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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0006: APT1

APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. [1]

EnterpriseG0006GroupObject v1.4Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0006: APT1 describes [APT1](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006) is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)

Executive priority

G0006: APT1 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0006: APT1 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0006: APT1 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

APT1

APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

23 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1003.001LSASS MemorySub-technique

APT1 has been known to use credential dumping using Mimikatz.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

APT1 gathered a list of running processes on the system using tasklist /v.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

APT1 has collected files from a local victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1550.002Pass the HashSub-technique

The APT1 group is known to have used pass the hash.[1]

EnterpriseT1583.001DomainsSub-technique

APT1 has registered hundreds of domains for use in operations.[1]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

APT1 has used RAR to compress files before moving them outside of the victim network.[1]

EnterpriseT1119Automated Collection

APT1 used a batch script to perform a series of discovery techniques and saves it to a text file.[1]

EnterpriseT1114.002Remote Email CollectionSub-technique

APT1 uses two utilities, GETMAIL and MAPIGET, to steal email. MAPIGET steals email still on Exchange servers that has not yet been archived.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing hyperlinks to malicious files.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

APT1 used the ipconfig /all command to gather network configuration information.[1]

EnterpriseT1114.001Local Email CollectionSub-technique

APT1 uses two utilities, GETMAIL and MAPIGET, to steal email. GETMAIL extracts emails from archived Outlook .pst files.[1]

EnterpriseT1588.001MalwareSub-technique

APT1 used publicly available malware for privilege escalation.[1]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

APT1 used the net use command to get a listing on network connections.[1]

EnterpriseT1585.002Email AccountsSub-technique

APT1 has created email accounts for later use in social engineering, phishing, and when registering domains.[1]

EnterpriseT1584.001DomainsSub-technique

APT1 hijacked FQDNs associated with legitimate websites hosted by hop points.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

The file name AcroRD32.exe, a legitimate process name for Adobe's Acrobat Reader, was used by APT1 as a name for malware.[1]CitationMandiant APT1 Appendix

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

APT1 used the commands net localgroup,net user, and net group to find accounts on the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.[1]

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

APT1 listed connected network shares.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

APT1 has used the Windows command shell to execute commands, and batch scripting to automate execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

APT1 has used various open-source tools for privilege escalation purposes.[1]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

APT1 used the commands net start and tasklist to get a listing of the services on the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique

The APT1 group is known to have used RDP during operations.CitationFireEye PLA

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0100: ipconfig

ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration. [1]

ToolEnterprise

S0029: PsExec

PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[1][2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0121: Lslsass

Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process. [1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0109: WEBC2

WEBC2 is a family of backdoor malware used by APT1 as early as July 2006. WEBC2 backdoors are designed to retrieve a webpage, with commands hidden in HTML comments or special tags, from a predetermined C2 server. [1][2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0008: gsecdump

gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems. [1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · MalwareS0345: SeasaltEnterpriseuses · ToolS0100: ipconfigEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0017: BISCUITEnterpriseuses · ToolS0119: CachedumpEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1003.001: LSASS MemoryEnterpriseuses · ToolS0029: PsExecEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0026: GLOOXMAILEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1550.002: Pass the HashEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1583.001: DomainsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560.001: Archive via UtilityEnterpriseuses · ToolS0121: LslsassEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0012: PoisonIvyEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0109: WEBC2Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1119: Automated CollectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1114.002: Remote Email CollectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.002: Spearphishing LinkEnterpriseuses · ToolS0002: MimikatzEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · ToolS0008: gsecdumpEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1114.001: Local Email CollectionEnterpriseuses · ToolS0122: Pass-The-Hash ToolkitEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0025: CALENDAREnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.4
Created
Modified
Raw hash
daa6b44b7fbcd8f8...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.4Current bundledaa6b44b7fbc…
19.21.4Older bundledaa6b44b7fbc…
19.11.4Older bundlee900813c68d3…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Mandiant APT1

    Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    APT1

    (Citation: Mandiant APT1)

  3. [3]
    Comment Crew

    (Citation: Mandiant APT1)

  4. [4]
    Comment Group

    (Citation: Mandiant APT1)

  5. [5]
    Comment Panda

    (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)

  6. [6]
    CrowdStrike Putter Panda

    Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.

  7. [7]
    mitre-attackG0006
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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