T1195: Supply Chain Compromise
Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:
* Manipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a development environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (removable media infected at the factory)[1][2] * Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions * Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors * Shipment interdiction
While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.[3][4][5] Adversaries may limit targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious software to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with specific victims.[6][3][5] Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.[7]
In some cases, adversaries may conduct “second-order” supply chain compromises by leveraging the access gained from an initial supply chain compromise to further compromise a software component.[8] This may allow the threat actor to spread to even more victims.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1195: Supply Chain Compromise describes Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including: * Manipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a development environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms * Compromised/infected syste...
Executive priority
T1195: Supply Chain Compromise is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1195: Supply Chain Compromise by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (initial-access), supported platforms (Linux, Windows, macOS, SaaS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1195: Supply Chain Compromise appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Supply Chain Compromise
Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:
* Manipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a development environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (removable media infected at the factory)[1][2] * Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions * Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors * Shipment interdiction
While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.[3][4][5] Adversaries may limit targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious software to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with specific victims.[6][3][5] Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.[7]
In some cases, adversaries may conduct “second-order” supply chain compromises by leveraging the access gained from an initial supply chain compromise to further compromise a software component.[8] This may allow the threat actor to spread to even more victims.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1195.001 | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsSub-technique | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1195.003 | Compromise Hardware Supply ChainSub-technique | Compromise Hardware Supply Chain subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1195.002 | Compromise Software Supply ChainSub-technique | Compromise Software Supply Chain subtechnique of this object. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0034: Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]
In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
G1003: Ember Bear
Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).[1] Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.[2] Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.[3][4][1] There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.[2][5]
S1213: Lumma Stealer
Lumma Stealer is an information stealer malware family in use since at least 2022. Lumma Stealer is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) where captured data has been sold in criminal markets to Initial Access Brokers.[1][2][3][4][5]
S1148: Raccoon Stealer
Raccoon Stealer is an information stealer malware family active since at least 2019 as a malware-as-a-service offering sold in underground forums. Raccoon Stealer has experienced two periods of activity across two variants, from 2019 to March 2022, then resurfacing in a revised version in June 2022.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.7 | Current bundle | de186c86b0cb… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.7 | Older bundle | de186c86b0cb… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]IBM Storwize
IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
Open source URL - [2]Schneider Electric USB Malware
Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification – USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
Open source URL - [3]Avast CCleaner3 2018
Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]Microsoft Dofoil 2018
Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign. Retrieved March 20, 2018.
Open source URL - [5]Command Five SK 2011
Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [6]Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012
O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [7]Trendmicro NPM Compromise
Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
Open source URL - [8]Krebs 3cx overview 2023
Brian Krebs. (2023, April 20). 3CX Breach Was a Double Supply Chain Compromise. Retrieved May 22, 2025.
Open source URL - [9]mitre-attackT1195Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
