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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1198: Gomir

Gomir is a Linux backdoor variant of the Go-based malware GoBear, uniquely assoicated with Kimsuky operations.[1]

EnterpriseS1198MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1198: Gomir describes Gomir is a Linux backdoor variant of the Go-based malware [GoBear](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1197), uniquely assoicated with [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) operations.(Citation: Symantec Troll Stealer 2024)

Executive priority

S1198: Gomir is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1198: Gomir by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1198: Gomir appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Gomir

Gomir is a Linux backdoor variant of the Go-based malware GoBear, uniquely assoicated with Kimsuky operations.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1573Encrypted Channel

Gomir uses a custom encryption algorithm for content sent to command and control infrastructure.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.002Systemd ServiceSub-technique

Gomir creates a systemd service named `syslogd` for persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

Gomir probes arbitrary network endpoints for TCP connectivity.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

Gomir uses Base64-encoded content in HTTP communications to command and control infrastructure.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.003CronSub-technique

Gomir will configure a crontab for process execution to start the backdoor on reboot if it is not initially running under group 0 privileges.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.004Unix ShellSub-technique

Gomir reads command line arguments and parses them for functionality when executed from a Linux shell, and can execute arbitrary strings passed to it as shell commands.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Gomir periodically communicates to its command and control infrastructure through HTTP POST requests.[1]

EnterpriseT1090.001Internal ProxySub-technique

Gomir can start a reverse proxy to initiate connections to arbitrary endpoints in victim networks.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Gomir collects information about directory and file structures, including total number of subdirectories, total number of files, and total size of files on infected systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Gomir collects network information on infected systems such as listing interface names, MAC and IP addresses, and IPv6 addresses.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Gomir collects information on infected systems such as hostname, username, CPU, and RAM information.[1]

EnterpriseT1069.001Local GroupsSub-technique

Gomir checks the effective group ID of its process when initially executed to determine if it is in group 0, denoting superuser privileges in Linux environments.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Gomir deletes its original executable and terminates its original process after creating a systemd service.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

Gomir uses reverse proxy functionality that employs SSL to encrypt communications.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0094: Kimsuky

Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]

DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0094: KimsukyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573: Encrypted ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.002: Systemd ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.003: CronEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.004: Unix ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090.001: Internal ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1069.001: Local GroupsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.002: Asymmetric CryptographyEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
577b5ada0b0c5539...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle577b5ada0b0c…
19.11.0Older bundle577b5ada0b0c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Symantec Troll Stealer 2024

    Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2024, May 16). Springtail: New Linux Backdoor Added to Toolkit. Retrieved January 17, 2025.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1198
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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