T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2]; some of their attacks have been destructive.[1][2][3][4]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

APT37 is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. APT37 has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018.[1][2][3]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” [1] [2] Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. [3] For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally. [4]

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

AcidRain is an ELF binary targeting modems and routers using MIPS architecture.[1] AcidRain is associated with the ViaSat KA-SAT communication outage that took place during the initial phases of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Analysis indicates overlap with another network device-targeting malware, VPNFilter, associated with Sandworm Team.[1] US and European government sources linked AcidRain to Russian government entities, while Ukrainian government sources linked AcidRain specifically to Sandworm Team.[2][3]

AvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.[1][2][3]

Olympic Destroyer is malware that was used by Sandworm Team against the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The main purpose of the malware was to render infected computer systems inoperable. The malware leverages various native Windows utilities and API calls to carry out its destructive tasks. Olympic Destroyer has worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network in order to maximize its destructive impact.[1][2]

DynoWiper is a destructive malware associated with the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks in December of 2025. DynoWiper is a native Windows binary that is distributed by a PowerShell script and overwrites files using data generated by the Mersenne Twister algorithm before they are deleted from the system. Multiple variants of DynoWiper have been identified, with the primary differences being that one variant shuts down the system after completing its destructive operations, and another introduces a time delay between file overwriting and deletion.[1][2]

ShrinkLocker is a VBS-based malicious script that leverages the legitimate Bitlocker application to encrypt files on victim systems for ransom. ShrinkLocker functions by using Bitlocker to encrypt files, then renames impacted drives to the adversary’s contact email address to facilitate communication for the ransom payment.[1][2]

Apostle is malware that has functioned as both a wiper and, in more recent versions, as ransomware. Apostle is written in .NET and shares various programming and functional overlaps with IPsec Helper.[1]

WhisperGate is a multi-stage wiper designed to look like ransomware that has been used against multiple government, non-profit, and information technology organizations in Ukraine since at least January 2022.[1][2][3]

AcidPour is a variant of AcidRain designed to impact a wider range of x86 architecture Linux devices. AcidPour is an x86 ELF binary that expands on the targeted devices and locations in AcidRain by including items such as Unsorted Block Image (UBI), Deice Mapper (DM), and various flash memory references. Based on this expanded targeting, AcidPour can impact a variety of device types including IoT, networking, and ICS embedded device types.[1] AcidPour is a wiping payload associated with the Sandworm Team threat actor, and potentially linked to attacks against Ukrainian internet service providers (ISPs) in 2023.[2]

CHIMNEYSWEEP is a backdoor malware that was deployed during HomeLand Justice along with ROADSWEEP ransomware, and has been used to target Farsi and Arabic speakers since at least 2012.[1]

DCSrv is destructive malware that has been used by Moses Staff since at least September 2021. Though DCSrv has ransomware-like capabilities, Moses Staff does not demand ransom or offer a decryption key.[1]

NotPetya is malware that was used by Sandworm Team in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While NotPetya appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, NotPetya may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. NotPetya contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.[1][2][3][4]

LockerGoga is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.[1][2]

2025 Poland Wiper Attacks is a Russian state-sponsored campaign that conducted destructive cyberattacks against Polish energy infrastructure in December 2025. Targets included more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, and a manufacturing sector company. The attacks on the distributed energy resources (DER) disrupted communications between affected facilities and the distribution system operator, but did not impact electricity generation or heat supply. Across the campaign, threat actors deployed two previously undocumented wiper tools, DynoWiper, a Windows-based wiper and LazyWiper, a PowerShell wiper, distributed via malicious Group Policy Objects. At the CHP plant, threat actors had maintained access since at least March 2025, using that foothold to obtain credentials and move laterally before attempting wiper deployment. Some reporting has assessed the activity to be consistent with Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) threat activity group Dragonfly, also tracked as STATIC TUNDRA, while other reporting attributes the destructive wiper activities to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) threat activity group ELECTRUM, also tracked as Sandworm Team.[1][2][3][4]