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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0599: Kinsing

Kinsing is Golang-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. [1][2][3]

EnterpriseS0599MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0599: Kinsing describes [Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599) is Golang-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. (Citation: Aqua Kinsing April 2020)(Citation: Sysdig Kinsing November 2020)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)

Executive priority

S0599: Kinsing is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0599: Kinsing by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Containers, Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Cloud control-plane, SaaS audit, and container platform logs
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0599: Kinsing appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Kinsing

Kinsing is Golang-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. [1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

17 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Kinsing has used the find command to search for specific files.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Kinsing has communicated with C2 over HTTP.[1]

EnterpriseT1078Valid Accounts

Kinsing has used valid SSH credentials to access remote hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.004Unix ShellSub-technique

Kinsing has used Unix shell scripts to execute commands in the victim environment.[1]

EnterpriseT1552.004Private KeysSub-technique

Kinsing has searched for private keys.[1]

EnterpriseT1222.002Linux and Mac PermissionsSub-technique

Kinsing has used chmod to modify permissions on key files for use.[1]

EnterpriseT1552.003Shell HistorySub-technique

Kinsing has searched bash_history for credentials.[1]

EnterpriseT1110Brute Force

Kinsing has attempted to brute force hosts over SSH.[1]

EnterpriseT1021.004SSHSub-technique

Kinsing has used SSH for lateral movement.[1]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

Kinsing has used a script to parse files like /etc/hosts and SSH known_hosts to discover remote systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1133External Remote Services

Kinsing was executed in an Ubuntu container deployed via an open Docker daemon API.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.003CronSub-technique

Kinsing has used crontab to download and run shell scripts every minute to ensure persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1609Container Administration Command

Kinsing was executed with an Ubuntu container entry point that runs shell scripts.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Kinsing has downloaded additional lateral movement scripts from C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Kinsing has used ps to list processes.[1]

EnterpriseT1496.001Compute HijackingSub-technique

Kinsing has created and run a Bitcoin cryptocurrency miner.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1610Deploy Container

Kinsing was run through a deployed Ubuntu container.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1078: Valid AccountsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.004: Unix ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1552.004: Private KeysEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1222.002: Linux and Mac PermissionsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1552.003: Shell HistoryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1110: Brute ForceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1021.004: SSHEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1133: External Remote ServicesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.003: CronEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1609: Container Administration CommandEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1496.001: Compute HijackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1610: Deploy ContainerEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
03e6f5f2ada7810a...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle03e6f5f2ada7…
19.11.1Older bundle03e6f5f2ada7…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Aqua Kinsing April 2020

    Singer, G. (2020, April 3). Threat Alert: Kinsing Malware Attacks Targeting Container Environments. Retrieved April 1, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Sysdig Kinsing November 2020

    Huang, K. (2020, November 23). Zoom into Kinsing. Retrieved April 1, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021

    Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0599
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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