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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0238: Proxysvc

Proxysvc is a malicious DLL used by Lazarus Group in a campaign known as Operation GhostSecret. It has appeared to be operating undetected since 2017 and was mostly observed in higher education organizations. The goal of Proxysvc is to deliver additional payloads to the target and to maintain control for the attacker. It is in the form of a DLL that can also be executed as a standalone process. [1]

EnterpriseS0238MalwareObject v1.3Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0238: Proxysvc describes [Proxysvc](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0238) is a malicious DLL used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) in a campaign known as Operation GhostSecret. It has appeared to be operating undetected since 2017 and was mostly observed in higher education organizations. The goal of [Proxysvc](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0238) is to deliver additional payloads to the target and to maintain control for the attacker. It is in the form of a DLL that can also be executed as a standalone proc...

Executive priority

S0238: Proxysvc is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0238: Proxysvc by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0238: Proxysvc appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Proxysvc

Proxysvc is a malicious DLL used by Lazarus Group in a campaign known as Operation GhostSecret. It has appeared to be operating undetected since 2017 and was mostly observed in higher education organizations. The goal of Proxysvc is to deliver additional payloads to the target and to maintain control for the attacker. It is in the form of a DLL that can also be executed as a standalone process. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Proxysvc searches the local system and gathers data.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Proxysvc uses HTTP over SSL to communicate commands with the control server.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Proxysvc can delete files indicated by the attacker and remove itself from disk using a batch file.[1]

EnterpriseT1119Automated Collection

Proxysvc automatically collects data about the victim and sends it to the control server.[1]

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

Proxysvc registers itself as a service on the victim’s machine to run as a standalone process.[1]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Proxysvc collects volume information for all drives on the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Proxysvc lists files in directories.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Proxysvc collects the OS version, country name, MAC address, computer name, and physical memory statistics.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Proxysvc lists processes running on the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Proxysvc performs data exfiltration over the control server channel using a custom protocol.[1]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

Proxysvc gathers product names from the Registry key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion ProductName and the processor description from the Registry key HKLM\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 ProcessorNameString.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Proxysvc collects the network adapter information and domain/username information based on current remote sessions.[1]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

As part of the data reconnaissance phase, Proxysvc grabs the system time to send back to the control server.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Proxysvc executes a binary on the system and logs the results into a temp file by using: cmd.exe /c " > %temp%\PM* .tmp 2>&1".[1]

EnterpriseT1485Data Destruction

Proxysvc can overwrite files indicated by the attacker before deleting them.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0032: Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0032: Lazarus GroupEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1119: Automated CollectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1569.002: Service ExecutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1680: Local Storage DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1485: Data DestructionEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
e5c6763fbfd91808...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundlee5c6763fbfd9…
19.11.3Older bundlee5c6763fbfd9…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    McAfee GhostSecret

    Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A. (2018, April 24). Analyzing Operation GhostSecret: Attack Seeks to Steal Data Worldwide. Retrieved May 16, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Proxysvc

    (Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0238
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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