S1068: BlackCat
BlackCat is ransomware written in Rust that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. First observed November 2021, BlackCat has been used to target multiple sectors and organizations in various countries and regions in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1068: BlackCat describes [BlackCat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1068) is ransomware written in Rust that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. First observed November 2021, [BlackCat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1068) has been used to target multiple sectors and organizations in various countries and regions in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe.(Citation: Microsoft BlackCat Jun 2022)(Citation: Sophos BlackCat Jul 2022)(Citation: ACSC BlackCat Apr 2022)
Executive priority
S1068: BlackCat is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1068: BlackCat by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1068: BlackCat appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
BlackCat
BlackCat is ransomware written in Rust that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. First observed November 2021, BlackCat has been used to target multiple sectors and organizations in various countries and regions in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1685.005 | Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | |
| Enterprise | T1489 | Service Stop | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1087.002 | Domain AccountSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1069.002 | Domain GroupsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | |
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1222.001 | Windows PermissionsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1491.001 | Internal DefacementSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1561.001 | Disk Content WipeSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | |
| Enterprise | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1015: Scattered Spider
Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022. [1] [2] The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. [2] Scattered Spider relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain. [3] [4] [5] Scattered Spider had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. [6]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | fd84985015c2… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | fd84985015c2… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Microsoft BlackCat Jun 2022
Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence. (2022, June 13). The many lives of BlackCat ransomware. Retrieved December 20, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]Sophos BlackCat Jul 2022
Brandt, Andrew. (2022, July 14). BlackCat ransomware attacks not merely a byproduct of bad luck. Retrieved December 20, 2022.
Open source URL - [3]ACSC BlackCat Apr 2022
Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2022, April 14). 2022-004: ACSC Ransomware Profile - ALPHV (aka BlackCat). Retrieved December 20, 2022.
Open source URL - [4]ALPHV
(Citation: Microsoft BlackCat Jun 2022)(Citation: ACSC BlackCat Apr 2022)
- [5]Noberus
(Citation: ACSC BlackCat Apr 2022)
- [6]mitre-attackS1068Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
