T1550.003: Pass the Ticket
Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.
When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by OS Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.[1][2]
A Silver Ticket can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).[1]
A Golden Ticket can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.[3]
Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. Pass the Hash) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.[4]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Pass the Ticket matters because it turns stolen Kerberos authentication material into lateral movement without needing a user’s password. For leaders, the practical risk is that password-centric controls may not stop an intruder who has already obtained valid tickets or ticket-generating material in a Windows Active Directory environment. This makes identity hygiene, credential theft prevention, privileged account control, and Kerberos-focused monitoring central to resilience.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as an Active Directory lateral-movement risk. The key business question is whether a compromised workstation or account could let an adversary reuse Kerberos tickets to reach critical systems, administrative services, or sensitive data. Executives should ask for evidence that privileged accounts are tightly managed, AD configuration is hardened, account lifecycle controls are enforced, and SOC/IR teams can investigate suspicious Kerberos authentication patterns. This technique is especially relevant to audit readiness because coverage depends on proving identity controls and log visibility, not just endpoint tooling.
Technical view
This Windows sub-technique sits under Use Alternate Authentication Material and is associated with lateral movement. ATT&CK describes adversaries using stolen Kerberos service tickets, TGTs, or ticket-generating material obtained through credential dumping, including paths related to Silver Ticket, Golden Ticket, and overpass-the-hash concepts. MITRE does not provide detection text for this object, but the relationship to DET0352 indicates a Windows detection strategy exists. SOC and detection engineering teams should validate whether they collect and correlate Windows endpoint, domain controller, Active Directory, and Kerberos authentication evidence well enough to distinguish normal ticket use from ticket reuse or anomalous access to services.
Likely telemetry
- Domain controller Kerberos authentication and ticket-granting activity logs
- Windows security events from endpoints and servers involved in lateral access
- Active Directory account, group, privilege, and logon policy change records
- Privileged account usage and administrative logon evidence
- Endpoint telemetry related to credential access or OS credential dumping precursors
Detection direction
- Validate the ATT&CK-linked DET0352 detection strategy against local Windows and Active Directory logging coverage before assuming visibility.
- Correlate Kerberos ticket activity with account context, host context, service access, privilege level, and expected user behavior.
- Treat credential dumping alerts as high-value precursors because the ATT&CK description ties PtT to tickets captured through OS Credential Dumping.
- Tune for false positives from legitimate administrative activity, service accounts, and normal Kerberos ticket renewal patterns.
- Look for relationship-driven context: Pass the Ticket may overlap analytically with Valid Accounts, Pass the Hash, Silver Ticket, and Golden Ticket behaviors, so detections should not be isolated to a single event type.
Mitigation priorities
- Start with Active Directory Configuration controls: secure account settings, access policies, and centralized restrictions that reduce unauthorized lateral movement opportunities.
- Strengthen User Account Management by enforcing least privilege, timely deactivation, and clean account lifecycle practices.
- Prioritize Privileged Account Management for administrative and high-impact accounts because ticket abuse inherits the privileges represented by the Kerberos material.
- Maintain strong Password Policies as supporting control, while recognizing that PtT can bypass direct password knowledge once valid Kerberos material is stolen or forged.
- Reduce exposure to credential dumping through hardening and monitoring of Windows endpoints that handle privileged logons.
Analyst notes and limits
ATT&CK relationships list use by APT29, APT32, BRONZE BUTLER, and software including Mimikatz, SeaDuke, and Pupy. These relationships show observed technique relevance but should not be interpreted as evidence that any specific organization is targeted. The former T1097 technique is revoked by this sub-technique, so reporting should use T1550.003. Glexia would treat this as an identity-first lateral movement scenario requiring joint validation by SOC, IAM, AD engineering, and incident response teams.
The supplied ATT&CK object provides no official detection text and only lists Windows as the platform for this sub-technique. Specific event IDs, analytic thresholds, product capabilities, and environmental baselines are not supplied and must be validated locally. Mitigation guidance is limited to related ATT&CK mitigations and should be adapted to the organization’s AD architecture, privilege model, and logging maturity.
Pass the Ticket
Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.
When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by OS Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.[1][2]
A Silver Ticket can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).[1]
A Golden Ticket can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.[3]
Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. Pass the Hash) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.[4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1550 | Use Alternate Authentication Material | This object subtechnique of Use Alternate Authentication Material. |
| Enterprise | T1097 | Pass the Ticket | Pass the Ticket revoked by this object. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0016: APT29
APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]
G0050: APT32
APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]
G0060: BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.[1][2][3]
S0053: SeaDuke
S0002: Mimikatz
S0192: Pupy
Pupy is an open source, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool. [1] It is written in Python and can be generated as a payload in several different ways (Windows exe, Python file, PowerShell oneliner/file, Linux elf, APK, Rubber Ducky, etc.). [1] Pupy is publicly available on GitHub. [1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 6008242c93c0… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks
Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.
Open source URL -
[2]
GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket
Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
Open source URL -
[3]
Campbell 2014
Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL -
[4]
Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
Open source URL -
[5]
mitre-attack T1550.003Open source URL
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