G1023: APT5
APT5 is a China-based espionage actor that has been active since at least 2007 primarily targeting the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense industries throughout the U.S., Europe, and Asia. APT5 has displayed advanced tradecraft and significant interest in compromising networking devices and their underlying software including through the use of zero-day exploits.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Security context for executives and security teams
G1023: APT5 describes [APT5](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1023) is a China-based espionage actor that has been active since at least 2007 primarily targeting the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense industries throughout the U.S., Europe, and Asia. [APT5](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1023) has displayed advanced tradecraft and significant interest in compromising networking devices and their underlying software including through the use of zero-day exploits.(Citation: NSA APT5 Citrix Threat Hunting December 2022)(Citation:...
Executive priority
G1023: APT5 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G1023: APT5 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G1023: APT5 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
APT5
APT5 is a China-based espionage actor that has been active since at least 2007 primarily targeting the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense industries throughout the U.S., Europe, and Asia. APT5 has displayed advanced tradecraft and significant interest in compromising networking devices and their underlying software including through the use of zero-day exploits.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0057: Tasklist
S0012: PoisonIvy
S1113: RAPIDPULSE
RAPIDPULSE is a web shell that exists as a modification to a legitimate Pulse Secure file that has been used by APT5 since at least 2021.[1]
S1050: PcShare
S0002: Mimikatz
S1104: SLOWPULSE
S1110: SLIGHTPULSE
SLIGHTPULSE is a web shell that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including against Pulse Secure VPNs at US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) entities.[1]
S0007: Skeleton Key
Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password. [1] Functionality similar to Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.
S0039: Net
The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1]
Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user.
S1109: PACEMAKER
S0032: gh0st RAT
S1108: PULSECHECK
PULSECHECK is a web shell written in Perl that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including against Pulse Secure VPNs at US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies.[1]
C0052: SPACEHOP Activity
SPACEHOP Activity is conducted through commercially leased Virtual Private Servers (VPS), otherwise known as provisioned Operational Relay Box (ORB) networks. The network leveraged for SPACEHOP Activity enabled China-nexus cyber threat actors – such as APT5 and Ke3chang – to perform network reconnaissance scanning and vulnerability exploitation. SPACEHOP Activity has historically targeted entities in North America, Europe, and the Middle East.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 3dba587436d1… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | b7a2b39aeb7d… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]NSA APT5 Citrix Threat Hunting December 2022
National Security Agency. (2022, December). APT5: Citrix ADC Threat Hunting Guidance. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]Microsoft East Asia Threats September 2023
Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, September). Digital threats from East Asia increase in breadth and effectiveness. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021
Perez, D. et al. (2021, April 20). Check Your Pulse: Suspected APT Actors Leverage Authentication Bypass Techniques and Pulse Secure Zero-Day. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]Mandiant Pulse Secure Update May 2021
Perez, D. et al. (2021, May 27). Re-Checking Your Pulse: Updates on Chinese APT Actors Compromising Pulse Secure VPN Devices. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [5]FireEye Southeast Asia Threat Landscape March 2015
FireEye. (2015, March). SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN EVOLVING CYBER THREAT LANDSCAPE. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [6]Mandiant Advanced Persistent Threats
Mandiant. (n.d.). Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). Retrieved February 14, 2024.
Open source URL - [7]Secureworks BRONZE FLEETWOOD Profile
Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). BRONZE FLEETWOOD. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [8]BRONZE FLEETWOOD
(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE FLEETWOOD Profile)
- [9]Keyhole Panda
(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE FLEETWOOD Profile)
- [10]MANGANESE
(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)(Citation: NSA APT5 Citrix Threat Hunting December 2022)
- [11]Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023
Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.
Open source URL - [12]Mulberry Typhoon
(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)(Citation: Microsoft East Asia Threats September 2023)
- [13]UNC2630
(Citation: NSA APT5 Citrix Threat Hunting December 2022)
- [14]mitre-attackG1023Open source URL
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