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MITRE ATT&CK® Campaign

C0061: Operation Digital Eye

Operation Digital Eye was conducted in June and July of 2024 by suspected People's Republic of China (PRC)-nexus threat actors targeting business-to-business IT service providers in Southern Europe. Operation Digital Eye activity included the use of Visual Studio Code tunnels for command and control (C2) and custom lateral movement capabilities. Overlaps in tooling between Digital Eye and previous China-nexus campaigns, Operation Soft Cell and Operation Tainted Love, indicate the potential use of shared vendors or digital quartermasters.[1]

EnterpriseC0061CampaignObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

C0061: Operation Digital Eye describes [Operation Digital Eye](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0061) was conducted in June and July of 2024 by suspected People's Republic of China (PRC)-nexus threat actors targeting business-to-business IT service providers in Southern Europe. [Operation Digital Eye](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0061) activity included the use of Visual Studio Code tunnels for command and control (C2) and custom lateral movement capabilities. Overlaps in tooling between Digital Eye and previous China-nexus campaigns, Operatio...

Executive priority

C0061: Operation Digital Eye is an official MITRE ATT&CK campaign. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate C0061: Operation Digital Eye by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether C0061: Operation Digital Eye appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Operation Digital Eye

Operation Digital Eye was conducted in June and July of 2024 by suspected People's Republic of China (PRC)-nexus threat actors targeting business-to-business IT service providers in Southern Europe. Operation Digital Eye activity included the use of Visual Studio Code tunnels for command and control (C2) and custom lateral movement capabilities. Overlaps in tooling between Digital Eye and previous China-nexus campaigns, Operation Soft Cell and Operation Tainted Love, indicate the potential use of shared vendors or digital quartermasters.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

22 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1505.003Web ShellSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors deployed a PHP-based webshell to maintain persistent access.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors created a service named Visual Studio Code Service to run Visual Studio code.[1]

EnterpriseT1614.001System Language DiscoverySub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used the local language of targeted organizations to disguise file system activity.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used native API such as `GetUserInfo`.[1]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used the local.exe tool to view local account information.[1]

EnterpriseT1003.002Security Account ManagerSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used `reg save` to retrieve credentials from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database.[1]

EnterpriseT1003.001LSASS MemorySub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors targeted memory from the LSASS process to extract credentials.[1]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used Ping for reconnaissance.[1]

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used the winsw tool to deploy a Visual Studio code executable as a Windows service.[1]

EnterpriseT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used SQL injection to compromise publicly exposed web and database servers.[1]

EnterpriseT1591Gather Victim Org Information

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors concealed malicious activity by using terms that aligned with the technological context of the targeted organization.[1]

EnterpriseT1665Hide Infrastructure

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used public Cloud infrastructure to mask malicious activity.[1]

EnterpriseT1098.004SSH Authorized KeysSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used SSH access enabled by authorized_keys files for remote execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors moved laterally using RDP.[1]

EnterpriseT1219.001IDE TunnelingSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors created Visual Studio Code dev tunnels to access targeted endpoints through the browser-based version of Visual Studio Code.[1]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used third party tools including custom implementations of Mimikatz.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors deleted files delivered to compromised hosts, often named with the pattern do.* such as do.exe.[1]

EnterpriseT1069.001Local GroupsSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used the local.exe tool to view group memberships.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used `cmd.exe` as a default method of execution for a custom version of Mimikatz named bK2o.exe.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors attempted to make filenames appear legitimate by tailoring them to the victim organization.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used `GetUserInfo` to identify current user information.[1]

EnterpriseT1550.002Pass the HashSub-technique

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used a pass-the-hash capability to move laterally.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0097: Ping

Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections. [1]

ToolEnterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0225: sqlmap

sqlmap is an open source penetration testing tool that can be used to automate the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws. [1]

MalwareEnterprise

S9028: PHPsert

PHPsert is a webshell used to execute PHP code that has been in use since at least 2023 against targets in Japan, Singapore, Peru, Taiwan, Iran, Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. PHPsert is not typically deployed as a standalone but integrated into web content such as text editors and content management systems.[1]

Network Devices
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · ToolS0097: PingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1505.003: Web ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1614.001: System Language DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · ToolS0002: MimikatzEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1003.002: Security Account ManagerEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1003.001: LSASS MemoryEnterpriseuses · ToolS0225: sqlmapEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1569.002: Service ExecutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1190: Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1591: Gather Victim Org InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1665: Hide InfrastructureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1098.004: SSH Authorized KeysEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1021.001: Remote Desktop ProtocolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1219.001: IDE TunnelingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1588.002: ToolEnterpriseuses · MalwareS9028: PHPsertEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1069.001: Local GroupsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
8e0e6be1bd91f8fd...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle8e0e6be1bd91…
19.11.0Older bundleba63a4627c6e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    sentinelone operationDigitalEye Dec 2024

    Aleksandar Milenkoski, Luigi Martire. (2024, December 10). Operation Digital Eye | Chinese APT Compromises Critical Digital Infrastructure via Visual Studio Code Tunnels. Retrieved February 27, 2025.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackC0061
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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