S0504: Anchor

S0504: Anchor describes [Anchor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0504) is one of a family of backdoor malware that has been used in conjunction with [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) on selected high profile targets since at least 2018.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)(Citation: Medium Anchor DNS July 2020)

Executive priority

S0504: Anchor is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0504: Anchor by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0504: Anchor appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Anchor

Anchor is one of a family of backdoor malware that has been used in conjunction with TrickBot on selected high profile targets since at least 2018.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques20 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1095	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Anchor has used ICMP in C2 communications.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	Anchor has used cmd.exe to run its self deletion routine.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Anchor can download additional payloads.[1][2]
Enterprise	T1480	Execution Guardrails	Anchor can terminate itself if specific execution flags are not present.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	Anchor can determine the hostname and linux version on a compromised host.[2]
Enterprise	T1053.005	Scheduled TaskSub-technique	Anchor can create a scheduled task for persistence.[1]
Enterprise	T1053.003	CronSub-technique	Anchor can install itself as a cron job.[2]
Enterprise	T1059.004	Unix ShellSub-technique	Anchor can execute payloads via shell scripting.[2]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Anchor has used HTTP and HTTPS in C2 communications.[1]
Enterprise	T1553.002	Code SigningSub-technique	Anchor has been signed with valid certificates to evade detection by security tools.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.004	DNSSub-technique	Variants of Anchor can use DNS tunneling to communicate with C2.[1][2]
Enterprise	T1543.003	Windows ServiceSub-technique	Anchor can establish persistence by creating a service.[1]
Enterprise	T1027	Obfuscated Files or Information	Anchor has obfuscated code with stack strings and string encryption.[1]
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	Anchor can determine the public IP and location of a compromised host.[2]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File DeletionSub-technique	Anchor can self delete its dropper after the malware is successfully deployed.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.002	Software PackingSub-technique	Anchor has come with a packed payload.[1]
Enterprise	T1564.004	NTFS File AttributesSub-technique	Anchor has used NTFS to hide files.[1]
Enterprise	T1569.002	Service ExecutionSub-technique	Anchor can create and execute services to load its payload.[1][2]
Enterprise	T1021.002	SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique	Anchor can support windows execution via SMB shares.[2]
Enterprise	T1008	Fallback Channels	Anchor can use secondary C2 servers for communication after establishing connectivity and relaying victim information to primary C2 servers.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0102: Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.[1][2][3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.1
Created: Sep 10, 2020, 15:54 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Dec 4, 2023, 20:02 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: f0aad297783869c1...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Dec 4, 2023, 20:02 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`f0aad2977838…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Dec 4, 2023, 20:02 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`f0aad2977838…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Cyberreason Anchor December 2019
Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.
Open source URL
[2]
Medium Anchor DNS July 2020
Grange, W. (2020, July 13). Anchor_dns malware goes cross platform. Retrieved September 10, 2020.
Open source URL
[3]
Anchor_DNS
(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)(Citation: Medium Anchor DNS July 2020)
[4]
mitre-attackS0504
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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