T1616: Call Control
Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication.
Several permissions may be used to programmatically control phone calls, including:
* `ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS` - Allows the application to answer incoming phone calls[1] * `CALL_PHONE` - Allows the application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer interface[1] * `PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS` - Allows the application to see the number being dialed during an outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a different number or abort the call altogether[1] * `MANAGE_OWN_CALLS` - Allows a calling application which manages its own calls through the self-managed `ConnectionService` APIs[1] * `BIND_TELECOM_CONNECTION_SERVICE` - Required permission when using a `ConnectionService`[1] * `WRITE_CALL_LOG` - Allows an application to write to the device call log, potentially to hide malicious phone calls[1]
When granted some of these permissions, an application can make a phone call without opening the dialer first. However, if an application desires to simply redirect the user to the dialer with a phone number filled in, it can launch an Intent using `Intent.ACTION_DIAL`, which requires no specific permissions. This then requires the user to explicitly initiate the call or use some form of Input Injection to programmatically initiate it.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1616: Call Control describes Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication. Several permissions may be used to programmatically control phone calls, including: * `ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS` - Allows the application to answer incoming phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions) * `CALL_PHONE` - Allows the application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer interfac...
Executive priority
T1616: Call Control is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1616: Call Control by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (collection, impact, command-and-control), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1616: Call Control appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Call Control
Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication.
Several permissions may be used to programmatically control phone calls, including:
* `ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS` - Allows the application to answer incoming phone calls[1] * `CALL_PHONE` - Allows the application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer interface[1] * `PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS` - Allows the application to see the number being dialed during an outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a different number or abort the call altogether[1] * `MANAGE_OWN_CALLS` - Allows a calling application which manages its own calls through the self-managed `ConnectionService` APIs[1] * `BIND_TELECOM_CONNECTION_SERVICE` - Required permission when using a `ConnectionService`[1] * `WRITE_CALL_LOG` - Allows an application to write to the device call log, potentially to hide malicious phone calls[1]
When granted some of these permissions, an application can make a phone call without opening the dialer first. However, if an application desires to simply redirect the user to the dialer with a phone number filled in, it can launch an Intent using `Intent.ACTION_DIAL`, which requires no specific permissions. This then requires the user to explicitly initiate the call or use some form of Input Injection to programmatically initiate it.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
S1195: SpyC23
SpyC23 is a mobile malware that has been used by APT-C-23 since at least 2017. SpyC23 has been observed primarily targeting Android devices in the Middle East.[1]
There are multiple close variants of SpyC23, such as VAMP[2], GnatSpy[3], Desert Scorpion and FrozenCell, which add some additional functionality but are not significantly different from the original malware.
S9004: Crocodilus
Crocodilus is an Android banking Trojan that was discovered in March 2025. Crocodilus targeted users worldwide, including Turkey, Poland, Argentina, Brazil, Spain, the United States, Indonesia and India. Crocodilus has been customized based on the target location. For example, Crocodilus mimicked major Turkish and Spanish banks for users in Turkey and Spain, while users in Poland saw Facebook advertisements that promoted Crocodilus to claim bonus points.[1][2]
S1083: Chameleon
Chameleon is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android’s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, Chameleon has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official applications. A new variant of Chameleon has expanded its targets to include Android users in the United Kingdom and Italy.[1][2]
S1092: Escobar
S1069: TangleBot
TangleBot is SMS malware that was initially observed in September 2021, primarily targeting mobile users in the United States and Canada. TangleBot has used SMS text message lures about COVID-19 regulations and vaccines to trick mobile users into downloading the malware, similar to FluBot Android malware campaigns.[1]
S1054: Drinik
Drinik is an evolving Android banking trojan that was observed targeting customers of around 27 banks in India in August 2021. Initially seen as an SMS stealer in 2016, Drinik resurfaced as a banking trojan with more advanced capabilities included in subsequent versions between September 2021 and August 2022.[1]
S0655: BusyGasper
BusyGasper is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.[1]
S0529: CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal is one of a family of four surveillanceware tools that share a common C2 infrastructure. CarbonSteal primarily deals with audio surveillance. [1]
S0422: Anubis
S0407: Monokle
S9005: DocSwap
DocSwap is an Android malware first identified in 2025, and attributed to Kimsuky. DocSwap’s name is a combination of its Korean name “문서열람 인증 앱” (Document Viewing Authentication App) and a phishing page masquerading as CoinSwap at the C2 address. Based on DocSwap’s name and Korean-language strings, DocSwap potentially targets mobile device users in South Korea. Several variants of DocSwap exist; one of the latest samples indicates that the adversary added a native decryption function that decrypts an internal APK.[1][2]
S1094: BRATA
BRATA (Brazilian Remote Access Tool, Android), is an evolving Android malware strain, detected in late 2018 and again in late 2021. Originating in Brazil, BRATA was later also found in the UK, Poland, Italy, Spain, and USA, where it is believed to have targeted financial institutions such as banks. There are currently three known variants of BRATA.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 75fbb6e6d329… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 75fbb6e6d329… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 75fbb6e6d329… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Android Permissions
Google. (2021, August 11). Manifest.permission. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-41Open source URL
- [3]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueCEL-18Open source URL
- [4]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueCEL-36Open source URL
- [5]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueCEL-42Open source URL
- [6]mitre-attackT1616Open source URL
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