S0552: AdFind
Security context for executives and security teams
AdFind matters because it is a legitimate Windows command-line tool for querying Active Directory, and ATT&CK records it as used by multiple campaigns and groups. For leaders, the risk is not the tool itself; it is what directory reconnaissance can enable: understanding users, groups, trusts, systems, and network context before lateral movement or broader intrusion activity.
Executive priority
Prioritize AdFind as an identity and ransomware-readiness validation point. Executives should ask whether the organization can distinguish approved Active Directory administration from unusual directory enumeration, especially from workstations, service accounts, or systems that do not normally perform directory queries. This is useful evidence for SOC readiness, incident response scoping, privileged access governance, and audit discussions around monitoring of identity infrastructure.
Technical view
ATT&CK lists AdFind as Windows software and relates it to discovery techniques including System Network Configuration Discovery, Remote System Discovery, Domain Groups, Domain Account, and Domain Trust Discovery. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility into Windows process execution and command-line arguments for AdFind, then correlate that activity with Active Directory query patterns and domain controller telemetry. Because official ATT&CK detection text is not provided, local baselining is essential: the key analytic question is whether the account, host, timing, and query purpose align with normal administration.
Likely telemetry
- Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry for AdFind execution
- File presence or execution telemetry for the AdFind binary on Windows hosts
- Active Directory and domain controller query/audit logs where enabled
- Authentication and account logon context for the user or service account running the tool
- Directory object access or LDAP-related telemetry where collected
Detection direction
- Baseline legitimate administrative use of AdFind and similar directory query utilities; alerting without this context can create false positives.
- Prioritize unusual execution from non-admin workstations, servers with no directory administration role, newly compromised hosts, or accounts that do not normally perform AD discovery.
- Correlate AdFind execution with relationship-mapped discovery objectives: domain accounts, domain groups, domain trusts, remote systems, and network configuration discovery.
- Treat command-line collection quality as a coverage dependency; process names alone are weaker because legitimate tools can be renamed or copied.
- During ransomware or intrusion response, use AdFind-related telemetry to help scope what identity, trust, and host information may have been enumerated.
Mitigation priorities
- Inventory approved Active Directory administration and discovery tools, including where AdFind is allowed to run and by whom.
- Apply least-privilege and privileged access governance so routine accounts are not used for broad directory administration.
- Use application control or allowlisting where operationally feasible for administrative utilities on sensitive servers and workstations.
- Harden and monitor domain controllers and identity infrastructure as high-value logging sources for directory reconnaissance.
- Ensure incident response playbooks include identity-discovery review so responders assess users, groups, trusts, and systems potentially exposed during an intrusion.
Additional notes and limits
The strongest decision value is identity visibility. AdFind is a legitimate free command-line query tool, so its presence is not automatically malicious. ATT&CK relationship context shows use by multiple named groups and campaigns, including ransomware-related and espionage-related contexts, but this should be used for defensive prioritization rather than attribution from a single observation.
ATT&CK provides no official detection guidance for this object, and the object’s tactics are not specified. Detection quality depends on local Windows endpoint logging, command-line capture, Active Directory auditing, and knowledge of approved administrative behavior. The supplied data supports Windows as the AdFind platform and discovery-related technique relationships, but not guaranteed detection coverage or organization-specific exposure.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
AdFind
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1069.002 | Domain GroupsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1087.002 | Domain AccountSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0092: TA505
G0030: Lotus Blossom
Lotus Blossom is a long-standing threat group largely targeting various entities in Asia since at least 2009. In addition to government and related targets, Lotus Blossom has also targeted entities such as digital certificate issuers.[1][2][3]
G0102: Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.[1][2][3]
G0046: FIN7
FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
G1040: Play
Play is a ransomware group that has been active since at least 2022 deploying Playcrypt ransomware against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. Play actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data, and are presumed by security researchers to operate as a closed group.[1][2]
G1043: BlackByte
BlackByte is a ransomware threat actor operating since at least 2021. BlackByte is associated with several versions of ransomware also labeled BlackByte Ransomware. BlackByte ransomware operations initially used a common encryption key allowing for the development of a universal decryptor, but subsequent versions such as BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware use more robust encryption mechanisms. BlackByte is notable for operations targeting critical infrastructure entities among other targets across North America.[1][2][3][4][5]
G0037: FIN6
G1024: Akira
Akira is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023.[1] Akira uses compromised credentials to access single-factor external access mechanisms such as VPNs for initial access, then various publicly-available tools and techniques for lateral movement.[1][2] Akira operations are associated with "double extortion" ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Technical analysis of Akira ransomware indicates variants capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi hypervisors and multiple overlaps with Conti ransomware.[3][4][5]
G0129: Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
G1032: INC Ransom
INC Ransom is a ransomware and data extortion threat group associated with the deployment of INC Ransomware that has been active since at least July 2023. INC Ransom has targeted organizations worldwide most commonly in the industrial, healthcare, and education sectors in the US and Europe.[1][2][3][4]
G0016: APT29
APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]
G0045: menuPass
menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.[1][2]
menuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[3][4][5][6][7][1][2]
C0015: C0015
C0015 was a ransomware intrusion during which the unidentified attackers used Bazar, Cobalt Strike, and Conti, along with other tools, over a 5 day period. Security researchers assessed the actors likely used the widely-circulated Conti ransomware playbook based on the observed pattern of activity and operator errors.[1]
C0024: SolarWinds Compromise
The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.[1] Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[2][3][4][5][1][6][7][8]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[9][10][11] The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.[12]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.5 | Current bundle | 504bdfe91161… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020
Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019
McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [3]FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019
Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]NCC Group TA505
Terefos, A. (2020, November 18). TA505: A Brief History of Their Time. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
Open source URL - [5]Symantec Bilbug 2022
Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.
Open source URL - [6]DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020
The DFIR Report. (2020, October 8). Ryuk’s Return. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
Open source URL - [7]DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020
The DFIR Report. (2020, November 5). Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom. Retrieved November 6, 2020.
Open source URL - [8]Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021
Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023.
Open source URL - [9]CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021
Loui, E. and Reynolds, J. (2021, August 30). CARBON SPIDER Embraces Big Game Hunting, Part 1. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
Open source URL - [10]DFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021
DFIR Report. (2021, November 29). CONTInuing the Bazar Ransomware Story. Retrieved September 29, 2022.
Open source URL - [11]Symantec Bumblebee June 2022
Kamble, V. (2022, June 28). Bumblebee: New Loader Rapidly Assuming Central Position in Cyber-crime Ecosystem. Retrieved August 24, 2022.
Open source URL - [12]CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023
CISA. (2023, December 18). #StopRansomware: Play Ransomware AA23-352A. Retrieved September 24, 2024.
Open source URL - [13]Trend Micro Ransomware Spotlight Play July 2023
Trend Micro Research. (2023, July 21). Ransomware Spotlight: Play. Retrieved September 24, 2024.
Open source URL - [14]Symantec BlackByte 2022
Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, October 21). Exbyte: BlackByte Ransomware Attackers Deploy New Exfiltration Tool. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
Open source URL - [15]Microsoft BlackByte 2023
Microsoft Incident Response. (2023, July 6). The five-day job: A BlackByte ransomware intrusion case study. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
Open source URL - [16]Arctic Wolf Akira 2023
Steven Campbell, Akshay Suthar, & Connor Belfiorre. (2023, July 26). Conti and Akira: Chained Together. Retrieved February 20, 2024.
Open source URL - [17]Palo Alto Unit42 STATELY TAURUS TONESHELL September 2023
Lior Rochberger, Tom Fakterman, Robert Falcone. (2023, September 22). Cyberespionage Attacks Against Southeast Asian Government Linked to Stately Taurus, Aka Mustang Panda. Retrieved September 9, 2025.
Open source URL - [18]Secureworks GOLD IONIC April 2024
Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2024, April 15). GOLD IONIC DEPLOYS INC RANSOMWARE. Retrieved June 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [19]Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020
MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.
Open source URL - [20]CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022
CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
Open source URL - [21]ESET T3 Threat Report 2021
ESET. (2022, February). THREAT REPORT T3 2021. Retrieved February 10, 2022.
Open source URL - [22]Symantec Cicada November 2020
Symantec. (2020, November 17). Japan-Linked Organizations Targeted in Long-Running and Sophisticated Attack Campaign. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
Open source URL - [23]Cybereason Bumblebee August 2022
Cybereason. (2022, August 17). Bumblebee Loader – The High Road to Enterprise Domain Control. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
Open source URL - [24]FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019
McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [25]FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019
McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [26]FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019
Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
Open source URL - [27]FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019
Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
Open source URL - [28]Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020
Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [29]Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020
Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [30]mitre-attackS0552Open source URL
- [31]mitre-attackS0552Open source URL
- [32]mitre-attackS0552Open source URL
- [33]NCC Group TA505
Terefos, A. (2020, November 18). TA505: A Brief History of Their Time. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
Open source URL - [34]Symantec Bilbug 2022
Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.
Open source URL - [35]DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020
The DFIR Report. (2020, November 5). Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom. Retrieved November 6, 2020.
Open source URL - [36]DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020
The DFIR Report. (2020, October 8). Ryuk’s Return. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
Open source URL - [37]FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019
Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
Open source URL - [38]FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019
Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
Open source URL - [39]Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021
Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023.
Open source URL - [40]Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020
Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [41]Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020
Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [42]CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021
Loui, E. and Reynolds, J. (2021, August 30). CARBON SPIDER Embraces Big Game Hunting, Part 1. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
Open source URL - [43]DFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021
DFIR Report. (2021, November 29). CONTInuing the Bazar Ransomware Story. Retrieved September 29, 2022.
Open source URL - [44]FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019
McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [45]FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019
McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [46]FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019
Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
Open source URL - [47]FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019
Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
Open source URL - [48]Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020
Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [49]Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020
Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [50]Symantec Bumblebee June 2022
Kamble, V. (2022, June 28). Bumblebee: New Loader Rapidly Assuming Central Position in Cyber-crime Ecosystem. Retrieved August 24, 2022.
Open source URL - [51]FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019
McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [52]FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019
McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [53]FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019
Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
Open source URL - [54]FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019
Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
Open source URL - [55]Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020
Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [56]Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020
Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [57]Symantec Bumblebee June 2022
Kamble, V. (2022, June 28). Bumblebee: New Loader Rapidly Assuming Central Position in Cyber-crime Ecosystem. Retrieved August 24, 2022.
Open source URL - [58]Symantec Bumblebee June 2022
Kamble, V. (2022, June 28). Bumblebee: New Loader Rapidly Assuming Central Position in Cyber-crime Ecosystem. Retrieved August 24, 2022.
Open source URL - [59]CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023
CISA. (2023, December 18). #StopRansomware: Play Ransomware AA23-352A. Retrieved September 24, 2024.
Open source URL - [60]Trend Micro Ransomware Spotlight Play July 2023
Trend Micro Research. (2023, July 21). Ransomware Spotlight: Play. Retrieved September 24, 2024.
Open source URL - [61]FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019
McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [62]FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019
McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [63]FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019
Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
Open source URL - [64]FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019
Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
Open source URL - [65]Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020
Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [66]Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020
Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [67]Microsoft BlackByte 2023
Microsoft Incident Response. (2023, July 6). The five-day job: A BlackByte ransomware intrusion case study. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
Open source URL - [68]Symantec BlackByte 2022
Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, October 21). Exbyte: BlackByte Ransomware Attackers Deploy New Exfiltration Tool. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
Open source URL - [69]FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019
McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [70]FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019
McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [71]Arctic Wolf Akira 2023
Steven Campbell, Akshay Suthar, & Connor Belfiorre. (2023, July 26). Conti and Akira: Chained Together. Retrieved February 20, 2024.
Open source URL - [72]Palo Alto Unit42 STATELY TAURUS TONESHELL September 2023
Lior Rochberger, Tom Fakterman, Robert Falcone. (2023, September 22). Cyberespionage Attacks Against Southeast Asian Government Linked to Stately Taurus, Aka Mustang Panda. Retrieved September 9, 2025.
Open source URL - [73]Secureworks GOLD IONIC April 2024
Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2024, April 15). GOLD IONIC DEPLOYS INC RANSOMWARE. Retrieved June 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [74]CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022
CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
Open source URL - [75]Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020
MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.
Open source URL - [76]CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022
CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
Open source URL - [77]CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022
CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
Open source URL - [78]ESET T3 Threat Report 2021
ESET. (2022, February). THREAT REPORT T3 2021. Retrieved February 10, 2022.
Open source URL - [79]Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020
MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.
Open source URL - [80]Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020
MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.
Open source URL - [81]Symantec Cicada November 2020
Symantec. (2020, November 17). Japan-Linked Organizations Targeted in Long-Running and Sophisticated Attack Campaign. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
Open source URL - [82]FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019
McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
Open source URL - [83]FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019
Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
Open source URL - [84]Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020
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