T1037: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence.[1][2] Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.
Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.
An adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges.
Security context for executives and security teams
Boot or logon initialization scripts matter because they turn normal startup and sign-in automation into a persistence and possible privilege-escalation path. For leaders, the risk is not just one compromised host: on Windows, macOS, Linux, ESXi, and network devices, trusted boot/logon mechanisms can allow unauthorized code to reappear after reboot or user logon and may run with elevated privileges depending on configuration.
Executive priority
Prioritize this technique where startup and logon automation affects critical servers, virtualization infrastructure, network devices, administrator workstations, or broadly applied enterprise policy. The key business question is whether the organization can prove who is allowed to modify boot/logon scripts, registry locations, startup items, and related directories, and whether changes are monitored well enough to support incident response and compliance evidence.
Technical view
SOC and IR teams should validate coverage across the parent technique and its sub-techniques: Windows local and network logon scripts, macOS login hooks and startup items, and Unix-like RC scripts on Linux, macOS, ESXi, and network devices. ATT&CK does not provide official detection text for T1037, but a related detection strategy, DET0112, exists. Detection engineering should focus on unauthorized creation or modification of startup/logon execution points, suspicious script or binary paths referenced from those locations, and changes made by unexpected users, processes, or management channels. Relationship context also shows use by multiple groups, a campaign, and software, so this should be treated as a persistence control-validation area rather than a niche host artifact.
Likely telemetry
- File creation, modification, ownership, and permission-change events for boot/logon script locations and startup directories
- Windows registry modification events for logon script-related keys where applicable
- Active Directory and Group Policy change records for network logon scripts where applicable
- macOS plist and login/startup configuration changes
- Linux, ESXi, and network device startup script or RC script file-change logs
Detection direction
- Baseline legitimate administrative boot and logon automation before alerting broadly; these mechanisms are commonly used for normal administration.
- Alert on new or changed script paths, unexpected executable references, or permission changes in sensitive startup/logon locations.
- Correlate modification events with the modifying account, source host, management tool, and subsequent boot/logon execution.
- For Windows environments, include both local logon script registry locations and centrally assigned network logon scripts through directory or policy changes.
- For macOS, Linux, ESXi, and network devices, validate that file integrity or configuration monitoring actually covers startup and RC-style locations, not only userland application paths.
Mitigation priorities
- Restrict file and directory permissions on sensitive boot, logon, startup, and RC script locations so only authorized administrators or trusted management processes can modify them.
- Restrict registry permissions on sensitive Windows logon-related keys where applicable.
- Apply least privilege to accounts that can configure local or network logon scripts, startup items, and boot-time execution mechanisms.
- Review broadly applied logon scripts and policy-based startup mechanisms for unnecessary write access or legacy entries.
- Use change control and configuration monitoring so authorized administrative changes can be distinguished from suspicious persistence activity.
Additional notes and limits
This object is a parent ATT&CK technique for persistence and privilege escalation across ESXi, Linux, macOS, network devices, and Windows. The relationship set provides useful scoping through sub-techniques and mitigations M1022 and M1024. ATT&CK also relates the technique to DET0112 and to several groups, software entries, and a campaign; those relationships support defensive prioritization but should not be read as proof of current activity in any specific environment.
Official detection text was not supplied for T1037, so detection guidance is inferred from the technique description, platforms, tactics, sub-techniques, and related mitigation/detection objects. Local script locations, policy mechanisms, logging depth, and normal administrative behavior vary by platform and organization; teams must confirm actual telemetry collection and control ownership before assessing coverage.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence.[1][2] Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.
Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.
An adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1037.004 | RC ScriptsSub-technique | RC Scripts subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1037.001 | Logon Script (Windows)Sub-technique | Logon Script (Windows) subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1037.003 | Network Logon ScriptSub-technique | Network Logon Script subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1037.005 | Startup ItemsSub-technique | Startup Items subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1037.002 | Login HookSub-technique | Login Hook subtechnique of this object. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0096: APT41
APT41 is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, APT41 has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries.[1] Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and Winnti Group.[2][3]
G0016: APT29
APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]
G0106: Rocke
Rocke is an alleged Chinese-speaking adversary whose primary objective appeared to be cryptojacking, or stealing victim system resources for the purposes of mining cryptocurrency. The name Rocke comes from the email address "rocke@live.cn" used to create the wallet which held collected cryptocurrency. Researchers have detected overlaps between Rocke and the Iron Cybercrime Group, though this attribution has not been confirmed.[1]
G1048: UNC3886
UNC3886 is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. UNC3886 has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.[1][2]
S9024: SPAWNCHIMERA
SPAWNCHIMERA is a backdoor that supports command and control and can inject malicious components into native processes.[1][2][3] SPAWNCHIMERA It incorporates capabilities from multiple tools within the SPAWN malware family, including SPAWNANT, SPAWNMOLE, and SPAWNSNAIL.[4][2][3] SPAWNCHIMERA was first reported in April 2024.[2] SPAWNCHIMERA has been observed in activity attributed to People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored threat actors, including UNC5221..[4][5][2][6]
S1078: RotaJakiro
RotaJakiro is a 64-bit Linux backdoor used by APT32. First seen in 2018, it uses a plugin architecture to extend capabilities. RotaJakiro can determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).[1][2]
S1217: VIRTUALPITA
VIRTUALPITA is a passive backdoor with ESXi and Linux vCenter variants capable of command execution, file transfer, and starting and stopping processes. VIRTUALPITA has been in use since at least 2022 including by UNC3886 who leveraged malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) for install on ESXi hypervisors.[1]
C0046: ArcaneDoor
ArcaneDoor is a campaign targeting networking devices from Cisco and other vendors between July 2023 and April 2024, primarily focused on government and critical infrastructure networks. ArcaneDoor is associated with the deployment of the custom backdoors Line Runner and Line Dancer. ArcaneDoor is attributed to a group referred to as UAT4356 or STORM-1849, and is assessed to be a state-sponsored campaign.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 2.4 | Current bundle | bd4dc3366bd2… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]Anomali Rocke March 2019
Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
Open source URL - [3]Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024
Cisco Talos. (2024, April 24). ArcaneDoor - New espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
Open source URL - [4]CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026
DHS/CISA. (2026, February 26). MAR-25993211-r1.v2 Ivanti Connect Secure (RESURGE): AR25-087A. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [5]apt41_mandiant
Mandiant. (n.d.). APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION. Retrieved June 11, 2024.
Open source URL - [6]RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis
Alex Turing, Hui Wang. (2021, April 28). RotaJakiro: A long live secret backdoor with 0 VT detection. Retrieved June 14, 2023.
Open source URL - [7]Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022
Alexander Marvi, Jeremy Koppen, Tufail Ahmed, and Jonathan Lepore. (2022, September 29). Bad VIB(E)s Part One: Investigating Novel Malware Persistence Within ESXi Hypervisors. Retrieved March 26, 2025.
Open source URL - [8]Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day
Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023.
Open source URL - [9]Anomali Rocke March 2019
Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
Open source URL - [10]Anomali Rocke March 2019
Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
Open source URL - [11]Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.
Open source URL - [12]Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.
Open source URL - [13]mitre-attackT1037Open source URL
- [14]mitre-attackT1037Open source URL
- [15]mitre-attackT1037Open source URL
- [16]Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024
Cisco Talos. (2024, April 24). ArcaneDoor - New espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
Open source URL - [17]CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026
DHS/CISA. (2026, February 26). MAR-25993211-r1.v2 Ivanti Connect Secure (RESURGE): AR25-087A. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [18]apt41_mandiant
Mandiant. (n.d.). APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION. Retrieved June 11, 2024.
Open source URL - [19]Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.
Open source URL - [20]Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.
Open source URL - [21]RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis
Alex Turing, Hui Wang. (2021, April 28). RotaJakiro: A long live secret backdoor with 0 VT detection. Retrieved June 14, 2023.
Open source URL - [22]Anomali Rocke March 2019
Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
Open source URL - [23]Anomali Rocke March 2019
Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
Open source URL - [24]Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022
Alexander Marvi, Jeremy Koppen, Tufail Ahmed, and Jonathan Lepore. (2022, September 29). Bad VIB(E)s Part One: Investigating Novel Malware Persistence Within ESXi Hypervisors. Retrieved March 26, 2025.
Open source URL - [25]Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day
Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023.
Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.