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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0046: CozyCar

CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality. [1]

EnterpriseS0046MalwareObject v1.3Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0046: CozyCar describes [CozyCar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0046) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)

Executive priority

S0046: CozyCar is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0046: CozyCar by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0046: CozyCar appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

CozyCar

CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

A module in CozyCar allows arbitrary commands to be executed by invoking C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

A system info module in CozyCar gathers information on the victim host’s configuration.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

CozyCar's main method of communicating with its C2 servers is using HTTP or HTTPS.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique

CozyCar uses Twitter as a backup C2 channel to Twitter accounts specified in its configuration file.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to set itself to be executed at system startup by adding a Registry value under one of the following Registry keys:
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\RunCitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

The main CozyCar dropper checks whether the victim has an anti-virus product installed. If the installed product is on a predetermined list, the dropper will exit.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

The CozyCar dropper copies the system file rundll32.exe to the install location for the malware, then uses the copy of rundll32.exe to load and execute the main CozyCar component.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1003.001LSASS MemorySub-technique

CozyCar has executed Mimikatz to harvest stored credentials from the victim and further victim penetration.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Some versions of CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. If it detects that it is, it will exit.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

The payload of CozyCar is encrypted with simple XOR with a rotating key. The CozyCar configuration file has been encrypted with RC4 keys.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1003.002Security Account ManagerSub-technique

Password stealer and NTLM stealer modules in CozyCar harvest stored credentials from the victim, including credentials used as part of Windows NTLM user authentication.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesSub-technique

The CozyCar dropper has masqueraded a copy of the infected system's rundll32.exe executable that was moved to the malware's install directory and renamed according to a predefined configuration file.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to register itself as a scheduled task.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to register itself as a Windows service.CitationF-Secure CozyDuke

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0016: APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0016: APT29Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1102.002: Bidirectional CommunicationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518.001: Security Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1003.001: LSASS MemoryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497: Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1003.002: Security Account ManagerEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.003: Rename Legitimate UtilitiesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
55a792f95e7a9857...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundle55a792f95e7a…
19.11.3Older bundle55a792f95e7a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    F-Secure The Dukes

    F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0046
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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