T1110.003: Password Spraying

Password spraying matters because it turns weak or reused passwords into an enterprise-wide access risk without creating the obvious lockout pattern of repeated guesses against one account. It is especially material for organizations with exposed management services, SSO, cloud applications, federated identity, and email platforms because one successful login can become the entry point for broader compromise.

Executive priority

Treat this as an identity resilience and business-continuity issue, not just a password problem. Leaders should ask whether MFA, password policy, and account-use controls are consistently enforced across identity providers, cloud/SaaS, email, remote access, network devices, ESXi, containers, and traditional operating systems. Audit and risk teams should expect evidence that authentication failures are monitored across many accounts and services, including lower-visibility LDAP and Kerberos paths that may not generate the same high-profile Windows logon failure events.

Technical view

ATT&CK places Password Spraying under Credential Access as a sub-technique of Brute Force. The key analytic pattern is a single or small set of passwords attempted across many accounts, often throttled to avoid alert thresholds. SOC and detection teams should validate coverage for distributed authentication failures across multiple accounts, aligned to DET0487, and should not rely only on repeated failures for one user or only on Windows Event ID 4625. Review authentication telemetry for SSO, federated identity, cloud/SaaS, externally facing email, and common management services such as SSH, SMB, LDAP, Kerberos, RDP, HTTP management interfaces, databases, FTP, Telnet, and VNC.

Likely telemetry

Identity provider sign-in logs, including failed and successful authentication attempts
SSO and federated authentication logs for cloud and SaaS applications
Externally facing email authentication logs, including Office Suite platforms where present
Windows authentication events, including but not limited to logon failure evidence such as Event ID 4625
Kerberos and LDAP authentication activity, because ATT&CK notes these may be less visible than failed SMB logons

Detection direction

Validate detections for one or a small number of passwords attempted across many accounts, rather than only many passwords against one account.
Tune for low-and-slow or throttled activity, since ATT&CK notes adversaries may deliberately avoid detection thresholds.
Correlate failures across services and source infrastructure, especially where attempts are distributed or occur against cloud, SSO, and email applications.
Include LDAP and Kerberos authentication paths in coverage reviews; do not assume SMB-related Windows logon failures are sufficient.
Track both failed attempts and subsequent successful logins after spray-like failure patterns, while accounting for legitimate helpdesk, migration, and misconfiguration events that can create broad authentication failures.

Mitigation priorities

Prioritize MFA for critical systems and services, especially identity providers, cloud/SaaS, email, remote access, and administrative interfaces, consistent with M1032.
Enforce secure password policies under M1027, including controls that reduce use of common, reused, or policy-compliant-but-guessable passwords.
Apply account-use policies under M1036, including lockout or throttling mechanisms, login restrictions, and inactivity controls where operationally appropriate.
Reduce exposure of management services and ensure authentication monitoring is enabled for externally reachable services listed in the ATT&CK description.
Continuously test whether policy enforcement and telemetry are consistent across Windows, Linux, macOS, network devices, ESXi, containers, IaaS, identity providers, SaaS, and Office Suite environments.

Additional notes and limits

This technique has broad platform relevance and documented ATT&CK relationships to campaigns, groups, and software, including APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, Quad7 Activity, APT28, APT29, Lazarus Group, APT33, Leafminer, Chimera, Silent Librarian, HAFNIUM, HEXANE, Ember Bear, Agrius, Linux Rabbit, MailSniper, CrackMapExec, and Bad Rabbit. Use these relationships to justify defensive prioritization, but avoid inferring current targeting without local intelligence or incident evidence.

The supplied ATT&CK object does not include official detection text. Detection guidance here is derived from the official description, the DET0487 relationship, listed platforms, listed services, and mitigation relationships. Actual coverage depends on local logging, identity architecture, exposed services, retention, normalization, and alert thresholds.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Password Spraying

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. [1]

Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following:

* SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) * FTP (21/TCP) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * LDAP (389/TCP) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) * MSSQL (1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900/TCP)

In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.[2]

In order to avoid detection thresholds, adversaries may deliberately throttle password spraying attempts to avoid triggering security alerting. Additionally, adversaries may leverage LDAP and Kerberos authentication attempts, which are less likely to trigger high-visibility events such as Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625 that is commonly triggered by failed SMB connection attempts.[3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques1 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1110	Brute Force	This object subtechnique of Brute Force.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0125: HAFNIUM

HAFNIUM is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. HAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs. HAFNIUM has targeted remote management tools and cloud software for intial access and has demonstrated an ability to quickly operationalize exploits for identified vulnerabilities in edge devices.[1][2][3]

G1030: Agrius

Agrius is an Iranian threat actor active since 2020 notable for a series of ransomware and wiper operations in the Middle East, with an emphasis on Israeli targets.[1][2] Public reporting has linked Agrius to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[3]

G1003: Ember Bear

Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).[1] Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.[2] Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.[3][4][1] There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.[2][5]

G0016: APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

G1001: HEXANE

HEXANE is a cyber espionage threat group that has targeted oil & gas, telecommunications, aviation, and internet service provider organizations since at least 2017. Targeted companies have been located in the Middle East and Africa, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to APT33 and OilRig but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity.[1][2][3][4]

G0032: Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

G0064: APT33

APT33 is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors.[1][2]

G0122: Silent Librarian

Silent Librarian is a group that has targeted research and proprietary data at universities, government agencies, and private sector companies worldwide since at least 2013. Members of Silent Librarian are known to have been affiliated with the Iran-based Mabna Institute which has conducted cyber intrusions at the behest of the government of Iran, specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[1][2][3]

G0114: Chimera

Chimera is a suspected China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2018 targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan as well as data from the airline industry.[1][2]

G0077: Leafminer

Leafminer is an Iranian threat group that has targeted government organizations and business entities in the Middle East since at least early 2017. [1]

G0007: APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.

S0606: Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. Bad Rabbit has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. [1][2][3]

Windows

S0488: CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec, or CME, is a post-exploitation tool developed in Python and designed for penetration testing against networks. CrackMapExec collects Active Directory information to conduct lateral movement through targeted networks.[1]

Windows

S0362: Linux Rabbit

Linux Rabbit is malware that targeted Linux servers and IoT devices in a campaign lasting from August to October 2018. It shares code with another strain of malware known as Rabbot. The goal of the campaign was to install cryptocurrency miners onto the targeted servers and devices.[1]

Linux

S0413: MailSniper

MailSniper is a penetration testing tool for searching through email in a Microsoft Exchange environment for specific terms (passwords, insider intel, network architecture information, etc.). It can be used by a non-administrative user to search their own email, or by an Exchange administrator to search the mailboxes of every user in a domain.[1]

WindowsOffice Suite

C0051: APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign

APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign was conducted by APT28 from early February 2022 to November 2024 against organizations and individuals with expertise on Ukraine. APT28 primarily leveraged living-off-the-land techniques, while leveraging the zero-day exploitation of CVE-2022-38028. Notably, APT28 leveraged Wi-Fi networks in close proximity to the intended target to gain initial access to the victim environment. By daisy-chaining multiple compromised organizations nearby the intended target, APT28 discovered dual-homed systems (with both a wired and wireless network connection) to enable Wi-Fi and use compromised credentials to connect to the victim network.[1]

C0055: Quad7 Activity

Quad7 Activity, also known as CovertNetwork-1658 or the 7777 Botnet, is a network of compromised small office/home office (SOHO) routers. [1] [2] The botnet was initially composed primarily of TP-Link routers and was named Quad7 due to compromised devices exposing TCP port 7777 with the distinctive banner xlogin. Later activity showed a significant increase in compromised Asus routers and the addition of new ports and banners, including TCP port 63256 displaying alogin. Quad7 infrastructure functions as a collection of egress IPs that various China-affiliated threat actors have used to conduct password-spraying and brute-force operations. [1][3] Microsoft has reported that Storm-0940 leveraged credentials obtained through Quad7 Activity to target organizations in North America and Europe, including government agencies, non-governmental organizations, think tanks, law firms, energy firms, IT providers, and defense industrial base entities. [2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0125: HAFNIUMEnterprise uses · MalwareS0606: Bad RabbitEnterprise uses · ToolS0488: CrackMapExecEnterprise uses · MalwareS0362: Linux RabbitEnterprise uses · CampaignC0051: APT28 Nearest Neighbor CampaignEnterprise mitigates · MitigationM1032: Multi-factor AuthenticationEnterprise uses · GroupG1030: AgriusEnterprise uses · GroupG1003: Ember BearEnterprise uses · GroupG0016: APT29Enterprise uses · CampaignC0055: Quad7 ActivityEnterprise uses · GroupG1001: HEXANEEnterprise uses · GroupG0032: Lazarus GroupEnterprise uses · GroupG0064: APT33Enterprise uses · GroupG0122: Silent LibrarianEnterprise uses · GroupG0114: ChimeraEnterprise detects · Detection StrategyDET0487: Distributed Password Spraying via Authentication Failures Across Multiple AccountsEnterprise uses · ToolS0413: MailSniperEnterprise mitigates · MitigationM1027: Password PoliciesEnterprise uses · GroupG0077: LeafminerEnterprise mitigates · MitigationM1036: Account Use PoliciesEnterprise subtechnique of · TechniqueT1110: Brute ForceEnterprise uses · GroupG0007: APT28Enterprise

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

M1032: Multi-factor Authentication

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access. These factors typically include:

- *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. - *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenticator apps. - *Something you are*: Biometric data such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans.

Implementing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures robust protection against account takeover and unauthorized access. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Identity and Access Management (IAM):

- Use IAM solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for privileged roles. - Enable conditional access policies to enforce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geolocations). - Enable Conditional Access policies to only allow logins from trusted devices, such as those enrolled in Intune or joined via Hybrid/Entra.

Authentication Tools and Methods:

- Use authenticator applications such as Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or Authy for time-based one-time passwords (TOTP). - Deploy hardware-based tokens like YubiKey, RSA SecurID, or smart cards for additional security. - Enforce biometric authentication for compatible devices and applications.

Secure Legacy Systems:

- Integrate MFA solutions with older systems using third-party tools like Duo Security or Thales SafeNet. - Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to facilitate MFA for VPNs, RDP, and other network logins.

Monitoring and Alerting:

- Use SIEM tools to monitor failed MFA attempts, login anomalies, or brute-force attempts against MFA systems. - Implement alerts for suspicious MFA activities, such as repeated failed codes or new device registrations.

Training and Policy Enforcement:

- Educate employees on the importance of MFA and secure authenticator usage. - Enforce policies that require MFA on all critical systems, especially for remote access, privileged accounts, and cloud applications.

M1027: Password Policies

Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access. Strong password policies include enforcing password complexity, requiring regular password changes, and preventing password reuse. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Windows Systems:

- Use Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to configure: - Minimum password length (e.g., 12+ characters). - Password complexity requirements. - Password history (e.g., disallow last 24 passwords). - Account lockout duration and thresholds.

Linux Systems:

- Configure Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM): - Use `pam_pwquality` to enforce complexity and length requirements. - Implement `pam_tally2` or `pam_faillock` for account lockouts. - Use `pwunconv` to disable password reuse.

Password Managers:

- Enforce usage of enterprise password managers (e.g., Bitwarden, 1Password, LastPass) to generate and store strong passwords.

Password Blacklisting:

- Use tools like Have I Been Pwned password checks or NIST-based blacklist solutions to prevent users from setting compromised passwords.

Regular Auditing:

- Periodically audit password policies and account configurations to ensure compliance using tools like LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution) and vulnerability scanners.

*Tools for Implementation*

Windows:

- Group Policy Management Console (GPMC): Enforce password policies. - Microsoft Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS): Enforce random, unique admin passwords.

Linux/macOS:

- PAM Modules (pam_pwquality, pam_tally2, pam_faillock): Enforce password rules. - Lynis: Audit password policies and system configurations.

Cross-Platform:

- Password Managers (Bitwarden, 1Password, KeePass): Manage and enforce strong passwords. - Have I Been Pwned API: Prevent the use of breached passwords. - NIST SP 800-63B compliant tools: Enforce password guidelines and blacklisting.

M1036: Account Use Policies

Account Use Policies help mitigate unauthorized access by configuring and enforcing rules that govern how and when accounts can be used. These policies include enforcing account lockout mechanisms, restricting login times, and setting inactivity timeouts. Proper configuration of these policies reduces the risk of brute-force attacks, credential theft, and unauthorized access by limiting the opportunities for malicious actors to exploit accounts. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Account Lockout Policies:

- Implementation: Configure account lockout settings so that after a defined number of failed login attempts (e.g., 3-5 attempts), the account is locked for a specific time period (e.g., 15 minutes) or requires an administrator to unlock it. - Use Case: This prevents brute-force attacks by limiting how many incorrect password attempts can be made before the account is temporarily disabled, reducing the likelihood of an attacker successfully guessing a password.

- Implementation: Set up login time policies to restrict when users or groups can log into systems. For example, only allowing login during standard business hours (e.g., 8 AM to 6 PM) for non-administrative accounts. - Use Case: This prevents unauthorized access outside of approved working hours, where login attempts might be more suspicious or harder to monitor. For example, if an account that is only supposed to be active during the day logs in at 2 AM, it should raise an alert or be blocked.

Inactivity Timeout and Session Termination:

- Implementation: Enforce session timeouts after a period of inactivity (e.g., 10-15 minutes) and require users to re-authenticate if they wish to resume the session. - Use Case: This policy prevents attackers from hijacking active sessions left unattended. For example, if an employee walks away from their computer without locking it, an attacker with physical access to the system would be unable to exploit the session.

Password Aging Policies:

- Implementation: Enforce password aging rules, requiring users to change their passwords after a defined period (e.g., 90 days) and ensure passwords are not reused by maintaining a password history. - Use Case: This limits the risk of compromised passwords being used indefinitely. Regular password changes make it more difficult for attackers to reuse stolen credentials.

Account Expiration and Deactivation:

- Implementation: Configure user accounts, especially for temporary or contract workers, to automatically expire after a set date or event. Accounts that remain unused for a specific period should be deactivated automatically. - Use Case: This prevents dormant accounts from becoming an attack vector. For example, an attacker can exploit unused accounts if they are not properly monitored or deactivated.

**Tools for Implementation**:

- Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Windows: To enforce account lockout thresholds, login time restrictions, session timeouts, and password policies. - Identity and Access Management (IAM) solutions: For centralized management of user accounts, session policies, and automated deactivation of accounts. - Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platforms: To monitor and alert on unusual login activity, such as failed logins or out-of-hours access attempts. - Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) Tools: To further enforce secure login attempts, preventing brute-force or credential stuffing attacks.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 1.8
Created: Feb 11, 2020, 18:39 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Oct 24, 2025, 17:48 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: e41e2b660c80f6b6...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.8	Oct 24, 2025, 17:48 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`e41e2b660c80…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying
Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017.
[2]
US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
Open source URL
[3]
Microsoft Storm-0940
Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, October 31). Chinese threat actor Storm-0940 uses credentials from password spray attacks from a covert network. Retrieved June 4, 2025.
Open source URL
[4]
Microsoft Silk Typhoon MAR 2025
Microsoft Threat Intelligence . (2025, March 5). Silk Typhoon targeting IT supply chain. Retrieved March 20, 2025.
Open source URL
[5]
Secure List Bad Rabbit
Mamedov, O. Sinitsyn, F. Ivanov, A.. (2017, October 24). Bad Rabbit ransomware. Retrieved January 28, 2021.
Open source URL
[6]
CME Github September 2018
byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
Open source URL
[7]
Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018
Anomali Labs. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved March 4, 2019.
Open source URL
[8]
Nearest Neighbor Volexity
Koessel, Sean. Adair, Steven. Lancaster, Tom. (2024, November 22). The Nearest Neighbor Attack: How A Russian APT Weaponized Nearby Wi-Fi Networks for Covert Access. Retrieved February 25, 2025.
Open source URL
[9]
Unit42 Agrius 2023
Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
Open source URL
[10]
CISA GRU29155 2024
US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024.
Open source URL
[11]
MSRC Nobelium June 2021
MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021.
Open source URL
[12]
MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021
Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2021, October 25). NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
Open source URL
[13]
NCSC et al APT29 2024
UK National Cyber Security Center et al. (2024, February). SVR cyber actors adapt tactics for initial cloud access. Retrieved March 1, 2024.
Open source URL
[14]
SecureWorks August 2019
SecureWorks 2019, August 27 LYCEUM Takes Center Stage in Middle East Campaign Retrieved. 2019/11/19
Open source URL
[15]
Novetta Blockbuster
Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.
Open source URL
[16]
Novetta Blockbuster RATs
Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Remote Administration Tools & Content Staging Malware Report. Retrieved March 16, 2016.
Open source URL
[17]
FireEye APT33 Guardrail
Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
Open source URL
[18]
Microsoft Holmium June 2020
Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020.
Open source URL
[19]
DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018
DOJ. (2018, March 23). U.S. v. Rafatnejad et al . Retrieved February 3, 2021.
Open source URL
[20]
NCC Group Chimera January 2021
Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
Open source URL
[21]
GitHub MailSniper
Bullock, B., . (2018, November 20). MailSniper. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
Open source URL
[22]
NIST 800-63-3
Grassi, P., et al. (2017, December 1). SP 800-63-3, Digital Identity Guidelines. Retrieved January 16, 2019.
Open source URL
[23]
Symantec Leafminer July 2018
Symantec Security Response. (2018, July 25). Leafminer: New Espionage Campaigns Targeting Middle Eastern Regions. Retrieved August 28, 2018.
Open source URL
[24]
Microsoft Common Conditional Access Policies
Microsoft. (2022, December 14). Conditional Access templates. Retrieved February 21, 2023.
Open source URL
[25]
Okta Block Anonymizing Services
Moussa Diallo and Brett Winterford. (2024, April 26). How to Block Anonymizing Services using Okta. Retrieved May 28, 2024.
Open source URL
[26]
Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020
Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.
Open source URL
[27]
Microsoft Targeting Elections September 2020
Burt, T. (2020, September 10). New cyberattacks targeting U.S. elections. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
Open source URL
[28]
Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021
NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021.
Open source URL
[29]
BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying
Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017.
[30]
BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying
Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017.
[31]
Microsoft Storm-0940
Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, October 31). Chinese threat actor Storm-0940 uses credentials from password spray attacks from a covert network. Retrieved June 4, 2025.
Open source URL
[32]
Microsoft Storm-0940
Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, October 31). Chinese threat actor Storm-0940 uses credentials from password spray attacks from a covert network. Retrieved June 4, 2025.
Open source URL
[33]
Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying
Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.
Open source URL
[34]
Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying
Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.
Open source URL
[35]
Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying
Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.
Open source URL
[36]
US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
Open source URL
[37]
US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
Open source URL
[38]
mitre-attackT1110.003
Open source URL
[39]
mitre-attackT1110.003
Open source URL
[40]
mitre-attackT1110.003
Open source URL
[41]
Microsoft Silk Typhoon MAR 2025
Microsoft Threat Intelligence . (2025, March 5). Silk Typhoon targeting IT supply chain. Retrieved March 20, 2025.
Open source URL
[42]
Secure List Bad Rabbit
Mamedov, O. Sinitsyn, F. Ivanov, A.. (2017, October 24). Bad Rabbit ransomware. Retrieved January 28, 2021.
Open source URL
[43]
CME Github September 2018
byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
Open source URL
[44]
Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018
Anomali Labs. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved March 4, 2019.
Open source URL
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