M1018: User Account Management
User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:
Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege
- Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions.
Implementing Strong Password Policies
- Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks.
Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts
- Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers.
Account Lockout Policies
- Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts.
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts
- Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen.
Restricting Interactive Logins
- Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.
*Tools for Implementation*
Built-in Tools:
- Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.
Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools:
- Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.
Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
User Account Management is a foundational mitigation because many ATT&CK behaviors depend on usable credentials, excessive privilege, dormant accounts, or weak account lifecycle controls. For leaders, the practical question is not whether an identity policy exists, but whether account creation, privilege assignment, password policy, lockout, MFA for high-risk accounts, and deactivation are enforced consistently enough to reduce lateral movement, persistence, cloud access misuse, and administrative abuse.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as an identity governance and resilience control. The relationship context ties this mitigation to Valid Accounts, Remote Services, RDP, SSH, direct cloud VM access, scheduled jobs, software deployment tools, network device CLI use, traffic duplication, and other behaviors where account misuse can become execution, lateral movement, persistence, exfiltration, or stealth. Executives should ask for evidence that privileged and high-risk accounts are known, least privilege is reviewed, dormant and orphaned accounts are removed, MFA is enforced where required, and account lifecycle actions are auditable across enterprise, cloud, and administrative systems.
Technical view
SOC, IAM, cloud, and IR teams should validate the full account lifecycle: creation, modification, privilege changes, authentication, lockout, MFA enrollment/enforcement, interactive logon restrictions, inactivity handling, and deactivation. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection for M1018, detection engineering should be driven by the related techniques: anomalous use of valid accounts, remote service logons such as RDP/SSH/cloud VM connection methods, account names that resemble legitimate accounts, scheduled task/job creation by unexpected users, privileged use of WMI or software deployment tools, network device CLI access, and unauthorized changes to traffic mirroring or sniffing-relevant configurations.
Likely telemetry
- Identity provider and directory audit logs for account creation, modification, disablement, deletion, group membership, and role changes
- Authentication logs including successful and failed logons, lockouts, password changes, password resets, and MFA events
- Privileged account management records, where present, for checkout, session use, approval, and privileged command activity
- Endpoint and server logon records for interactive and remote access, including RDP, SSH, WMI, and administrative sessions
- Cloud IAM and cloud compute access logs for role assignment, console access, API-driven account changes, and direct VM connection activity
Detection direction
- Confirm that account lifecycle and privilege-change events are collected from authoritative identity stores, not only from endpoints.
- Tune for risky account states: dormant accounts becoming active, orphaned accounts, unexpected privilege grants, unusual MFA changes, repeated lockouts, and newly created accounts with names similar to legitimate users.
- Correlate account activity with related ATT&CK behaviors, especially remote services, valid account use, scheduled jobs, cloud VM connections, software deployment tools, and network device administration.
- Separate legitimate administrative activity from risk by using expected owners, approved change windows, source systems, role baselines, and ticket or approval context where available.
- Validate cloud and hybrid identity blind spots, including accounts that exist only in SaaS, IaaS, identity providers, local systems, containers, ESXi, or network devices.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish authoritative ownership for user, service, local, cloud, and privileged accounts before tuning alerts or enforcing exceptions.
- Apply least privilege and recurring access reviews, with priority on administrative, remote access, software deployment, cloud, and network device accounts.
- Enforce strong password, lockout, and reuse controls consistent with organizational policy, while monitoring for operational side effects such as help desk spikes or service disruption.
- Require MFA for administrative and high-risk accounts, and verify enforcement rather than enrollment alone.
- Automate inactivity and orphan-account handling so dormant access is disabled or removed through repeatable workflow.
Analyst notes and limits
This mitigation is broad and identity-centric. Its value is highest when mapped to concrete account populations and administrative paths: domain accounts, local accounts, cloud accounts, remote services, privileged tools, network devices, and scheduling mechanisms. Glexia would use this object as a control-validation anchor for identity governance, SOC detection engineering, cloud security review, incident response readiness, and audit evidence collection.
MITRE provides no official detection text for M1018, and the mitigation object itself does not specify platforms or tactics. Platform and tactic relevance is inferred only from the supplied relationships to techniques. Local architecture, identity sources, logging configuration, retention, and administrative processes are required to determine actual coverage or gaps.
User Account Management
User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:
Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege
- Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions.
Implementing Strong Password Policies
- Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks.
Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts
- Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers.
Account Lockout Policies
- Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts.
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts
- Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen.
Restricting Interactive Logins
- Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.
*Tools for Implementation*
Built-in Tools:
- Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.
Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools:
- Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.
Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1580 | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | Limit permissions to discover cloud infrastructure in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assignments, and conduct periodic entitlement reviews on IAM users, roles and policies. |
| Enterprise | T1677 | Poisoned Pipeline Execution | Ensure that CI/CD pipelines only have permissions they require to complete their operations. Additionally, limit the number of users who have write access to internal repositories to only those necessary. |
| Enterprise | T1078.002 | Domain Accounts Sub-technique | Regularly review and manage domain accounts to ensure that only active, necessary accounts exist. Remove or disable inactive and unnecessary accounts to reduce the risk of adversaries abusing these accounts to gain unauthorized access or move laterally within the network. |
| Enterprise | T1543 | Create or Modify System Process | Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with system-level process changes and service configurations. |
| Enterprise | T1040 | Network Sniffing | In cloud environments, ensure that users are not granted permissions to create or modify traffic mirrors unless this is explicitly required. |
| Enterprise | T1578 | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure | Limit permissions for creating, deleting, and otherwise altering compute components in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assignments, and conduct periodic entitlement reviews on IAM users, roles and policies.CitationMandiant M-Trends 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1072 | Software Deployment Tools | Ensure that any accounts used by third-party providers to access these systems are traceable to the third-party and are not used throughout the network or used by other third-party providers in the same environment. Ensure there are regular reviews of accounts provisioned to these systems to verify continued business need, and ensure there is governance to trace de-provisioning of access that is no longer required. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of account privilege separation. |
| Enterprise | T1021.008 | Direct Cloud VM Connections Sub-technique | Limit which users are allowed to access compute infrastructure via cloud native methods. |
| Enterprise | T1574.010 | Services File Permissions Weakness Sub-technique | Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able. |
| Enterprise | T1213.004 | Customer Relationship Management Software Sub-technique | Enforce the principle of least-privilege. Consider implementing access control mechanisms that include both authentication and authorization. |
| Enterprise | T1578.005 | Modify Cloud Compute Configurations Sub-technique | Limit permissions to request quotas adjustments or modify tenant-level compute setting to only those required. |
| Enterprise | T1685.001 | Disable or Modify Windows Event Log Sub-technique | Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with logging. |
| Enterprise | T1098.004 | SSH Authorized Keys Sub-technique | In cloud environments, ensure that only users who explicitly require the permissions to update instance metadata or configurations can do so. |
| Enterprise | T1619 | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | Restrict granting of permissions related to listing objects in cloud storage to necessary accounts. |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services. |
| Enterprise | T1053 | Scheduled Task/Job | Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. |
| Enterprise | T1556.006 | Multi-Factor Authentication Sub-technique | Ensure that proper policies are implemented to dictate the secure enrollment and deactivation of MFA for user accounts. |
| Enterprise | T1530 | Data from Cloud Storage | Configure user permissions groups and roles for access to cloud storage.CitationMicrosoft Azure Storage Security, 2019 Implement strict Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls to prevent access to storage solutions except for the applications, users, and services that require access.CitationAmazon S3 Security, 2019 Ensure that temporary access tokens are issued rather than permanent credentials, especially when access is being granted to entities outside of the internal security boundary.CitationAmazon AWS Temporary Security Credentials |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | Consider defining and enforcing a naming convention for user accounts to more easily spot generic account names that do not fit the typical schema. |
| Enterprise | T1610 | Deploy Container | Enforce the principle of least privilege by limiting container dashboard access to only the necessary users. When using Kubernetes, avoid giving users wildcard permissions or adding users to the `system:masters` group, and use `RoleBindings` rather than `ClusterRoleBindings` to limit user privileges to specific namespaces.CitationKubernetes RBAC |
| Enterprise | T1197 | BITS Jobs | Consider limiting access to the BITS interface to specific users or groups.CitationSymantec BITS May 2007 |
| Enterprise | T1537 | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | Limit user account and IAM policies to the least privileges required. |
| Enterprise | T1556.009 | Conditional Access Policies Sub-technique | Limit permissions to modify conditional access policies to only those required. |
| Enterprise | T1566.003 | Spearphishing via Service Sub-technique | Enforce strict user account management policies on third-party service accounts to control access and limit privileges. Configure accounts with the minimum permissions necessary to perform their roles and regularly review access levels. This minimizes the risk of adversaries exploiting service accounts to execute spearphishing attacks or gain unauthorized access to sensitive resources. |
| Enterprise | T1546.003 | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Sub-technique | By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. |
| Enterprise | T1547.009 | Shortcut Modification Sub-technique | Limit Privileges for Shortcut Creation: While the SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege is not directly related to .lnk file creation, you should still enforce least privilege principles by limiting user rights to create and modify shortcuts, especially in system-critical locations. This can be done through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create symbolic links. CitationUCF STIG Symbolic Links Regular User Permissions Review: Regularly review and audit user permissions to ensure that only necessary accounts have write access to startup folders and critical system directories. |
| Enterprise | T1578.003 | Delete Cloud Instance Sub-technique | Limit permissions for deleting new instances in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assignments, and conduct periodic entitlement reviews on IAM users, roles and policies.CitationMandiant M-Trends 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. |
| Enterprise | T1686.002 | Network Device Firewall Sub-technique | Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or modifying firewall settings. |
| Enterprise | T1543.004 | Launch Daemon Sub-technique | Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons. |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. |
| Enterprise | T1134.001 | Token Impersonation/Theft Sub-technique | An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique | Apply user account management principles to limit permissions for accounts interacting with email attachments, ensuring that only necessary accounts have the ability to open or execute files. Restricting account privileges reduces the potential impact of malicious attachments by preventing unauthorized execution or spread of malware within the environment. |
| Enterprise | T1609 | Container Administration Command | Enforce authentication and role-based access control on the container service to restrict users to the least privileges required.CitationKubernetes Hardening Guide When using Kubernetes, avoid giving users wildcard permissions or adding users to the `system:masters` group, and use `RoleBindings` rather than `ClusterRoleBindings` to limit user privileges to specific namespaces.CitationKubernetes RBAC |
| Enterprise | T1550.003 | Pass the Ticket Sub-technique | Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. |
| Enterprise | T1654 | Log Enumeration | Limit the ability to access and export sensitive logs to privileged accounts where possible. |
| Enterprise | T1574 | Hijack Execution Flow | Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory |
| Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | Regularly audit user accounts for activity and deactivate or remove any that are no longer needed. |
| Enterprise | T1098.001 | Additional Cloud Credentials Sub-technique | Ensure that low-privileged user accounts do not have permission to add access keys to accounts. In AWS environments, prohibit users from calling the `sts:GetFederationToken` API unless explicitly required.CitationCrowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence |
| Enterprise | T1053.007 | Container Orchestration Job Sub-technique | Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate privilege escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create container orchestration jobs. |
| Enterprise | T1484.001 | Group Policy Modification Sub-technique | Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.CitationWald0 Guide to GPOsCitationMicrosoft WMI FiltersCitationMicrosoft GPO Security Filtering |
| Enterprise | T1547.006 | Kernel Modules and Extensions Sub-technique | Use MDM to disable user's ability to install or approve kernel extensions, and ensure all approved kernel extensions are in alignment with policies specified in |
| Enterprise | T1563.002 | RDP Hijacking Sub-technique | Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. |
| Enterprise | T1098 | Account Manipulation | Ensure that low-privileged user accounts do not have permissions to modify accounts or account-related policies. |
| Enterprise | T1569 | System Services | Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons. |
| Enterprise | T1686 | Disable or Modify System Firewall | Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or modifying firewall settings. |
| Enterprise | T1666 | Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy | Limit permissions to add, delete, or modify resource groups to only those required. |
| Enterprise | T1213.002 | Sharepoint Sub-technique | Enforce the principle of least-privilege. Consider implementing access control mechanisms that include both authentication and authorization. |
| Enterprise | T1543.002 | Systemd Service Sub-technique | Limit user access to system utilities such as `systemctl` to only users who have a legitimate need. |
| Enterprise | T1485.001 | Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion Sub-technique | In cloud environments, limit permissions to modify cloud bucket lifecycle policies (e.g., `PutLifecycleConfiguration` in AWS) to only those accounts that require it. In AWS environments, consider using Service Control policies to limit the use of the `PutBucketLifecycle` API call. |
| Enterprise | T1021 | Remote Services | Limit the accounts that may use remote services. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. |
| Enterprise | T1685.004 | Disable or Modify Linux Audit System Log Sub-technique | An adversary must already have root level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. |
| Enterprise | T1550.002 | Pass the Hash Sub-technique | Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems. |
| Enterprise | T1555.005 | Password Managers Sub-technique | Implement strict user account management policies to prevent unnecessary accounts from accessing sensitive systems. Regularly audit user accounts to identify and disable inactive accounts that may be targeted by attackers to extract credentials or gain unauthorized access. |
| Enterprise | T1484 | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.CitationWald0 Guide to GPOsCitationMicrosoft WMI FiltersCitationMicrosoft GPO Security Filtering |
| Enterprise | T1548 | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Limit the privileges of cloud accounts to assume, create, or impersonate additional roles, policies, and permissions to only those required. Where just-in-time access is enabled, consider requiring manual approval for temporary elevation of privileges. |
| Enterprise | T1078.003 | Local Accounts Sub-technique | Enforce user account management practices for local accounts to limit access and remove inactive or unused accounts. By doing so, you reduce the attack surface available to adversaries and prevent unauthorized access to local systems. |
| Enterprise | T1547.013 | XDG Autostart Entries Sub-technique | Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized privileged users can create and modify XDG autostart entries. |
| Enterprise | T1686.001 | Cloud Firewall Sub-technique | Ensure least privilege principles are applied to Identity and Access Management (IAM) security policies.CitationExpel IO Evil in AWS |
| Enterprise | T1213 | Data from Information Repositories | Enforce the principle of least-privilege. Consider implementing access control mechanisms that include both authentication and authorization. |
| Enterprise | T1675 | ESXi Administration Command | If not required, restrict the permissions of users to perform Guest Operations on ESXi-hosted VMs.CitationBroadcom Virtual Machine Guest Operations Privileges |
| Enterprise | T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol Sub-technique | Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. |
| Enterprise | T1484.002 | Trust Modification Sub-technique | In cloud environments, limit permissions to create new identity providers to only those accounts that require them. In AWS environments, consider using Service Control policies to limit the use of API calls such as `CreateSAMLProvider` or `CreateOpenIDConnectProvider`. |
| Enterprise | T1578.001 | Create Snapshot Sub-technique | Limit permissions for creating snapshots or backups in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assignments, and conduct periodic entitlement reviews on IAM users, roles and policies.CitationMandiant M-Trends 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1606.002 | SAML Tokens Sub-technique | Ensure that user accounts with administrative rights follow best practices, including use of privileged access workstations, Just in Time/Just Enough Administration (JIT/JEA), and strong authentication. Reduce the number of users that are members of highly privileged Directory Roles.CitationMicrosoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance |
| Enterprise | T1134.002 | Create Process with Token Sub-technique | An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task Sub-technique | Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. |
| Enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing Link Sub-technique | Azure AD Administrators apply limitations upon the ability for users to grant consent to unfamiliar or unverified third-party applications. |
| Enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers Sub-technique | Implement strict user account management policies to prevent unnecessary accounts from accessing sensitive systems. Regularly audit user accounts to identify and disable inactive accounts that may be targeted by attackers to extract credentials or gain unauthorized access. |
| Enterprise | T1199 | Trusted Relationship | Properly manage accounts and permissions used by parties in trusted relationships to minimize potential abuse by the party and if the party is compromised by an adversary. In Office 365 environments, partner relationships and roles can be viewed under the “Partner Relationships” page.CitationOffice 365 Partner Relationships |
| Enterprise | T1110.004 | Credential Stuffing Sub-technique | Proactively reset accounts that are known to be part of breached credentials either immediately, or after detecting bruteforce attempts. |
| Enterprise | T1185 | Browser Session Hijacking | Since browser pivoting requires a high integrity process to launch from, restricting user permissions and addressing Privilege Escalation and Bypass User Account Control opportunities can limit the exposure to this technique. |
| Enterprise | T1195 | Supply Chain Compromise | Implement robust user account management practices to limit permissions associated with software execution. Ensure that software runs with the lowest necessary privileges, avoiding the use of root or administrator accounts when possible. By restricting permissions, you can minimize the risk of propagation and unauthorized actions in the event of a supply chain compromise, reducing the attack surface for adversaries to exploit within compromised systems. |
| Enterprise | T1021.004 | SSH Sub-technique | Limit which user accounts are allowed to login via SSH. |
| Enterprise | T1685.002 | Disable or Modify Cloud Log Sub-technique | Configure default account policy to enable logging. Manage policies to ensure only necessary users have permissions to make changes to logging policies. |
| Enterprise | T1134.003 | Make and Impersonate Token Sub-technique | An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. |
| Enterprise | T1489 | Service Stop | Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. |
| Enterprise | T1657 | Financial Theft | Limit access/authority to execute sensitive transactions, and switch to systems and procedures designed to authenticate/approve payments and purchase requests outside of insecure communication lines such as email. |
| Enterprise | T1110 | Brute Force | Proactively reset accounts that are known to be part of breached credentials either immediately, or after detecting bruteforce attempts. |
| Enterprise | T1485 | Data Destruction | In cloud environments, limit permissions to modify cloud bucket lifecycle policies (e.g., `PutLifecycleConfiguration` in AWS) to only those accounts that require it. In AWS environments, consider using Service Control policies to limit the use of the `PutBucketLifecycle` API call. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 0b3ad1f947c8… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack M1018Open source URL
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