S0372: LockerGoga
LockerGoga is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0372: LockerGoga describes [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)
Executive priority
S0372: LockerGoga is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0372: LockerGoga by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0372: LockerGoga appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
LockerGoga
LockerGoga is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | LockerGoga has been observed deleting its original launcher after execution.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | LockerGoga has encrypted files, including core Windows OS files, using RSA-OAEP MGF1 and then demanded Bitcoin be paid for the decryption key.[2][1]CitationWired Lockergoga 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1529 | System Shutdown/Reboot | LockerGoga has been observed shutting down infected systems.CitationWired Lockergoga 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1531 | Account Access Removal | LockerGoga has been observed changing account passwords and logging off current users.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | LockerGoga installation has been immediately preceded by a "task kill" command in order to disable anti-virus.CitationWired Lockergoga 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | LockerGoga has been signed with stolen certificates in order to make it look more legitimate.CitationWired Lockergoga 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer | LockerGoga has been observed moving around the victim network via SMB, indicating the actors behind this ransomware are manually copying files form computer to computer instead of self-propagating.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0037: FIN6
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.1 | Current bundle | bb305f34cd81… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.1 | Older bundle | bb305f34cd81… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Unit42 LockerGoga 2019
Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.
Open source URL - [2]CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019
CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS0372Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.