T1098.005: Device Registration
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.CitationCISA MFA PrintNightmareCitationDarkReading FireEye SolarWinds In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022
Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device or a virtual machine to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.CitationAADInternals - Device RegistrationCitationAADInternals - Conditional Access BypassCitationMicrosoft DEV-0537CitationExpel Atlas Lion 2025
Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct Internal Spearphishing campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.CitationMicrosoft - Device Registration Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a Service Exhaustion Flood on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.CitationAADInternals - BPRT
Security context for executives and security teams
T1098.005: Device Registration describes Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance. MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain p...
Executive priority
T1098.005: Device Registration is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1098.005: Device Registration by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (persistence, privilege-escalation), supported platforms (Windows, Identity Provider), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1098.005: Device Registration appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Device Registration
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.CitationCISA MFA PrintNightmareCitationDarkReading FireEye SolarWinds In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022
Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device or a virtual machine to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.CitationAADInternals - Device RegistrationCitationAADInternals - Conditional Access BypassCitationMicrosoft DEV-0537CitationExpel Atlas Lion 2025
Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct Internal Spearphishing campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.CitationMicrosoft - Device Registration Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a Service Exhaustion Flood on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.CitationAADInternals - BPRT
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
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