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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0241: RATANKBA

RATANKBA is a remote controller tool used by Lazarus Group. RATANKBA has been used in attacks targeting financial institutions in Poland, Mexico, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, and Chile. It was also seen used against organizations related to telecommunications, management consulting, information technology, insurance, aviation, and education. RATANKBA has a graphical user interface to allow the attacker to issue jobs to perform on the infected machines. [1] [2]

EnterpriseS0241MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0241: RATANKBA describes [RATANKBA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0241) is a remote controller tool used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). [RATANKBA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0241) has been used in attacks targeting financial institutions in Poland, Mexico, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, and Chile. It was also seen used against organizations related to telecommunications, management consulting, information technology, insurance, aviation, and education. [RATANKBA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S024...

Executive priority

S0241: RATANKBA is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0241: RATANKBA by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0241: RATANKBA appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

RATANKBA

RATANKBA is a remote controller tool used by Lazarus Group. RATANKBA has been used in attacks targeting financial institutions in Poland, Mexico, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, and Chile. It was also seen used against organizations related to telecommunications, management consulting, information technology, insurance, aviation, and education. RATANKBA has a graphical user interface to allow the attacker to issue jobs to perform on the infected machines. [1] [2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

RATANKBA runs the whoami and query user commands.[2]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

RATANKBA uses netstat -ano to search for specific IP address ranges.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

RATANKBA uses cmd.exe to execute commands.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

RATANKBA uses tasklist /svc to display running tasks.[2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

RATANKBA uses HTTP/HTTPS for command and control communication.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

RATANKBA performs a reflective DLL injection using a given pid.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

RATANKBA uses WMI to perform process monitoring.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

RATANKBA uses the net user command.[2]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

RATANKBA lists the system’s processes.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

RATANKBA gathers the victim’s IP address via the ipconfig -all command.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

RATANKBA runs the net view /domain and net view commands.[2]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

RATANKBA uses the command reg query “HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\InternetSettings”.[2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

RATANKBA uploads and downloads information.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

There is a variant of RATANKBA that uses a PowerShell script instead of the traditional PE form.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

RATANKBA gathers information about the OS architecture, OS name, and OS version/Service pack.[1][2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0032: Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0032: Lazarus GroupEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1049: System Network Connections DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055.001: Dynamic-link Library InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
29a4dcced5895ab2...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle29a4dcced589…
19.11.1Older bundle29a4dcced589…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Lazarus RATANKBA

    Lei, C., et al. (2018, January 24). Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    RATANKBA

    Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0241
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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