S0401: Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux is a backdoor written in the Go Programming Language and compiled as a 64-bit ELF binary. The Windows version is tracked separately under Exaramel for Windows.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0401: Exaramel for Linux describes [Exaramel for Linux](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0401) is a backdoor written in the Go Programming Language and compiled as a 64-bit ELF binary. The Windows version is tracked separately under [Exaramel for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0343).(Citation: ESET TeleBots Oct 2018)
Executive priority
S0401: Exaramel for Linux is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0401: Exaramel for Linux by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0401: Exaramel for Linux appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux is a backdoor written in the Go Programming Language and compiled as a 64-bit ELF binary. The Windows version is tracked separately under Exaramel for Windows.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Exaramel for Linux has a command to download a file from and to a remote C2 server.[1]CitationANSSI Sandworm January 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | Exaramel for Linux can run |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | Exaramel for Linux uses HTTPS for C2 communications.[1]CitationANSSI Sandworm January 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1543 | Create or Modify System Process | Exaramel for Linux has a hardcoded location that it uses to achieve persistence if the startup system is Upstart or System V and it is running as root.CitationANSSI Sandworm January 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Exaramel for Linux can decrypt its configuration file.CitationANSSI Sandworm January 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1008 | Fallback Channels | Exaramel for Linux can attempt to find a new C2 server if it receives an error.CitationANSSI Sandworm January 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1543.002 | Systemd ServiceSub-technique | Exaramel for Linux has a hardcoded location under systemd that it uses to achieve persistence if it is running as root.[1]CitationANSSI Sandworm January 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | Exaramel for Linux can uninstall its persistence mechanism and delete its configuration file.CitationANSSI Sandworm January 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1548.001 | Setuid and SetgidSub-technique | Exaramel for Linux can execute commands with high privileges via a specific binary with setuid functionality.CitationANSSI Sandworm January 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | Exaramel for Linux uses RC4 for encrypting the configuration.[1]CitationANSSI Sandworm January 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1059.004 | Unix ShellSub-technique | Exaramel for Linux has a command to execute a shell command on the system.[1]CitationANSSI Sandworm January 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1053.003 | CronSub-technique | Exaramel for Linux uses crontab for persistence if it does not have root privileges.[1]CitationANSSI Sandworm January 2021 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0034: Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]
In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.3 | Current bundle | 87d368415c13… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.3 | Older bundle | 87d368415c13… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ESET TeleBots Oct 2018
Cherepanov, A., Lipovsky, R. (2018, October 11). New TeleBots backdoor: First evidence linking Industroyer to NotPetya. Retrieved November 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]Exaramel for Linux
(Citation: ESET TeleBots Oct 2018)
- [3]mitre-attackS0401Open source URL
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