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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0601: Hildegard

Hildegard is malware that targets misconfigured kubelets for initial access and runs cryptocurrency miner operations. The malware was first observed in January 2021. The TeamTNT activity group is believed to be behind Hildegard. [1]

EnterpriseS0601MalwareObject v1.2Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0601: Hildegard describes [Hildegard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0601) is malware that targets misconfigured kubelets for initial access and runs cryptocurrency miner operations. The malware was first observed in January 2021. The TeamTNT activity group is believed to be behind [Hildegard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0601). (Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)

Executive priority

S0601: Hildegard is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0601: Hildegard by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux, Containers, IaaS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Cloud control-plane, SaaS audit, and container platform logs
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0601: Hildegard appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Hildegard

Hildegard is malware that targets misconfigured kubelets for initial access and runs cryptocurrency miner operations. The malware was first observed in January 2021. The TeamTNT activity group is believed to be behind Hildegard. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

27 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1071Application Layer Protocol

Hildegard has used an IRC channel for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1552.004Private KeysSub-technique

Hildegard has searched for private keys in .ssh.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Hildegard has deleted scripts after execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1609Container Administration Command

Hildegard was executed through the kubelet API run command and by executing commands on running containers.[1]

EnterpriseT1613Container and Resource Discovery

Hildegard has used masscan to search for kubelets and the kubelet API for additional running containers.[1]

EnterpriseT1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingSub-technique

Hildegard has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to intercept shared library import functions.[1]

EnterpriseT1046Network Service Discovery

Hildegard has used masscan to look for kubelets in the internal Kubernetes network.[1]

EnterpriseT1133External Remote Services

Hildegard was executed through an unsecure kubelet that allowed anonymous access to the victim environment.[1]

EnterpriseT1552.001Credentials In FilesSub-technique

Hildegard has searched for SSH keys, Docker credentials, and Kubernetes service tokens.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

Hildegard has packed ELF files into other binaries.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

Hildegard has disguised itself as a known Linux process.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Hildegard has collected the host's OS, CPU, and memory information.[1]

EnterpriseT1102Web Service

Hildegard has downloaded scripts from GitHub.[1]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

Hildegard has modified DNS resolvers to evade DNS monitoring tools.[1]

EnterpriseT1014Rootkit

Hildegard has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to overwrite readdir() and readdir64().[1]

EnterpriseT1070.003Clear Command HistorySub-technique

Hildegard has used history -c to clear script shell logs.[1]

EnterpriseT1219Remote Access Tools

Hildegard has established tmate sessions for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Hildegard has decrypted ELF files with AES.[1]

EnterpriseT1496.001Compute HijackingSub-technique

Hildegard has used xmrig to mine cryptocurrency.[1]

EnterpriseT1136.001Local AccountSub-technique

Hildegard has created a user named “monerodaemon”.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Hildegard has downloaded additional scripts that build and run Monero cryptocurrency miners.[1]

EnterpriseT1552.005Cloud Instance Metadata APISub-technique

Hildegard has queried the Cloud Instance Metadata API for cloud credentials.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Hildegard has encrypted an ELF file.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.002Systemd ServiceSub-technique

Hildegard has started a monero service.[1]

EnterpriseT1611Escape to Host

Hildegard has used the BOtB tool that can break out of containers. [1]

EnterpriseT1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Hildegard has used the BOtB tool which exploits CVE-2019-5736.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.004Unix ShellSub-technique

Hildegard has used shell scripts for execution.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0139: TeamTNT

TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
b1323b6bd6d00963...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.2Current bundleb1323b6bd6d0…
19.21.2Older bundleb1323b6bd6d0…
19.11.2Older bundleb1323b6bd6d0…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Unit 42 Hildegard Malware

    Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0601
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.