G1024: Akira
MITRE ATT&CK G1024: Akira Group details, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.
Security context for executives and security teams
G1024: Akira describes [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023.(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023) [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) uses compromised credentials to access single-factor external access mechanisms such as VPNs for initial access, then various publicly-available tools and techniques for lateral movement.(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA) [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G102...
Executive priority
G1024: Akira is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G1024: Akira by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G1024: Akira appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Akira
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1567.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud StorageSub-technique | This object uses Exfiltration to Cloud Storage. |
| Enterprise | T1213.002 | SharepointSub-technique | This object uses Sharepoint. |
| Enterprise | T1531 | Account Access Removal | This object uses Account Access Removal. |
| Enterprise | T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery | This object uses Domain Trust Discovery. |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | This object uses Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location. |
| Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | This object uses Valid Accounts. |
| Enterprise | T1558 | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | This object uses Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets. |
| Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery | This object uses Remote System Discovery. |
| Enterprise | T1021.001 | Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique | This object uses Remote Desktop Protocol. |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | This object uses PowerShell. |
| Enterprise | T1657 | Financial Theft | This object uses Financial Theft. |
| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | This object uses Data Encrypted for Impact. |
| Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services | This object uses External Remote Services. |
| Enterprise | T1027.001 | Binary PaddingSub-technique | This object uses Binary Padding. |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | This object uses Disable or Modify Tools. |
| Enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Tools | This object uses Remote Access Tools. |
| Enterprise | T1560.001 | Archive via UtilitySub-technique | This object uses Archive via Utility. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0002: Mimikatz
S0029: PsExec
S0552: AdFind
S1194: Akira _v2
S1129: Akira
Akira ransomware, written in C++, is most prominently (but not exclusively) associated with the ransomware-as-a-service entity Akira. Akira ransomware has been used in attacks across North America, Europe, and Australia, with a focus on critical infrastructure sectors including manufacturing, education, and IT services. Akira ransomware employs hybrid encryption and threading to increase the speed and efficiency of encryption and runtime arguments for tailored attacks. Notable variants include Rust-based Megazord for targeting Windows and Akira _v2 for targeting VMware ESXi servers.[1][2][3]
S1191: Megazord
S0349: LaZagne
S1040: Rclone
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 3eea72fa163b… | ||
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 3eea72fa163b… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 94a6589eab70… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Arctic Wolf Akira 2023
Steven Campbell, Akshay Suthar, & Connor Belfiorre. (2023, July 26). Conti and Akira: Chained Together. Retrieved February 20, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]Secureworks GOLD SAHARA
Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD SAHARA. Retrieved February 20, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]BushidoToken Akira 2023
Will Thomas. (2023, September 15). Tracking Adversaries: Akira, another descendent of Conti. Retrieved February 21, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]CISA Akira Ransomware APR 2024
CISA et al. (2024, April 18). #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware. Retrieved December 10, 2024.
Open source URL - [5]Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024
Nutland, J. and Szeliga, M. (2024, October 21). Akira ransomware continues to evolve. Retrieved December 10, 2024.
Open source URL - [6]Palo Alto Howling Scorpius DEC 2024
Zemah, Y. (2024, December 2). Threat Assessment: Howling Scorpius (Akira Ransomware). Retrieved January 8, 2025.
Open source URL - [7]CrowdStrike PUNK SPIDER
CrowdStrike. (n.d.). Punk Spider. Retrieved February 20, 2024.
Open source URL - [8]GOLD SAHARA
(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)
- [9]Howling Scorpius
(Citation: Palo Alto Howling Scorpius DEC 2024)
- [10]PUNK SPIDER
(Citation: CrowdStrike PUNK SPIDER)
- [11]mitre-attackG1024Open source URL
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