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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0376: HOPLIGHT

HOPLIGHT is a backdoor Trojan that has reportedly been used by the North Korean government.[1]

EnterpriseS0376MalwareObject v1.4Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0376: HOPLIGHT describes [HOPLIGHT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0376) is a backdoor Trojan that has reportedly been used by the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019)

Executive priority

S0376: HOPLIGHT is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0376: HOPLIGHT by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0376: HOPLIGHT appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

HOPLIGHT

HOPLIGHT is a backdoor Trojan that has reportedly been used by the North Korean government.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

21 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1652Device Driver Discovery

HOPLIGHT can enumerate device drivers located in the registry at `HKLM\Software\WBEM\WDM`.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

HOPLIGHT has modified Managed Object Format (MOF) files within the Registry to run specific commands and create persistence on the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1008Fallback Channels

HOPLIGHT has multiple C2 channels in place in case one fails.[1]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

A variant of HOPLIGHT hooks lsass.exe, and lsass.exe then checks the Registry for the data value 'rdpproto' under the key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa Name.[1]

EnterpriseT1090Proxy

HOPLIGHT has multiple proxy options that mask traffic between the malware and the remote operators.[1]

EnterpriseT1571Non-Standard Port

HOPLIGHT has connected outbound over TCP port 443 with a FakeTLS method.[1]

EnterpriseT1550.002Pass the HashSub-technique

HOPLIGHT has been observed loading several APIs associated with Pass the Hash.[1]

EnterpriseT1686Disable or Modify System Firewall

HOPLIGHT has modified the firewall using netsh.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

HOPLIGHT has been observed enumerating system drives and partitions.[1]

EnterpriseT1003.002Security Account ManagerSub-technique

HOPLIGHT has the capability to harvest credentials and passwords from the SAM database.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

HOPLIGHT can launch cmd.exe to execute commands on the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

HOPLIGHT has used its C2 channel to exfiltrate data.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

HOPLIGHT has utilized Zlib compression to obfuscate the communications payload. [1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

HOPLIGHT has been observed collecting victim machine information like OS version.[1]

EnterpriseT1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionSub-technique

HOPLIGHT can use WMI event subscriptions to create persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

HOPLIGHT has used svchost.exe to execute a malicious DLL .[1]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

HOPLIGHT has been observed collecting victim machine volume information.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

HOPLIGHT has the ability to connect to a remote host in order to upload and download files.[1]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

HOPLIGHT has used WMI to recompile the Managed Object Format (MOF) files in the WMI repository.[1]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

HOPLIGHT has been observed collecting system time from victim machines.[1]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

HOPLIGHT has injected into running processes.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0082: APT38

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2]; some of their attacks have been destructive.[1][2][3][4]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

GroupEnterprise

G0032: Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0082: APT38Enterpriseuses · GroupG0032: Lazarus GroupEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1652: Device Driver DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1008: Fallback ChannelsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090: ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1571: Non-Standard PortEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1550.002: Pass the HashEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1686: Disable or Modify System FirewallEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1003.002: Security Account ManagerEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1546.003: Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1569.002: Service ExecutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1680: Local Storage DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055: Process InjectionEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.4
Created
Modified
Raw hash
198cb5dd5a146256...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.4Current bundle198cb5dd5a14…
19.11.4Older bundle198cb5dd5a14…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019

    US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    HOPLIGHT

    (Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0376
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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