S1160: Latrodectus
Latrodectus is a Windows malware downloader that has been used since at least 2023 to download and execute additional payloads and modules. Latrodectus has most often been distributed through email campaigns, primarily by TA577 and TA578, and has infrastructure overlaps with historic IcedID operations.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1160: Latrodectus describes [Latrodectus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160) is a Windows malware downloader that has been used since at least 2023 to download and execute additional payloads and modules. [Latrodectus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160) has most often been distributed through email campaigns, primarily by [TA577](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1037) and [TA578](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1038), and has infrastructure overlaps with historic [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483) operations.(Citat...
Executive priority
S1160: Latrodectus is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1160: Latrodectus by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1160: Latrodectus appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Latrodectus
Latrodectus is a Windows malware downloader that has been used since at least 2023 to download and execute additional payloads and modules. Latrodectus has most often been distributed through email campaigns, primarily by TA577 and TA578, and has infrastructure overlaps with historic IcedID operations.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | Latrodectus has used Google Firebase to download malicious installation scripts.CitationPalo Alto Latrodectus Activity June 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32Sub-technique | Latrodectus can use rundll32.exe to execute downloaded DLLs.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[2] |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | Latrodectus has Base64-encoded the message body of a HTTP request sent to C2.[1]CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | The Latrodectus command handler can use `cmdexe` to run multiple discovery commands.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | Latrodectus can discover the IP and MAC address of a targeted host.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1218.007 | MsiexecSub-technique | Latrodectus has called `msiexec` to install remotely-hosted MSI files.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery | Latrodectus can run `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c net view /all` to discover network shares.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | Latrodectus can enumerate running processes including process grandchildren on targeted hosts.[1]CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | Latrodectus can discover the username of an infected host.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | Latrodectus can create scheduled tasks for persistence.[1]CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious LinkSub-technique | Latrodectus has been executed through malicious links distributed in email campaigns.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1027.007 | Dynamic API ResolutionSub-technique | Latrodectus can resolve Windows APIs dynamically by hash.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | Latrodectus can collect data from a compromised host using a stealer module.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | Latrodectus has been distributed through reply-chain phishing emails with malicious attachments.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Latrodectus has the ability to deobfuscate encrypted strings.[1]CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | Latrodectus has the ability to delete itself.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Latrodectus can collect desktop filenames.[1][3]CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1559.001 | Component Object ModelSub-technique | Latrodectus can use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) to set scheduled tasks.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1027.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | The Latrodectus payload has been packed for obfuscation.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1059.007 | JavaScriptSub-technique | Latrodectus has used JavaScript files as part its infection chain during malicious spam email campaigns.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3]CitationPalo Alto Latrodectus Activity June 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Latrodectus can download and execute PEs, DLLs, and shellcode from C2.[1]CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | Latrodectus can send registration information to C2 via HTTP `POST`.[1]CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Latrodectus can exfiltrate encrypted system information to the C2 server.[1][3] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | Latrodectus has been packed to appear as a component to Bitdefender’s kernel-mode driver, TRUFOS.SYS.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | Latrodectus has used multiple Windows API post exploitation including `GetAdaptersInfo`, `CreateToolhelp32Snapshot`, and `CreateProcessW`.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | Latrodectus has lured users into opening malicious email attachments for execution.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1104 | Multi-Stage Channels | Latrodectus has used a two-tiered C2 configuration with tier one nodes connecting to the victim and tier two nodes connecting to backend infrastructure.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery | Latrodectus can run `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c nltest /domain_trusts` to discover domain trusts.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1027.001 | Binary PaddingSub-technique | Latrodectus has been obfuscated with a 129 byte sequence of junk data prepended to the file.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1529 | System Shutdown/Reboot | Latrodectus has the ability to restart compromised hosts.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Latrodectus can gather operating system information.[1]CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | Latrodectus has the ability to identify installed antivirus products.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | Latrodectus can send RC4 encrypted data over C2 channels.[1]CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1564.004 | NTFS File AttributesSub-technique | Latrodectus can delete itself while its process is still running through the use of an alternate data stream.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1069.002 | Domain GroupsSub-technique | Latrodectus can identify domain groups through `cmd.exe /c net group "Domain Admins" /domain`.[3]CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | Latrodectus has used a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) algorithm and a rolling XOR key to obfuscate strings.[1]CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | Latrodectus can set an AutoRun key to establish persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1497.001 | System ChecksSub-technique | Latrodectus can determine if it is running in a virtualized environment by checking the OS version, checking the number of running processes, ensuring a 64-bit application is running on a 64-bit host, and checking if the host has a valid MAC address.[1]CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing LinkSub-technique | Latrodectus has been distributed to victims through emails containing malicious links.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | Latrodectus has used WMI in malicious email infection chains to facilitate the installation of remotely-hosted files.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024[3] |
| Enterprise | T1622 | Debugger Evasion | Latrodectus has the ability to check for the presence of debuggers.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1087.002 | Domain AccountSub-technique | Latrodectus can run `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c net group "Domain Admins" /domain` to identify domain administrator accounts.CitationElastic Latrodectus May 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1021.005 | VNCSub-technique | Latrodectus has routed C2 traffic using Keyhole VNC.CitationPalo Alto Latrodectus Activity June 2024 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1037: TA577
TA577 is an initial access broker (IAB) that has distributed QakBot and Pikabot, and was among the first observed groups distributing Latrodectus in 2023.[1]
G1038: TA578
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | bee5219d1dcc… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | bee5219d1dcc… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Latrodectus APR 2024
Proofpoint Threat Research and Team Cymru S2 Threat Research. (2024, April 4). Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice . Retrieved May 31, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]Bleeping Computer Latrodectus April 2024
Abrams, L. (2024, April 30). New Latrodectus malware attacks use Microsoft, Cloudflare themes. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]Bitsight Latrodectus June 2024
Batista, J. (2024, June 17). Latrodectus, are you coming back?. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]IceNova
(Citation: Bleeping Computer Latrodectus April 2024)
- [5]Unidentified 111
(Citation: Bleeping Computer Latrodectus April 2024)
- [6]mitre-attackS1160Open source URL
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