerading are visible in endpoint telemetry, not only blocked by prevention controls.
Correlate malicious file execution with follow-on tool transfer, privilege escalation attempts, and credential access to improve incident confidence.

Mitigation priorities

Harden identity and privileged access first: reduce unnecessary admin rights, protect credential material, and monitor high-value accounts.
Improve endpoint visibility and prevention for credential dumping, suspicious DLL loading, malicious file execution, and script abuse.
Maintain timely vulnerability management for systems where privilege escalation would materially increase impact.
Restrict and monitor inbound tool transfer paths, including web, proxy, and endpoint-controlled file acquisition.
Strengthen user-facing controls and response processes for malicious files, including training, attachment handling, and rapid triage.

Additional notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK object identifies Whitefly as an espionage group operating since at least 2017, mostly targeting Singapore-based organizations across varied sectors, and interested in large-scale sensitive information theft. The most actionable details come from relationships to techniques and Mimikatz rather than from group-specific detection guidance.

Platforms and tactics are not specified on the Whitefly group object, and official detection is not provided. Related techniques include platform information, but that should not be treated as a complete Whitefly platform profile. Local telemetry, asset context, geography, sector relevance, and incident evidence are required before assessing exposure or coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Whitefly

Whitefly is a cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2017. The group has targeted organizations based mostly in Singapore across a wide variety of sectors, and is primarily interested in stealing large amounts of sensitive information. The group has been linked to an attack against Singapore’s largest public health organization, SingHealth.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques9 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Whitefly has the ability to download additional tools from the C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1574.001	DLLSub-technique	Whitefly has used search order hijacking to run the loader Vcrodat.[1]
Enterprise	T1003.001	LSASS MemorySub-technique	Whitefly has used Mimikatz to obtain credentials.[1]
Enterprise	T1068	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Whitefly has used an open-source tool to exploit a known Windows privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2016-0051) on unpatched computers.[1]
Enterprise	T1588.002	ToolSub-technique	Whitefly has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz.[1]
Enterprise	T1059	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Whitefly has used a simple remote shell tool that will call back to the C2 server and wait for commands.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	Whitefly has encrypted the payload used for C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1204.002	Malicious FileSub-technique	Whitefly has used malicious .exe or .dll files disguised as documents or images.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.005	Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique	Whitefly has named the malicious DLL the same name as DLLs belonging to legitimate software from various security vendors.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 1.2
Created: May 26, 2020, 16:55 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 10, 2024, 20:43 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 1940aa925701c74b...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.2	Apr 10, 2024, 20:43 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`1940aa925701…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[2]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[3]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[4]
mitre-attackG0107
Open source URL
[5]
mitre-attackG0107
Open source URL
[6]
mitre-attackG0107
Open source URL
[7]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[8]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[9]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[10]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[11]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[12]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[13]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[14]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[15]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[16]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[17]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[18]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[19]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[20]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[21]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[22]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[23]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[24]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL
[25]
Symantec Whitefly March 2019
Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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