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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1655.001: Match Legitimate Name or Location

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by giving artifacts the name and icon of a legitimate, trusted application (i.e., Settings), or using a package name that matches legitimate, trusted applications (i.e., `com.google.android.gm`).

Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file or application they are trying to mimic.

MobileT1655.001Sub-techniqueObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1655.001: Match Legitimate Name or Location describes Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by giving artifacts the name and icon of a legitimate, trusted application (i.e., Settings), or using a package name that matches legitimate, trusted applications (i.e., `com.google.android.gm`). Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file or application they are trying to mimic.

Executive priority

T1655.001: Match Legitimate Name or Location is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1655.001: Match Legitimate Name or Location by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (defense-evasion), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Identity, privilege, and authentication events

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1655.001: Match Legitimate Name or Location appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Match Legitimate Name or Location

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by giving artifacts the name and icon of a legitimate, trusted application (i.e., Settings), or using a package name that matches legitimate, trusted applications (i.e., `com.google.android.gm`).

Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file or application they are trying to mimic.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1655MasqueradingThis object subtechnique of Masquerading.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupMobile

G1028: APT-C-23

APT-C-23 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014.[1] APT-C-23 has primarily focused its operations on the Middle East, including Israeli military assets. APT-C-23 has developed mobile spyware targeting Android and iOS devices since 2017.[2]

MalwareMobile

S0480: Cerberus

Cerberus is a banking trojan whose usage can be rented on underground forums and marketplaces. Prior to being available to rent, the authors of Cerberus claim was used in private operations for two years.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0320: DroidJack

DroidJack is an Android remote access tool that has been observed posing as legitimate applications including the Super Mario Run and Pokemon GO games. [1] [2]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0551: GoldenEagle

GoldenEagle is a piece of Android malware that has been used in targeting of Uyghurs, Muslims, Tibetans, individuals in Turkey, and individuals in China. Samples have been found as early as 2012.[1]

MalwareMobile

S1083: Chameleon

Chameleon is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android’s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, Chameleon has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official applications. A new variant of Chameleon has expanded its targets to include Android users in the United Kingdom and Italy.[1][2]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0301: Dendroid

Dendroid is an Android remote access tool (RAT) primarily targeting Western countries. The RAT was available for purchase for $300 and came bundled with a utility to inject the RAT into legitimate applications.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S9005: DocSwap

DocSwap is an Android malware first identified in 2025, and attributed to Kimsuky. DocSwap’s name is a combination of its Korean name “문서열람 인증 앱” (Document Viewing Authentication App) and a phishing page masquerading as CoinSwap at the C2 address. Based on DocSwap’s name and Korean-language strings, DocSwap potentially targets mobile device users in South Korea. Several variants of DocSwap exist; one of the latest samples indicates that the adversary added a native decryption function that decrypts an internal APK.[1][2]

Android
MalwareMobile

S1080: Fakecalls

Fakecalls is an Android trojan, first detected in January 2021, that masquerades as South Korean banking apps. It has capabilities to intercept calls to banking institutions and even maintain realistic dialogues with the victim using pre-recorded audio snippets.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0485: Mandrake

Mandrake is a sophisticated Android espionage platform that has been active in the wild since at least 2016. Mandrake is very actively maintained, with sophisticated features and attacks that are executed with surgical precision.

Mandrake has gone undetected for several years by providing legitimate, ad-free applications with social media and real reviews to back the apps. The malware is only activated when the operators issue a specific command.[1]

Android
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
3eb05942136178b0...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle3eb059421361…
19.11.0Older bundle3eb059421361…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-14
    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-31
    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackT1655.001
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.