LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1092: Escobar

Escobar is an Android banking trojan, first detected in March 2021, believed to be a new variant of AbereBot.[1]

MobileS1092MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1092: Escobar describes [Escobar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1092) is an Android banking trojan, first detected in March 2021, believed to be a new variant of AbereBot.(Citation: Bleeipng Computer Escobar)

Executive priority

S1092: Escobar is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1092: Escobar by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1092: Escobar appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Escobar

Escobar is an Android banking trojan, first detected in March 2021, believed to be a new variant of AbereBot.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

16 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-technique

Escobar can read SMS messages on the device.[1]

MobileT1512Video Capture

Escobar can take photos using the device cameras.[1]

MobileT1616Call Control

Escobar can initiate phone calls.[1]

MobileT1461Lockscreen Bypass

Escobar can request the `DISABLE_KEYGUARD` permission to disable the device lock screen password.[1]

MobileT1430Location Tracking

Escobar can request coarse and fine location permissions to track the device.[1]

MobileT1409Stored Application Data

Escobar can request the `GET_ACCOUNTS` permission to get the list of accounts on the device, and can collect media files.[1]

MobileT1420File and Directory Discovery

Escobar can access external storage.[1]

MobileT1636.002Call LogSub-technique

Escobar can access the device’s call log.[1]

MobileT1517Access Notifications

Escobar can monitor a device’s notifications.[1]

MobileT1582SMS Control

Escobar can modify, send, and delete SMS messages.[1]

MobileT1663Remote Access Software

Escobar can use VNC to remotely control an infected device.[1]

MobileT1533Data from Local System

Escobar can collect sensitive information, such as Google Authenticator codes.[1]

MobileT1417.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Escobar can collect application keylogs.[1]

MobileT1630.001Uninstall Malicious ApplicationSub-technique

Escobar can uninstall itself and other applications.[1]

MobileT1429Audio Capture

Escobar can record audio from the device’s microphone.[1]

MobileT1417.002GUI Input CaptureSub-technique

Escobar can collect credentials using phishing overlays.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1636.004: SMS MessagesMobileuses · TechniqueT1512: Video CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1616: Call ControlMobileuses · TechniqueT1461: Lockscreen BypassMobileuses · TechniqueT1430: Location TrackingMobileuses · TechniqueT1409: Stored Application DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1420: File and Directory DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.002: Call LogMobileuses · TechniqueT1517: Access NotificationsMobileuses · TechniqueT1582: SMS ControlMobileuses · TechniqueT1663: Remote Access SoftwareMobileuses · TechniqueT1533: Data from Local SystemMobileuses · TechniqueT1417.001: KeyloggingMobileuses · TechniqueT1630.001: Uninstall Malicious ApplicationMobileuses · TechniqueT1429: Audio CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1417.002: GUI Input CaptureMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
cfd0926bef0d4f38...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundlecfd0926bef0d…
19.11.0Older bundlecfd0926bef0d…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Bleeipng Computer Escobar

    B. Toulas. (2022, March 12). Android malware Escobar steals your Google Authenticator MFA codes. Retrieved September 28, 2023.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1092
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use