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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1242: Qilin

Qilin is a ransomware family operated as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) that has been active since at least 2022. It includes variants written in Go and Rust capable of targeting Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi environments. Qilin shares functionality overlaps with Black Basta, REvil, and BlackCat ransomware. Qilin affiliates have targeted multiple entities worldwide with the majority of victims in the US, France, Canada, and the UK, primarily in the manufacturing, technology, financial services, and healthcare sectors.[1][2][3][4][5]

EnterpriseS1242MalwareObject v2.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1242: Qilin describes [Qilin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1242) is a ransomware family operated as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) that has been active since at least 2022. It includes variants written in Go and Rust capable of targeting Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi environments. [Qilin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1242) shares functionality overlaps with [Black Basta](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1070), [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496), and [BlackCat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1068) rans...

Executive priority

S1242: Qilin is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1242: Qilin by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (ESXi, Windows, Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1242: Qilin appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Qilin

Qilin is a ransomware family operated as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) that has been active since at least 2022. It includes variants written in Go and Rust capable of targeting Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi environments. Qilin shares functionality overlaps with Black Basta, REvil, and BlackCat ransomware. Qilin affiliates have targeted multiple entities worldwide with the majority of victims in the US, France, Canada, and the UK, primarily in the manufacturing, technology, financial services, and healthcare sectors.[1][2][3][4][5]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

52 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Qilin can employ several code obfuscation methods, including renaming functions, altering control flows, and encrypting strings.CitationHC3 Qilin Threat Profile JUN 2024

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Qilin can detect whether a system is running FreeBSD, VMkernel (ESXi), Nutanix AHV, or a standard Linux distribution to enable platform-specific encryption behaviors.[5]

EnterpriseT1134Access Token Manipulation

Qilin can use an embedded Mimikatz module for token manipulation.CitationPicus Qilin MAR 2025

EnterpriseT1480.002Mutual ExclusionSub-technique

Qilin can create a mutex to ensure only one instance is running.CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024

EnterpriseT1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLSub-technique

Qilin can configure a Winlogon registry entry.[1]

EnterpriseT1529System Shutdown/Reboot

Qilin can initiate a reboot of the backup server to hinder recovery.CitationPicus Qilin MAR 2025

EnterpriseT1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsSub-technique

Qilin can use WinSCP for the secure file transfer of the Linux ransomware binary to a targeted system.[5]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

Qilin can list all local users found on a targeted system.[1]

EnterpriseT1489Service Stop

Qilin can terminate specific services on compromised hosts.[1]CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024CitationHC3 Qilin Threat Profile JUN 2024CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

Qilin has been delivered via malicious links in spearphishing emails.[2][4]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Qilin can use WMIC to change the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) startup type to manual.CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Qilin can attempt to log on to the local computer via `LogonUserW` and use `GetLogicalDrives()` and `EnumResourceW()` for discovery.[1]CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

Qilin has created a scheduled task named TVInstallRestore to mimic TeamViewer. CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1673Virtual Machine Discovery

Qilin can detect virtual machine environments including ESXi hosts, datacenters, and clusters within vCenter environments.CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

Qilin can bypass standard user access controls by using stolen tokens to launch processes at an elevated security context.CitationPicus Qilin MAR 2025

EnterpriseT1480Execution Guardrails

Qilin can require a specific password to be passed by command-line argument during execution which must match a pre-defined value in the configuration in order for it to continue execution.CitationPicus Qilin MAR 2025[5]

EnterpriseT1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique

Qilin can embed a copy of PsExec within its payload and place it in the %Temp% directory under a randomly generated filename.CitationPicus Qilin MAR 2025CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Qilin has named its payload file TeamViewer_Host_Setup to disguise itself as a legitimate TeamViewer file.CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Qilin can define specific processes to be terminated or left alone at execution.[1][2]CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024CitationHC3 Qilin Threat Profile JUN 2024[5]CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Qilin has pushed scheduled tasks via Group Policy Objects (GPOs) for execution.[3][1] Qilin has also created a scheduled task named TVInstallRestore, configured to run at logon using the `/SC ONLOGON` argument.CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Qilin can make Registry modifications to share networked drives between elevated and non-elevated processes and to increase the number of outstanding network requests per client.CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024CitationPicus Qilin MAR 2025 Qilin can also modify `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop\Wallpaper` to enable posting of ransom messages.CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

Qilin has the ability to list network drives.[1]CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024

EnterpriseT1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique

Qilin has the ability to clear Windows Event Logs.CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024[4]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

Qilin can identify specific services for termination or to be left running at execution.[1][2]CitationHC3 Qilin Threat Profile JUN 2024CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1570Lateral Tool Transfer

Qilin has used PsExec to distribute a second encryptor, named encryptor_1.exe, across the targeted environment.CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

Qilin can inject pwndll.dll, a patched DLL from the legitimate DLL WICloader.dll, into svchost.exe for continuous execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Qilin has run `cmd /C [PsExec] -accepteula \\IP Address -c -f -h -d -i C:\Users\xxx\.exe --password [PASSWORD] --spread --spread-process` to execute its encryptor to target multiple network shares.CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

Qilin can check `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control SystemStartOptions` to determine if a machine is running in safe mode.[1]

EnterpriseT1069.002Domain GroupsSub-technique

Qilin can run PowerShell cmdlets to discover domain groups.CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Qilin can accept a command line argument identifying specific IPs.[1]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Qilin has used `GetLogicalDrives()` and `EnumResourceW()` to locate mounted drives and shares.CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024

EnterpriseT1222File and Directory Permissions Modification

Qilin can use symbolic links to redirect file paths for remote and local objects and can use `chmod +x` to make its payload binary executable.CitationPicus Qilin MAR 2025CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

Qilin can use AES-256 or ChaCha20 for domain-wide encryption of victim servers and workstations and RSA-4096 or RSA-2048 to secure generated encryption keys.[1][2]CitationPicus Qilin MAR 2025[3]CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024CitationHC3 Qilin Threat Profile JUN 2024[5]CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

Qilin has been executed by luring victims into clicking links in spearphishing emails.[2][4]

EnterpriseT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

Qilin has been delivered through exploitation of exposed applications and interfaces including Citrix and RDP.[2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Qilin has created a RunOnce autostart entry at `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce*aster = %Public%\enc.exe` pointing to a dropped copy of itself in the Public folder.[1]CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1484.001Group Policy ModificationSub-technique

Qilin has pushed a scheduled task via a Group Policy Object for payload execution.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1021.004SSHSub-technique

Qilin can enable SSH access on ESXi hosts.CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1003.001LSASS MemorySub-technique

Qilin can employ an embedded Mimikatz module to dump LSASS memory.CitationPicus Qilin MAR 2025

EnterpriseT1678Delay Execution

Qilin has the ability to delay execution.[5]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Qilin has been delivered to victims through spearphishing emails with malicious attachments.[2]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Qilin can exclude specific directories and files from encryption.[1][5]

EnterpriseT1688Safe Mode Boot

Qilin can reboot targeted systems in safe mode to avoid detection.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

Qilin can terminate antivirus-related processes and services.[1][2]CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024CitationPicus Qilin MAR 2025

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

Qilin can enumerate domain-connected hosts during its discovery phase.CitationPicus Qilin MAR 2025[4]CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Qilin has been delivered to victims through malicious email attachments.[2]

EnterpriseT1087.002Domain AccountSub-technique

Qilin can use PowerShell cmdlets to enumerate domain users.CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1490Inhibit System Recovery

Qilin can execute `vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet` to remove volume shadow copies and can disable High Availability (HA) and Distributed Resource Scheduler (DRS) in vCenter clusters.[1]CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024[4]CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Qilin can delete itself from infected hosts after execution.CitationHalcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024[4]

EnterpriseT1491.001Internal DefacementSub-technique

Qilin can set the wallpaper on compromised hosts to display a ransom message in each encrypted folder.[4][5]CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

Qilin has been deployed on VMware vCenter and ESXi servers via custom PowerShell script.[3]CitationPicus Qilin MAR 2025 Qilin has also used PowerShell for discovery in vCenter and Active Directory environments.CitationCisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025

EnterpriseT1219.002Remote Desktop SoftwareSub-technique

Qilin can use the Splashtop remote management service (SRManager.exe) to execute the Linux ransomware binary directly on Windows systems.[5]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1050: Water Galura

Water Galura are the operators of the Qilin Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) who handle payload generation, ransom negotiations, and the publication of stolen data for Qilin affilates recruited on Russian cybercrime forums. Water Galura have been active since at least 2022 and use a double extortion model where they demand payment for providing decryption keys and for refraining from publishing the stolen data to their leak site.[1][2]

GroupEnterprise

G1036: Moonstone Sleet

Moonstone Sleet is a North Korean-linked threat actor executing both financially motivated attacks and espionage operations. The group previously overlapped significantly with another North Korean-linked entity, Lazarus Group, but has differentiated its tradecraft since 2023. Moonstone Sleet is notable for creating fake companies and personas to interact with victim entities, as well as developing unique malware such as a variant delivered via a fully functioning game.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
09bb6c248146b4fd...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.0Current bundle09bb6c248146…
19.12.0Older bundle09bb6c248146…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Trend Micro Agenda Ransomware AUG 2022

    Magdy, S. et al. (2022, August 25). New Golang Ransomware Agenda Customizes Attacks. Retrieved September 26, 2025.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    SentinelOne Qilin NOV 2022

    SentinelOne. (2022, November 30). Agenda (Qilin). Retrieved September 26, 2025.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    BushidoToken Qilin RaaS JUN 2024

    Thomas, W. (2024, June 12). Tracking Adversaries: The Qilin RaaS. Retrieved September 26, 2025.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Sophos Qilin MSP APR 2025

    Bradshaw, A. et al. (2025, April 1). Qilin affiliates spear-phish MSP ScreenConnect admin, targeting customers downstream. Retrieved September 26, 2025.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Trend Micro Agenda Ransomware OCT 2025

    Trend Micro. (2025, October 23). Agenda Ransomware Deploys Linux Variant on Windows Systems Through Remote Management Tools and BYOVD Techniques. Retrieved March 26, 2026.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Agenda

    (Citation: Sophos Qilin MSP APR 2025)(Citation: Trend Micro Agenda Ransomware AUG 2022)(Citation: SentinelOne Qilin NOV 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Agenda Ransomware OCT 2025)

  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS1242
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.