S0598: P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell is a publicly available multifunctional PHP webshell in use since at least 2016 that provides remote access and execution on target web servers.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0598: P.A.S. Webshell describes [P.A.S. Webshell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0598) is a publicly available multifunctional PHP webshell in use since at least 2016 that provides remote access and execution on target web servers.(Citation: ANSSI Sandworm January 2021)
Executive priority
S0598: P.A.S. Webshell is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0598: P.A.S. Webshell by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0598: P.A.S. Webshell appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell is a publicly available multifunctional PHP webshell in use since at least 2016 that provides remote access and execution on target web servers.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | P.A.S. Webshell can use a decryption mechanism to process a user supplied password and allow execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | P.A.S. Webshell has the ability to list files and file characteristics including extension, size, ownership, and permissions.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1505.003 | Web ShellSub-technique | P.A.S. Webshell can gain remote access and execution on target web servers.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | P.A.S. Webshell has the ability to copy files on a compromised host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1222.002 | Linux and Mac PermissionsSub-technique | P.A.S. Webshell has the ability to modify file permissions.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | P.A.S. Webshell can issue commands via HTTP POST.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | P.A.S. Webshell has the ability to create reverse shells with Perl scripts.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery | P.A.S. Webshell can list PHP server configuration details.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | P.A.S. Webshell can use encryption and base64 encoding to hide strings and to enforce access control once deployed.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | P.A.S. Webshell can delete scripts from a subdirectory of /tmp after they are run.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | P.A.S. Webshell can scan networks for open ports and listening services.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1213.006 | DatabasesSub-technique | P.A.S. Webshell has the ability to list and extract data from SQL databases.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1110.001 | Password GuessingSub-technique | P.A.S. Webshell can use predefined users and passwords to execute brute force attacks against SSH, FTP, POP3, MySQL, MSSQL, and PostgreSQL services.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | P.A.S. Webshell can upload and download files to and from compromised hosts.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1087.001 | Local AccountSub-technique | P.A.S. Webshell can display the /etc/passwd file on a compromised host.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0034: Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]
In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]
G1003: Ember Bear
Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).[1] Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.[2] Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.[3][4][1] There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.[2][5]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | c6c4c5b09d85… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | c6c4c5b09d85… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ANSSI Sandworm January 2021
ANSSI. (2021, January 27). SANDWORM INTRUSION SET CAMPAIGN TARGETING CENTREON SYSTEMS. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]Fobushell
(Citation: NCCIC AR-17-20045 February 2017)
- [3]NCCIC AR-17-20045 February 2017
NCCIC. (2017, February 10). Enhanced Analysis of GRIZZLY STEPPE Activity. Retrieved April 12, 2021.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackS0598Open source URL
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