S0655: BusyGasper
BusyGasper is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0655: BusyGasper describes [BusyGasper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655) is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.(Citation: SecureList BusyGasper)
Executive priority
S0655: BusyGasper is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0655: BusyGasper by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0655: BusyGasper appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
BusyGasper
BusyGasper is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1645 | Compromise Client Software Binary | BusyGasper can abuse existing root access to copy components into the system partition.[1] |
| Mobile | T1639.001 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolSub-technique | BusyGasper can download text files with commands from an FTP server and exfiltrate data via email.[1] |
| Mobile | T1481.002 | Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique | BusyGasper can be controlled via IRC using freenode.net servers.[1] |
| Mobile | T1533 | Data from Local System | BusyGasper can collect images stored on the device and browser history.[1] |
| Mobile | T1628.001 | Suppress Application IconSub-technique | BusyGasper can hide its icon.[1] |
| Mobile | T1623.001 | Unix ShellSub-technique | BusyGasper can run shell commands.[1] |
| Mobile | T1417.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | BusyGasper can collect every user screen tap and compare the input to a hardcoded list of coordinates to translate the input to a character.[1] |
| Mobile | T1429 | Audio Capture | BusyGasper can record audio.[1] |
| Mobile | T1616 | Call Control | BusyGasper can open a hidden menu when a specific phone number is called from the infected device.[1] |
| Mobile | T1512 | Video Capture | BusyGasper can record from the device’s camera.[1] |
| Mobile | T1407 | Download New Code at Runtime | BusyGasper can download a payload or updates from either its C2 server or email attachments in the adversary’s inbox.[1] |
| Mobile | T1430 | Location Tracking | BusyGasper can collect the device’s location information based on cellular network or GPS coordinates.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.004 | SMS MessagesSub-technique | BusyGasper can collect SMS messages.[1] |
| Mobile | T1628.002 | User EvasionSub-technique | BusyGasper can utilize the device’s sensors to determine when the device is in use and subsequently hide malicious activity. When active, it attempts to hide its malicious activity by turning the screen’s brightness as low as possible and muting the device.[1] |
| Mobile | T1582 | SMS Control | BusyGasper can send an SMS message after the device boots, messages containing logs, messages to adversary-specified numbers with custom content, and can delete all SMS messages on the device.[1] |
| Mobile | T1644 | Out of Band Data | BusyGasper can perform actions when one of two hardcoded magic SMS strings is received.[1] |
| Mobile | T1513 | Screen Capture | BusyGasper can use its keylogger module to take screenshots of the area of the screen that the user tapped.[1] |
| Mobile | T1409 | Stored Application Data | BusyGasper can collect data from messaging applications, including WhatsApp, Viber, and Facebook.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 83106e611111… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 83106e611111… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]SecureList BusyGasper
Alexey Firsh. (2018, August 29). BusyGasper – the unfriendly spy. Retrieved October 1, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0655Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.