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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1053.003: Cron

Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.[1] The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.

An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence. In ESXi environments, cron jobs must be created directly via the crontab file (e.g., `/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root`).[2]

EnterpriseT1053.003Sub-techniqueObject v1.3Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1053.003: Cron describes Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths. An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or o...

Executive priority

T1053.003: Cron is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1053.003: Cron by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (execution, persistence, privilege-escalation), supported platforms (Linux, macOS, ESXi), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Identity, privilege, and authentication events
  • Endpoint process, command-line, and script execution logs
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1053.003: Cron appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Cron

Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.[1] The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.

An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence. In ESXi environments, cron jobs must be created directly via the crontab file (e.g., `/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root`).[2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1053Scheduled Task/JobThis object subtechnique of Scheduled Task/Job.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0082: APT38

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2]; some of their attacks have been destructive.[1][2][3][4]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

GroupEnterprise

G0106: Rocke

Rocke is an alleged Chinese-speaking adversary whose primary objective appeared to be cryptojacking, or stealing victim system resources for the purposes of mining cryptocurrency. The name Rocke comes from the email address "rocke@live.cn" used to create the wallet which held collected cryptocurrency. Researchers have detected overlaps between Rocke and the Iron Cybercrime Group, though this attribution has not been confirmed.[1]

GroupEnterprise

G1023: APT5

APT5 is a China-based espionage actor that has been active since at least 2007 primarily targeting the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense industries throughout the U.S., Europe, and Asia. APT5 has displayed advanced tradecraft and significant interest in compromising networking devices and their underlying software including through the use of zero-day exploits.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

MalwareEnterprise

S0198: NETWIRE

NETWIRE is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012.[1][2][3]

WindowsLinuxmacOS
MalwareEnterprise

S0588: GoldMax

GoldMax is a second-stage C2 backdoor written in Go with Windows and Linux variants that are nearly identical in functionality. GoldMax was discovered in early 2021 during the investigation into the SolarWinds Compromise, and has likely been used by APT29 since at least mid-2019. GoldMax uses multiple defense evasion techniques, including avoiding virtualization execution and masking malicious traffic.[1][2][3]

WindowsLinux
MalwareEnterprise

S0504: Anchor

Anchor is one of a family of backdoor malware that has been used in conjunction with TrickBot on selected high profile targets since at least 2018.[1][2]

LinuxWindows
MalwareEnterprise

S0341: Xbash

Xbash is a malware family that has targeted Linux and Microsoft Windows servers. The malware has been tied to the Iron Group, a threat actor group known for previous ransomware attacks. Xbash was developed in Python and then converted into a self-contained Linux ELF executable by using PyInstaller.[1]

WindowsLinux
MalwareEnterprise

S0374: SpeakUp

SpeakUp is a Trojan backdoor that targets both Linux and OSX devices. It was first observed in January 2019. [1]

LinuxmacOS
MalwareEnterprise

S1107: NKAbuse

NKAbuse is a Go-based, multi-platform malware abusing NKN (New Kind of Network) technology for data exchange between peers, functioning as a potent implant, and equipped with both flooder and backdoor capabilities.[1][2]

LinuxmacOSWindows
MalwareEnterprise

S0599: Kinsing

Kinsing is Golang-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. [1][2][3]

ContainersLinux
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
1c3523f53364d912...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundle1c3523f53364…
19.11.3Older bundle1c3523f53364…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques

    Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    CloudSEK ESXiArgs 2023

    Mehardeep Singh Sawhney. (2023, February 9). Analysis of Files Used in ESXiArgs Ransomware Attack Against VMware ESXi Servers. Retrieved March 26, 2025.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackT1053.003
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.