S1135: MultiLayer Wiper
MultiLayer Wiper is wiper malware written in .NET associated with Agrius operations. Observed samples of MultiLayer Wiper have an anomalous, future compilation date suggesting possible metadata manipulation.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1135: MultiLayer Wiper describes [MultiLayer Wiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1135) is wiper malware written in .NET associated with [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) operations. Observed samples of [MultiLayer Wiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1135) have an anomalous, future compilation date suggesting possible metadata manipulation.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
Executive priority
S1135: MultiLayer Wiper is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1135: MultiLayer Wiper by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1135: MultiLayer Wiper appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
MultiLayer Wiper
MultiLayer Wiper is wiper malware written in .NET associated with Agrius operations. Observed samples of MultiLayer Wiper have an anomalous, future compilation date suggesting possible metadata manipulation.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1529 | System Shutdown/Reboot | MultiLayer Wiper reboots the infected system following wiping and related tasks to prevent system recovery.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal | MultiLayer Wiper uses a batch script to clear file system cache memory via the |
| Enterprise | T1685.005 | Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique | MultiLayer Wiper removes Windows event logs during execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1565.001 | Stored Data ManipulationSub-technique | MultiLayer Wiper changes the original path information of deleted files to make recovery efforts more difficult.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | MultiLayer Wiper uses a batch file, |
| Enterprise | T1485 | Data Destruction | MultiLayer Wiper deletes files on network drives, but corrupts and overwrites with random data files stored locally.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.009 | Embedded PayloadsSub-technique | MultiLayer Wiper contains two binaries in its resources section, MultiList and MultiWip. MultiLayer Wiper drops and executes each of these items when run, then deletes them after execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | MultiLayer Wiper uses a batch script launched via a scheduled task to delete Windows Event Logs.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | MultiLayer Wiper wipes the boot sector of infected systems to inhibit system recovery.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | MultiLayer Wiper creates a malicious scheduled task that launches a batch file to remove Windows Event Logs.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.006 | TimestompSub-technique | MultiLayer Wiper changes timestamps of overwritten files to either 1601.1.1 for NTFS filesystems, or 1980.1.1 for all other filesystems.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1561.002 | Disk Structure WipeSub-technique | MultiLayer Wiper opens a handle to |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | MultiLayer Wiper generates a list of all files and paths on the fixed drives of an infected system, enumerating all files on the system except specific folders defined in a hardcoded list.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | MultiLayer Wiper removes the Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) service from infected devices along with all present shadow copies.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 9b5341e76626… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 9b5341e76626… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Unit42 Agrius 2023
Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1135Open source URL
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