S0550: DoubleAgent
DoubleAgent is a family of RAT malware dating back to 2013, known to target groups with contentious relationships with the Chinese government.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0550: DoubleAgent describes [DoubleAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0550) is a family of RAT malware dating back to 2013, known to target groups with contentious relationships with the Chinese government.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)
Executive priority
S0550: DoubleAgent is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0550: DoubleAgent by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0550: DoubleAgent appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
DoubleAgent
DoubleAgent is a family of RAT malware dating back to 2013, known to target groups with contentious relationships with the Chinese government.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1628.001 | Suppress Application IconSub-technique | DoubleAgent has hidden its app icon.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.003 | Contact ListSub-technique | DoubleAgent has accessed the contact list.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.004 | SMS MessagesSub-technique | DoubleAgent has captured SMS and MMS messages.[1] |
| Mobile | T1645 | Compromise Client Software Binary | DoubleAgent has used exploits to root devices and install additional malware on the system partition.[1] |
| Mobile | T1623.001 | Unix ShellSub-technique | DoubleAgent can run arbitrary shell commands.[1] |
| Mobile | T1429 | Audio Capture | DoubleAgent has captured audio and can record phone calls.[1] |
| Mobile | T1407 | Download New Code at Runtime | DoubleAgent has downloaded additional code to root devices, such as TowelRoot.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.002 | Call LogSub-technique | DoubleAgent has accessed the call logs.[1] |
| Mobile | T1630.002 | File DeletionSub-technique | DoubleAgent has deleted or renamed specific files.[1] |
| Mobile | T1533 | Data from Local System | DoubleAgent has collected files from the infected device.[1] |
| Mobile | T1437 | Application Layer Protocol | DoubleAgent has used both FTP and TCP sockets for data exfiltration.[1] |
| Mobile | T1404 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | DoubleAgent has used exploit tools to gain root, such as TowelRoot.[1] |
| Mobile | T1406 | Obfuscated Files or Information | DoubleAgent has used an AES encrypted file in the assets folder with an unsuspecting name (e.g. ‘GoogleMusic.png’) for holding configuration and C2 information.[1] |
| Mobile | T1409 | Stored Application Data | DoubleAgent has accessed browser history, as well as the files for 15 other apps.[1] |
| Mobile | T1420 | File and Directory Discovery | DoubleAgent has searched for specific existing data directories, including the Gmail app, Dropbox app, Pictures, and thumbnails.[1] |
| Mobile | T1418 | Software Discovery | DoubleAgent has accessed the list of installed apps.[1] |
| Mobile | T1655.001 | Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique | DoubleAgent has been embedded into trojanized versions of applications such as Voxer, TalkBox, and Amaq News.[1] |
| Mobile | T1426 | System Information Discovery | DoubleAgent has accessed common system information.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | efc50187bd2d… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | efc50187bd2d… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Lookout Uyghur Campaign
A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0550Open source URL
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