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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1054: Drinik

Drinik is an evolving Android banking trojan that was observed targeting customers of around 27 banks in India in August 2021. Initially seen as an SMS stealer in 2016, Drinik resurfaced as a banking trojan with more advanced capabilities included in subsequent versions between September 2021 and August 2022.[1]

MobileS1054MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1054: Drinik describes [Drinik](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1054) is an evolving Android banking trojan that was observed targeting customers of around 27 banks in India in August 2021. Initially seen as an SMS stealer in 2016, [Drinik](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1054) resurfaced as a banking trojan with more advanced capabilities included in subsequent versions between September 2021 and August 2022.(Citation: cyble_drinik_1022)

Executive priority

S1054: Drinik is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1054: Drinik by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1054: Drinik appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Drinik

Drinik is an evolving Android banking trojan that was observed targeting customers of around 27 banks in India in August 2021. Initially seen as an SMS stealer in 2016, Drinik resurfaced as a banking trojan with more advanced capabilities included in subsequent versions between September 2021 and August 2022.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1582SMS Control

Drinik can steal incoming SMS messages and send SMS messages from compromised devices. [1]

MobileT1629.003Disable or Modify ToolsSub-technique

Drinik can use Accessibility Services to disable Google Play Protect.[1]

MobileT1646Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Drinik can send stolen data back to the C2 server.[1]

MobileT1616Call Control

Drinik can use the Android `CallScreeningService` to silently block incoming calls.[1]

MobileT1417.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Drinik can use keylogging to steal user banking credentials.[1]

MobileT1513Screen Capture

Drinik can record the screen via the `MediaProjection` library to harvest user credentials, including biometric PINs.[1]

MobileT1417.002GUI Input CaptureSub-technique

Drinik can use overlays to steal user banking credentials entered into legitimate sites.[1]

MobileT1541Foreground Persistence

Drinik has C2 commands that can move the malware in and out of the foreground. [1]

MobileT1636.002Call LogSub-technique

Drinik can request the `READ_CALL_LOG` permission.[1]

MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-technique

Drinik can collect user SMS messages.[1]

MobileT1406Obfuscated Files or Information

Drinik has used custom encryption to hide strings, potentially to evade antivirus products.[1]

MobileT1533Data from Local System

Drinik can request the `READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE` and `WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE` Android permissions.[1]

MobileT1437Application Layer Protocol

Drinik has code to use Firebase Cloud Messaging for receiving C2 instructions.[1]

MobileT1628.001Suppress Application IconSub-technique

Drinik can hide its application icon.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1582: SMS ControlMobileuses · TechniqueT1629.003: Disable or Modify ToolsMobileuses · TechniqueT1646: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelMobileuses · TechniqueT1616: Call ControlMobileuses · TechniqueT1417.001: KeyloggingMobileuses · TechniqueT1513: Screen CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1417.002: GUI Input CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1541: Foreground PersistenceMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.002: Call LogMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.004: SMS MessagesMobileuses · TechniqueT1406: Obfuscated Files or InformationMobileuses · TechniqueT1533: Data from Local SystemMobileuses · TechniqueT1437: Application Layer ProtocolMobileuses · TechniqueT1628.001: Suppress Application IconMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
03baab84c784b6c2...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle03baab84c784…
19.11.0Older bundle03baab84c784…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    cyble_drinik_1022

    Cyble. (2022, October 27). Drinik Malware Returns With Advanced Capabilities Targeting Indian Taxpayers. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1054
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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