S1214: Android/SpyAgent
Android/SpyAgent is a variant of spyware in the MoqHao phishing campaign primarily targeting Korean and Japanese users.[1] Fake security applications were used to target Japanese users, while fake police applications were used to target Korean users. Both fake applications have common C2 commands and share the same crash report key on a cloud service.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1214: Android/SpyAgent describes [Android/SpyAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1214) is a variant of spyware in the MoqHao phishing campaign primarily targeting Korean and Japanese users.(Citation: McAfee MoqHao 2019) Fake security applications were used to target Japanese users, while fake police applications were used to target Korean users. Both fake applications have common C2 commands and share the same crash report key on a cloud service.(Citation: McAfee MoqHao 2019)
Executive priority
S1214: Android/SpyAgent is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1214: Android/SpyAgent by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1214: Android/SpyAgent appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Android/SpyAgent
Android/SpyAgent is a variant of spyware in the MoqHao phishing campaign primarily targeting Korean and Japanese users.[1] Fake security applications were used to target Japanese users, while fake police applications were used to target Korean users. Both fake applications have common C2 commands and share the same crash report key on a cloud service.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1629.003 | Disable or Modify ToolsSub-technique | Android/SpyAgent has attempted to detect anti-spam call applications.[1] |
| Mobile | T1655.001 | Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique | Android/SpyAgent has used the official icon of the Korean police application and the package name “kpo,” which contain references related to the Korean police.[1] |
| Mobile | T1481 | Web Service | Android/SpyAgent’s payload has obtained the C2 address via Twitter accounts.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.004 | SMS MessagesSub-technique | Android/SpyAgent has exfiltrated SMS and MMS messages.[1] |
| Mobile | T1616 | Call Control | Android/SpyAgent can execute an automated phone call.[1] |
| Mobile | T1481.001 | Dead Drop ResolverSub-technique | Android/SpyAgent has used the Tencent Push Notification Service to receive commands from the C2 server.[1] |
| Mobile | T1422 | System Network Configuration Discovery | Android/SpyAgent has collected device network information, such as the IMEI and the phone number.[1] |
| Mobile | T1406 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Android/SpyAgent has used the Tencent packer to hide its malicious payload.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 6e587771342a… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 6e587771342a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]McAfee MoqHao 2019
Pak, C. (2019, August 7). MoqHao Related Android Spyware Targeting Japan and Korea Found on Google Play. Retrieved November 13, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1214Open source URL
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