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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0334: DarkComet

DarkComet is a Windows remote administration tool and backdoor.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0334MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

DarkComet matters because ATT&CK describes it as a Windows remote administration tool and backdoor, with relationships to behaviors that support persistence, command execution, discovery, collection, command-and-control, and defense impairment. For leaders, the practical issue is not the tool name alone: it is whether Windows endpoint, identity, RDP, network, and registry telemetry can prove or disprove remote access, data collection, and persistence activity during an incident.

Executive priority

Prioritize DarkComet as a readiness test for Windows remote-access malware coverage. ATT&CK links it to multiple groups and to techniques such as RDP use, Windows command shell execution, registry modification, Run Keys/Startup Folder persistence, web-protocol C2, keylogging, clipboard collection, audio/video capture, tool transfer, and firewall/security-tool impairment. Executives should ask whether SOC and IR teams can quickly answer: which Windows hosts have suspicious remote access, what accounts were used, what persistence was created, what data or peripherals may have been accessed, and whether security controls or Windows Firewall were modified.

Technical view

The official object has no ATT&CK detection text, so detection engineering should be built from the related techniques and validated locally. Focus on Windows evidence for unusual RDP logons, command shell execution, new or modified registry keys including Run Keys, startup-folder changes, host firewall changes, process and system discovery, file transfer into the environment, web-protocol outbound communications, packed or disguised executables, clipboard access, keylogging indicators, and microphone/camera access. Relationship context also shows ATT&CK reporting of use by APT38, SilverTerrier, and Transparent Tribe; use that as threat-intelligence context, not as proof of attribution in any local case.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry, especially cmd.exe and discovery commands
  • Windows Security and RDP logon/session events for remote interactive access
  • Registry auditing for autoruns, Run Keys, startup-related persistence, and other modifications
  • File creation and executable metadata for newly introduced, packed, or suspiciously named binaries
  • Network proxy, DNS, firewall, and EDR network telemetry for outbound web-protocol communications

Detection direction

  • Treat the absence of official ATT&CK detection guidance as a coverage gap to close with behavior-based analytics mapped to the related techniques.
  • Correlate suspicious RDP activity with subsequent command shell execution, registry changes, file transfer, discovery commands, and outbound web traffic from the same Windows host.
  • Tune for false positives from legitimate administration tools, helpdesk activity, software deployment, remote support, and normal RDP use by requiring context such as unusual account, source, time, destination, newly created persistence, or security-control changes.
  • Validate detections for Run Key/Startup Folder persistence and Windows Firewall modification because those behaviors materially affect incident containment and recovery.
  • Review blind spots around endpoint telemetry depth: packed executables, renamed binaries in trusted-looking locations, clipboard/peripheral access, and security-tool impairment may be missed by log-only monitoring.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with Windows remote access governance: restrict and monitor RDP exposure, require strong account controls, and review who can initiate remote interactive sessions.
  • Harden persistence and configuration-change surfaces by controlling write access to autorun registry locations, startup folders, and Windows Firewall settings.
  • Maintain endpoint protection and logging resilience so attempts to disable, modify, or degrade security tools generate actionable alerts.
  • Use application control or equivalent execution controls where feasible to reduce execution of unauthorized remote administration tools, backdoors, and packed binaries.
  • Ensure IR playbooks cover credential risk, persistence removal, host isolation, log preservation, and review of possible collection from keyboard, clipboard, audio, and video sources.
Additional notes and limits

ATT&CK identifies DarkComet as software S0334, a Windows remote administration tool and backdoor. The object has no aliases listed in the main fields, but external references include names such as DarkKomet, FYNLOS, Fynloski, and Krademok. Related techniques provide the most useful defensive framing: RDP, software packing, user/process/system discovery, command shell execution, web-protocol C2, tool transfer, registry modification, clipboard/audio/video collection, Run Key persistence, security-tool impairment, and Windows host firewall modification.

The supplied ATT&CK object does not provide official detection guidance and does not list tactics directly on the malware object. Several related technique descriptions are truncated or have broader platform lists, so this take limits platform-specific conclusions to the supplied DarkComet platform: Windows. Local telemetry, baselines, business-approved remote administration patterns, and incident evidence are required before determining exposure, impact, or attribution.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

DarkComet

DarkComet is a Windows remote administration tool and backdoor.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

18 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1686.003Windows Host FirewallSub-technique

DarkComet can disable Security Center functions like the Windows Firewall.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1059Command and Scripting Interpreter

DarkComet can execute various types of scripts on the victim’s machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1115Clipboard Data

DarkComet can steal data from the clipboard.[2]

EnterpriseT1125Video Capture

DarkComet can access the victim’s webcam to take pictures.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

DarkComet can collect the computer name, RAM used, and operating system version from the victim’s machine.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

DarkComet can load any files onto the infected machine to execute.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

DarkComet can list active processes running on the victim’s machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

DarkComet can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique

DarkComet can open an active screen of the victim’s machine and take control of the mouse and keyboard.[2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

DarkComet adds several Registry entries to enable automatic execution at every system startup.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

DarkComet can disable Security Center functions like anti-virus.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

DarkComet can use HTTP for C2 communications.[2]

EnterpriseT1123Audio Capture

DarkComet can listen in to victims' conversations through the system’s microphone.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

DarkComet has the option to compress its payload using UPX or MPRESS.[2]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

DarkComet adds a Registry value for its installation routine to the Registry Key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System Enable LUA=”0” and HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\DC3_FEXEC.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

DarkComet has a keylogging capability.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

DarkComet gathers the username from the victim’s machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

DarkComet has dropped itself onto victim machines with file names such as WinDefender.Exe and winupdate.exe in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate file.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0082: APT38

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2]; some of their attacks have been destructive.[1][2][3][4]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0134: Transparent TribeEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1686.003: Windows Host FirewallEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059: Command and Scripting InterpreterEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1115: Clipboard DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1125: Video CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1021.001: Remote Desktop ProtocolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1685: Disable or Modify ToolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1123: Audio CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterpriseuses · GroupG0083: SilverTerrierEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · GroupG0082: APT38Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
bda8046af7fa88ec...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundlebda8046af7fa…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016

    Falcone, R. and Conant S. (2016, March 25). ProjectM: Link Found Between Pakistani Actor and Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved September 2, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Unit42 SilverTerrier 2018

    Unit42. (2016). SILVERTERRIER: THE RISE OF NIGERIAN BUSINESS EMAIL COMPROMISE. Retrieved November 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    FireEye APT38 Oct 2018

    FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    DarkComet

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  7. [7]
    DarkComet

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  8. [8]
    DarkComet

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  9. [9]
    DarkKomet

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  10. [10]
    DarkKomet

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  11. [11]
    DarkKomet

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  12. [12]
    FYNLOS

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  13. [13]
    FYNLOS

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  14. [14]
    FYNLOS

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  15. [15]
    Fynloski

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  16. [16]
    Fynloski

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  17. [17]
    Fynloski

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  18. [18]
    Krademok

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  19. [19]
    Krademok

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  20. [20]
    Krademok

    (Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)

  21. [21]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    mitre-attackS0334
    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    mitre-attackS0334
    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    mitre-attackS0334
    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016

    Falcone, R. and Conant S. (2016, March 25). ProjectM: Link Found Between Pakistani Actor and Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved September 2, 2021.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  57. [57]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  58. [58]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  59. [59]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  60. [60]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  61. [61]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  62. [62]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  63. [63]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  64. [64]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  65. [65]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  66. [66]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  67. [67]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  68. [68]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  69. [69]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  70. [70]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  72. [72]
    Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018

    Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
  73. [73]
    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014

    TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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