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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0241: RATANKBA

MITRE ATT&CK S0241: RATANKBA Malware details for Windows, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.

EnterpriseS0241MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

RATANKBA matters because it represents a Windows remote controller capability associated in ATT&CK with Lazarus Group and reported use against financial institutions and multiple enterprise sectors. For leaders, the key risk is not just “malware present,” but an operator-controlled foothold that can run jobs, discover users, services, systems, network connections, and configuration details, and potentially transfer additional tools.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a resilience and incident-readiness use case for Windows estates, especially where financial services, telecommunications, aviation, education, insurance, IT, or consulting operations are material. Executives should ask whether the SOC can prove visibility into Windows discovery, command execution, WMI, PowerShell, web-based command-and-control, and file transfer behaviors—not just whether malware signatures exist. This object is also useful for audit and risk discussions because it maps to concrete control evidence: endpoint logging, egress monitoring, administrative tool governance, and response procedures for suspected remote access malware.

Technical view

ATT&CK does not provide a detection section for RATANKBA, so defensive validation should be driven by the related techniques. On Windows, teams should test whether they can observe and correlate service discovery, registry queries, network and remote system discovery, user and account discovery, process discovery, WMI execution, PowerShell and cmd execution, DLL injection indicators, web-protocol command-and-control, and ingress tool transfer. The most useful analytic view is likely behavioral: unusual discovery followed by command execution, outbound web traffic, or new file/tool creation from a non-administrative or unexpected host context.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows process creation and command-line telemetry for cmd.exe, PowerShell, discovery utilities, and administrative commands
  • PowerShell logging where enabled, including script block/module activity relevant to execution and discovery
  • WMI activity logs and endpoint telemetry showing local or remote WMI execution
  • Windows Registry access/query telemetry where available
  • Service, process, local account, logged-on user, network configuration, and network connection discovery evidence

Detection direction

  • Do not rely on a RATANKBA-specific signature alone; ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this software object.
  • Build and tune detections around clusters of related behaviors: discovery commands, registry queries, WMI, PowerShell/cmd execution, outbound HTTP/S-like traffic, and new tool/file introduction.
  • Baseline legitimate administrative use of WMI, PowerShell, service queries, registry queries, and network discovery to reduce false positives from IT operations.
  • Pay attention to sequencing: discovery across users, processes, services, network configuration, and remote systems can be more meaningful when followed by command execution or external communications.
  • Validate visibility on Windows endpoints specifically, since Windows is the platform supplied for RATANKBA.

Mitigation priorities

  • Confirm endpoint detection and logging coverage for Windows command execution, PowerShell, WMI, registry access, process activity, and file creation.
  • Restrict and monitor administrative tooling such as WMI, PowerShell, and command shell usage according to least privilege and operational need.
  • Apply egress controls and proxy/DNS/firewall monitoring so web-protocol command-and-control and tool transfer are reviewable and enforceable.
  • Use application control or execution governance where practical to reduce unauthorized tool execution and DLL abuse opportunities.
  • Segment sensitive systems and financial or operationally critical environments to limit the value of discovery and reduce lateral movement options after compromise.
Additional notes and limits

The strongest source-supported points are that RATANKBA is a Windows remote controller tool, is associated by ATT&CK with Lazarus Group, has been reported in activity affecting financial institutions and other enterprise sectors, and is related to multiple discovery, execution, command-and-control, ingress transfer, and DLL injection techniques. Glexia’s defensive emphasis is therefore on proving behavioral coverage across those related techniques rather than treating this as a single malware-name detection problem.

ATT&CK does not supply official detection guidance, aliases, labels, or explicit tactics for the RATANKBA object itself. The telemetry and control guidance above is inferred from the supplied relationships to ATT&CK techniques and must be validated against the local Windows environment, logging configuration, administrative practices, and network architecture. No claim is made that RATANKBA is currently active in any specific environment.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

RATANKBA

No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User DiscoveryThis object uses System Owner/User Discovery.
EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections DiscoveryThis object uses System Network Connections Discovery.
EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-techniqueThis object uses Windows Command Shell.
EnterpriseT1007System Service DiscoveryThis object uses System Service Discovery.
EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-techniqueThis object uses Web Protocols.
EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-techniqueThis object uses Dynamic-link Library Injection.
EnterpriseT1047Windows Management InstrumentationThis object uses Windows Management Instrumentation.
EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-techniqueThis object uses Local Account.
EnterpriseT1057Process DiscoveryThis object uses Process Discovery.
EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryThis object uses System Network Configuration Discovery.
EnterpriseT1018Remote System DiscoveryThis object uses Remote System Discovery.
EnterpriseT1012Query RegistryThis object uses Query Registry.
EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool TransferThis object uses Ingress Tool Transfer.
EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-techniqueThis object uses PowerShell.
EnterpriseT1082System Information DiscoveryThis object uses System Information Discovery.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0032: Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1049: System Network Connections DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055.001: Dynamic-link Library InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · GroupG0032: Lazarus GroupEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
29a4dcced5895ab2...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundle29a4dcced589…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS0241
    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    mitre-attackS0241
    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    mitre-attackS0241
    Open source URL
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    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
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    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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