S0488: CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec, or CME, is a post-exploitation tool developed in Python and designed for penetration testing against networks. CrackMapExec collects Active Directory information to conduct lateral movement through targeted networks.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0488: CrackMapExec describes [CrackMapExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0488), or CME, is a post-exploitation tool developed in Python and designed for penetration testing against networks. [CrackMapExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0488) collects Active Directory information to conduct lateral movement through targeted networks.(Citation: CME Github September 2018)
Executive priority
S0488: CrackMapExec is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0488: CrackMapExec by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0488: CrackMapExec appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec, or CME, is a post-exploitation tool developed in Python and designed for penetration testing against networks. CrackMapExec collects Active Directory information to conduct lateral movement through targeted networks.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1003.002 | Security Account ManagerSub-technique | CrackMapExec can dump usernames and hashed passwords from the SAM.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1003.003 | NTDSSub-technique | CrackMapExec can dump hashed passwords associated with Active Directory using Windows' Directory Replication Services API (DRSUAPI), or Volume Shadow Copy.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1110.003 | Password SprayingSub-technique | CrackMapExec can brute force credential authentication by using a supplied list of usernames and a single password.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1201 | Password Policy Discovery | CrackMapExec can discover the password policies applied to the target system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1087.002 | Domain AccountSub-technique | CrackMapExec can enumerate the domain user accounts on a targeted system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | CrackMapExec can discover active sessions for a targeted system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1110.001 | Password GuessingSub-technique | CrackMapExec can brute force passwords for a specified user on a single target system or across an entire network.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1053.002 | AtSub-technique | CrackMapExec can set a scheduled task on the target system to execute commands remotely using at.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery | CrackMapExec can enumerate the shared folders and associated permissions for a targeted network.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery | CrackMapExec can discover active IP addresses, along with the machine name, within a targeted network.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1003.004 | LSA SecretsSub-technique | CrackMapExec can dump hashed passwords from LSA secrets for the targeted system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | CrackMapExec can execute remote commands using Windows Management Instrumentation.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | CrackMapExec can create a registry key using wdigest.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | CrackMapExec can discover specified filetypes and log files on a targeted system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1550.002 | Pass the HashSub-technique | CrackMapExec can pass the hash to authenticate via SMB.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | CrackMapExec can enumerate the system drives and associated system name.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1069.002 | Domain GroupsSub-technique | CrackMapExec can gather the user accounts within domain groups.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | CrackMapExec can execute PowerShell commands via WMI.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | CrackMapExec can collect DNS information from the targeted system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1110 | Brute Force | CrackMapExec can brute force supplied user credentials across a network range.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0035: Dragonfly
Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.[1][2] Active since at least 2010, Dragonfly has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
G0069: MuddyWater
MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
G0046: FIN7
FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
G0087: APT39
APT39 is one of several names for cyber espionage activity conducted by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014. APT39 has primarily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecommunications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America to track individuals and entities considered to be a threat by the MOIS.[1][2][3][4][5]
G1003: Ember Bear
Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).[1] Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.[2] Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.[3][4][1] There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.[2][5]
C0029: Cutting Edge
Cutting Edge was a campaign conducted by suspected China-nexus espionage actors, variously identified as UNC5221/UTA0178 and UNC5325, that began as early as December 2023 with the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure (previously Pulse Secure) VPN appliances. Cutting Edge targeted the U.S. defense industrial base and multiple sectors globally including telecommunications, financial, aerospace, and technology. Cutting Edge featured the use of defense evasion and living-off-the-land (LoTL) techniques along with the deployment of web shells and other custom malware.[1][2][3][4][5]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | b92db6b73925… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | b92db6b73925… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]CME Github September 2018
byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0488Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
