S0431: HotCroissant
HotCroissant is a remote access trojan (RAT) attributed by U.S. government entities to malicious North Korean government cyber activity, tracked collectively as HIDDEN COBRA.[1] HotCroissant shares numerous code similarities with Rifdoor.[2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0431: HotCroissant describes [HotCroissant](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0431) is a remote access trojan (RAT) attributed by U.S. government entities to malicious North Korean government cyber activity, tracked collectively as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HOTCROISSANT February 2020) [HotCroissant](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0431) shares numerous code similarities with [Rifdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0433).(Citation: Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020)
Executive priority
S0431: HotCroissant is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0431: HotCroissant by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0431: HotCroissant appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
HotCroissant
HotCroissant is a remote access trojan (RAT) attributed by U.S. government entities to malicious North Korean government cyber activity, tracked collectively as HIDDEN COBRA.[1] HotCroissant shares numerous code similarities with Rifdoor.[2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | HotCroissant has the ability to download files from the infected host to the command and control (C2) server.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | HotCroissant has compressed network communications and encrypted them with a custom stream cipher.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | HotCroissant has the ability to clean up installed files, delete files, and delete itself from the victim’s machine.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | HotCroissant can perform dynamic DLL importing and API lookups using |
| Enterprise | T1027.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | HotCroissant has used the open source UPX executable packer.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | HotCroissant has the ability to retrieve a list of files in a given directory as well as drives and drive types.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1489 | Service Stop | HotCroissant has the ability to stop services on the infected host.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | HotCroissant has the ability to upload a file from the command and control (C2) server to the victim machine.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | HotCroissant can remotely open applications on the infected host with the |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | HotCroissant has the ability to list running processes on the infected host.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1007 | System Service Discovery | HotCroissant has the ability to retrieve a list of services on the infected host.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | HotCroissant has the ability to collect the username on the infected host.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | HotCroissant has encrypted strings with single-byte XOR and base64 encoded RC4.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1010 | Application Window Discovery | HotCroissant has the ability to list the names of all open windows on the infected host.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery | HotCroissant can retrieve a list of applications from the |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | HotCroissant has the ability to determine if the current user is an administrator, Windows product name, processor name, screen resolution, and physical RAM of the infected host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | HotCroissant has the ability to do real time screen viewing on an infected host.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | HotCroissant has the ability to identify the IP address of the compromised machine.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | HotCroissant has attempted to install a scheduled task named “Java Maintenance64” on startup to establish persistence.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | HotCroissant has the ability to hide the window for operations performed on a given file.[2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0032: Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]
North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 9b8bc1d0999a… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 9b8bc1d0999a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]US-CERT HOTCROISSANT February 2020
US-CERT. (2020, February 20). MAR-10271944-1.v1 – North Korean Trojan: HOTCROISSANT. Retrieved May 1, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020
Knight, S.. (2020, April 16). VMware Carbon Black TAU Threat Analysis: The Evolution of Lazarus. Retrieved May 1, 2020.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS0431Open source URL
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