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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1207: XLoader

XLoader is an infostealer malware in use since at least 2016. Previously known and sometimes still referred to as Formbook, XLoader is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) known for stealing data from web browsers, email clients and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) applications.[1][2][3][4][5]

EnterpriseS1207MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1207: XLoader describes [XLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1207) is an infostealer malware in use since at least 2016. Previously known and sometimes still referred to as Formbook, [XLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1207) is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) known for stealing data from web browsers, email clients and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) applications.(Citation: Zscaler XLoader 2025)(Citation: ANY.RUN XLoader 2023)(Citation: CheckPoint XLoader 2022)(Citation: Acronis XLoader 2021)(Citation: Google XLoader 2017)

Executive priority

S1207: XLoader is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1207: XLoader by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1207: XLoader appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

XLoader

XLoader is an infostealer malware in use since at least 2016. Previously known and sometimes still referred to as Formbook, XLoader is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) known for stealing data from web browsers, email clients and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) applications.[1][2][3][4][5]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

28 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

XLoader can capture screenshots on compromised hosts.[5]CitationNetskope XLoader 2022

EnterpriseT1555Credentials from Password Stores

XLoader can collect credentials stored in email clients.[5]CitationNetskope XLoader 2022

EnterpriseT1055.012Process HollowingSub-technique

XLoader uses process hollowing by injecting itself into the `explorer.exe` process and other files ithin the Windows `SysWOW64` directory.[1][5][2]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

XLoader loads a copy of NTDLL to evade hooks from security monitoring tools on this library.[1] XLoader can add the path of its executable to the Microsoft Defender exclusion list.CitationNetskope XLoader 2022

EnterpriseT1539Steal Web Session Cookie

XLoader can capture web session cookies and session information from victim browsers.[5]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

XLoader features encrypted functions using the RC4 algorithm and bytecode operations.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

XLoader can create scheduled tasks for persistence.CitationNetskope XLoader 2022

EnterpriseT1059.010AutoHotKey & AutoITSub-technique

XLoader can use an AutoIT script to decrypt a payload file, load it into victim memory, then execute it on the victim machine.[5]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

XLoader can capture keystrokes from the victim machine.[5]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

XLoader can delete malicious executables from compromised machines.[4]

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

XLoader has exploited Office vulnerabilities during local execution such as CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0798.CitationNetskope XLoader 2022

EnterpriseT1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

XLoader can utilize decoy command and control domains within the malware configuration to circumvent sandbox analysis.[2][3]

EnterpriseT1115Clipboard Data

XLoader can collect data stored in the victim's clipboard.[5]CitationNetskope XLoader 2022

EnterpriseT1106Native API

XLoader uses the native Windows API for functionality, including defense evasion.[1]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

XLoader can gather credentials from several web browsers.[1][5]CitationNetskope XLoader 2022

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

XLoader has been delivered as a phishing attachment, including PDFs with embedded links, Word and Excel files, and various archive files (ZIP, RAR, ACE, and ISOs) containing EXE payloads.[5][4]

EnterpriseT1185Browser Session Hijacking

XLoader can conduct form grabbing, steal cookies, and extract data from HTTP sessions.[5]

EnterpriseT1529System Shutdown/Reboot

XLoader can initiate a system reboot or shutdown.[5]

EnterpriseT1622Debugger Evasion

XLoader uses anti-debugging mechanisms such as calling `NtQueryInformationProcess` with `InfoClass=7`, referencing `ProcessDebugPort`, to determine if it is being analyzed.[5]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

XLoader uses XOR and RC4 algorithms to decrypt payloads and functions.[1] XLoader can be distributed as a self-extracting RAR archive that launches an AutoIT loader.[5]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

XLoader performs timing checks using the Read-Time Stamp Counter (RDTSC) instruction on the victim CPU.[5]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

XLoader uses HTTP and HTTPS for command and control communication.[5]

EnterpriseT1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallSub-technique

XLoader injects code into the APC queue using `NtQueueApcThread` API.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

XLoader can identify the username from a victim machine.[4]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

XLoader can collect system information and supported language information from the victim machine.[4]

EnterpriseT1583.001DomainsSub-technique

XLoader can utilize hardcoded command and control domain configurations created by the XLoader authors. These are designed to mimic domain registrars and hosting service providers such as Hostinger and Namecheap.[3]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

XLoader uses various packers, including CyaX, to obfuscate malicious executables.CitationNetskope XLoader 2022

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

XLoader establishes persistence by copying its executable in a subdirectory of `%APPDATA%` or `%PROGRAMFILES%`, and then modifies Windows Registry Run keys or policies keys to execute the executable on system start.[1][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
ca66366f0ecd7f87...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundleca66366f0ecd…
19.11.0Older bundleca66366f0ecd…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Zscaler XLoader 2025

    Zscaler Threatlabz. (2025, January 27). Technical Analysis of Xloader Versions 6 and 7 | Part 1. Retrieved March 11, 2025.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    ANY.RUN XLoader 2023

    ANY.RUN. (2023, February 28). XLoader/FormBook: Encryption Analysis and Malware Decryption . Retrieved March 11, 2025.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    CheckPoint XLoader 2022

    Alexey Bukhteyev & Raman Ladutska, Check Point Research. (2022, May 31). XLoader Botnet: Find Me If You Can. Retrieved March 11, 2025.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Acronis XLoader 2021

    Acronis. (2021, November 26). Trojan-as-a-service: From Formbook to XLoader. Retrieved March 11, 2025.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Google XLoader 2017

    Nart Villeneuve, Randi Eitzman, Sandor Nemes & Tyler Dean, Google Cloud. (2017, October 5). Significant FormBook Distribution Campaigns Impacting the U.S. and South Korea. Retrieved March 11, 2025.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Formbook

    (Citation: Zscaler XLoader 2025)(Citation: ANY.RUN XLoader 2023)(Citation: CheckPoint XLoader 2022)(Citation: Google XLoader 2017)

  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS1207
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.