T1037.004: RC Scripts
Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.
Adversaries may establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to rc.local, rc.common, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.[1][2] Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.
Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as ESXi hypervisors, IoT, or embedded systems.[3] As ESXi servers store most system files in memory and therefore discard changes on shutdown, leveraging `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` is one of the few mechanisms for enabling persistence across reboots.[4]
Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of Launchd.[5][6] This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.[7] To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.[8]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1037.004: RC Scripts describes Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify. Adversaries may establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to rc.local , rc.common , and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp...
Executive priority
T1037.004: RC Scripts is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1037.004: RC Scripts by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (persistence, privilege-escalation), supported platforms (macOS, Linux, Network Devices, ESXi), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1037.004: RC Scripts appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
RC Scripts
Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.
Adversaries may establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to rc.local, rc.common, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.[1][2] Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.
Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as ESXi hypervisors, IoT, or embedded systems.[3] As ESXi servers store most system files in memory and therefore discard changes on shutdown, leveraging `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` is one of the few mechanisms for enabling persistence across reboots.[4]
Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of Launchd.[5][6] This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.[7] To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.[8]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1037 | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | This object subtechnique of Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts. |
| Enterprise | T1163 | Rc.common | Rc.common revoked by this object. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1047: Velvet Ant
Velvet Ant is a threat actor operating since at least 2021. Velvet Ant is associated with complex persistence mechanisms, the targeting of network devices and appliances during operations, and the use of zero day exploits.[1][2]
G1048: UNC3886
UNC3886 is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. UNC3886 has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.[1][2]
G0016: APT29
APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]
S0394: HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp is a Linux-based Trojan used to target systems for remote control. It comes in the form of a statically linked ELF binary with stdlibc++.[1]
S9051: The Gentlemen Ransomware
The Gentlemen Ransomware is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). The Gentlemen Ransomware has been written in Go programming language and has utilized Garble to obfuscate its code to target Windows environments. The Gentlemen Ransomware is capable of executing its’ OS lockers in Windows, Linux, NAS, BSD and ESXi environments. The Gentlemen Ransomware was first observed in mid-2025 as a closed ransomware and shortly later emerged as a RaaS to affiliates in September 2025. The Gentlemen Ransomware has been affiliated with the threat group The Gentlemen.[1][2][3][4]
S0690: Green Lambert
Green Lambert is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of Green Lambert may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.[1][2]
S9046: IOControl
IOControl is a malware that targeted Linux ARM-based IoT/OT devices including Hikvision IP cameras, D-Link firewalls and routers, Unitronics PLCs and HMIs, Orpak and Gasboy fuel management systems, and Baicells LTE controllers across the United States and Israel. The malware has been attributed to CyberAv3ngers which is suspected to be affiliated with the Iranian Government Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[1][2][3]
S0687: Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by Sandworm Team since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus. Cyclops Blink is assessed to be a replacement for VPNFilter, a similar platform targeting network devices.[1][2][3]
S0278: iKitten
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 2.2 | Current bundle | d14ed29fc812… | ||
| 19.2 | 2.2 | Older bundle | d14ed29fc812… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.2 | Older bundle | d14ed29fc812… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017
Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019
Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.
Open source URL - [3]intezer-kaiji-malware
Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]Juniper Networks ESXi Backdoor 2022
Asher Langton. (2022, December 9). A Custom Python Backdoor for VMWare ESXi Servers. Retrieved March 26, 2025.
Open source URL - [5]Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd
Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.
Open source URL - [6]Startup Items
Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.
Open source URL - [7]Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
Open source URL - [8]Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc
Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility generator for starting /etc/rc.local and /usr/sbin/halt.local during boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.
- [9]mitre-attackT1037.004Open source URL
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